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Abstract 
This is an empirical study of relations between derivatives markets and their underlying 
asset or commodity markets. The dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay analyzes 
the impact of option trading on stock price efficiency around the expirations of IPO lockup 
agreements. It is well documented that IPO stock prices decline around lockup expirations, 
without reversals. Investors can exploit these price declines either by short selling in the 
underlying stock market or by establishing synthetic short positions in the option markets prior to 
the lockup expiration date. If the existence of option trading relaxes short sale constraints then 
the prices of optionable stocks should decline earlier (relative to the lockup expiration) than the 
prices of non-optionable stocks. I find that the prices of optionable IPO stocks experience 
significant price declines prior to the lockup expirations, while the prices of non-optionable 
stocks start to decline at and after the expiration dates. In addition, the cumulative (abnormal) 
order imbalances in the option markets are negative during the ten-day event window prior to the 
lockup expirations and even more negative when it is difficult to sell short in the underlying 
stock markets. These results provide direct evidence that derivatives trading helps make the 
underlying stock market more efficient.   
The second essay addresses a recent heated debate among academics, practitioners, and 
regulators about whether financial institutions’ trades and holdings have had important impacts 
on commodity prices and their return dynamics.  This paper uses a novel dataset of Commodity-
Linked Notes (CLNs) to examine the impact of the flows of financial investors on commodity 
futures prices.  Investor flows into and out of CLNs are passed to and withdrawn from the futures 
markets via issuers’ trades to hedge their CLN liabilities.  The flows are not based on 
information about futures price movements, but nonetheless cause increases and decreases in 
commodity futures prices when they are passed through to and withdrawn from the futures 
markets.  These finding are consistent with the hypothesis that non-information based financial 
investments have important impacts on commodity prices. 
The third essay investigates one mechanism by which derivatives markets affect the 
prices of their underlying stocks. Issuers of structured equity products (SEPs) based on common 
stocks hedge their liabilities by trading in the underlying common stocks. In the sample used in 
this paper, these trades raise the prices of the underlying stocks by an average of almost 100 
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basis points on the pricing dates of the SEPs. This is direct evidence that derivatives’ hedging 
has important impacts on the prices of even very large and liquid stocks. The price impact is 
mostly, but not fully, reversed on the subsequent trading day. In addition, these results provide 
new estimates of the price impact of trading volume for large-capitalization U.S. common stocks.  
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Chapter 1  
Does Option Trading Make Underlying Stock Prices More Efficient? 
Evidence from IPO Lockup Expirations 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent regulatory policy changes put a lot of effort into restricting derivatives trading, leading to 
research works analyzing the consequent impact on the market function. Before evaluating these 
policies, it is critical to first understand the role of derivatives trading in the financial markets. 
There is a long-standing literature showing that option trading can contribute to price discovery 
of the underlying stocks (see, for example, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Pan and 
Poteshman (2006)), and an important follow-up question is whether option trading can make the 
underlying stock markets more efficient since the role of options in price discovery does not 
necessarily make the stock price more efficient. But so far there is limited direct evidence. 
Mainly responsible for this could be the lack of a good experimental setting. I investigate this 
question by focusing on a special eventthe expirations of IPO lockup provisions. It is well-
documented that IPO stocks experience significantly negative abnormal returns without reversals 
around the lockup expiration dates1 (see, for example, Field and Hanka (2001)), and theoretical 
studies predict this price declines with the existence of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales 
constraints during lockup periods2. Given this well-known fact of negative returns around lockup 
expiration dates, sophisticated investors can either short the IPO stocks or use the option markets 
to establish synthetic short positions prior to the lockup expiration dates. The goal of this paper is 
to examine how the availability of tradable options impacts the underlying stock price 
adjustment process around the lockup expiration dates, rather than, to solve the puzzle of the 
price declines documented in the literature. 
                                                 
1 Lockup expirations are widely discussed in the financial press. For example, it has been reported that ZYNGA 
suffered an 8% loss on the first 165-day lockup expiration date. The Wall Street Journal, the NASDAQ website, 
Edgar-Online.com, and others regularly publish upcoming lockup expiration dates within one week or one month to 
alert investors of the coming additional supply of tradable shares. 
2  Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) argue that during IPO lockup period, the heterogeneity of investors’ 
expectations may be highest, and the difficulty of locating shares during the IPO lockup periods may initially elevate 
the prices, which are expected to decline upon lockup expirations. Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) focus on 
the relation between asset float and speculative bubbles during lockup period, implying the prices decline upon 
lockup expirations. 
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The IPO lockup expiration event provides an excellent setting to study whether the 
existence of option trading improves the price efficiency of the market for the underlying stocks 
because these events provide a set of fixed dates on which it is public known that the float and 
lendable shares to short sellers are increased and stock prices will likely decline. If the 
availability of option trading makes the underlying stock prices more efficient through relaxing 
the short sale constraints3, one would expect that optionable IPO stocks experience the price 
declines well before the lockup expiration dates, while the non-optionable IPO stocks would not 
experience significant price declines prior to the expiration dates but “catch up” afterward. If 
option trades cause the stock price declines prior to the lockup expiration dates then one would 
also expect to find negative (abnormal) option order imbalances and a strong relation between 
these order imbalances and stocks’ abnormal returns prior to the lockup expiration dates. 
Moreover, one would expect option trading to have a more important role in explaining the 
stocks’ returns prior to lockup expirations when short selling the underlying equity market are 
more expensive. 
To test these hypotheses, I first compare the return pattern of the optionable IPO stocks 
with that of the otherwise similar stocks without listed options around the lockup expirations. 
The results show that optionable IPO stocks experience negative abnormal returns starting from 
ten days before the lockup expiration dates while stocks without listed options experience 
negative returns starting almost exactly on the lockup expiration dates. The difference in the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) between optionable stocks and non-optionable stocks during 
the ten-day event window prior to lockup expiration is large, 299 basis points, and statistically 
significant. Following the lockup expirations this difference gradually decreases. These findings 
are compelling evidence that the existence of option trading helps make the underlying stock 
markets more efficient. 
                                                 
3  Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) mention four reasons why “ordinary” investors face high short selling cost 
compared to option market makers: (i) Investors do not generally receive the proceeds of a short sale. (ii) Option 
market makers are not subject to the “uptick” rule. (iii) If the securities are not widely held, the search cost of 
locating a willing lender may be substantial. (iv) Short squeezes can force premature liquidation on the short seller 
resulting in a loss that cannot be recoupled unless replacement shares can be borrowed before the price falls as 
expected. In addition, before September 2008, option market makers are exempt from the requirement of locating 
shares to borrow before short sales (Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed, 2009).  
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The fact that optionable stock prices incorporate this public information of negative 
returns through option trading during a short time period prior to the unlock dates seems to 
contradict the “Efficient Market Hypothesis”. However, close investigations show that limits to 
arbitrage and illiquidity of option markets at early stage may impede the incorporation of public 
information right after the option listing. There has been an increasing theoretical works and 
empirical evidence suggesting that the riskless arbitrage and unconstrained arbitrage capital 
assumptions in “Efficient Market Hypothesis” are unlikely to apply in practice (see, for example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Lou, Yan, and Zhang (2013)). For example, arbitrage can be risky 
with the presence of noise traders. This is plausible during the lockup period since the price 
decline around expiration dates is well documented, but there is still uncertainty arising from 
noise traders since the degree of different opinions is high during lockup period (Duffie, 
Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2002). Risk-averse short sellers may find it more profitable to trade later 
than earlier. The Sharpe Ratios of shorting strategies using options from actual trade transactions 
support this hypothesis. In addition, the rare liquidity of option markets immediately after option 
listing may be another factor contributing to the delayed investor reaction. The option volume for 
the underlying IPO stocks at 10 days prior to lockup expirations is about 10 times as large as that 
within one month after option introduction, providing evidence of the illiquidity of option 
markets at early stage4. 
I conduct three additional analyses to mitigate concerns that there might be other 
explanations for my main findings. First, one possible alternative explanation for the delayed 
price decline of the non-optionable stocks is that these stocks have less outside investor attention 
than optionable stocks. I address this by using trading volume as a proxy for investor attention.  
Specifically, I compare the returns of the optionable stocks to those of a sample of non-
optionable stocks with trading volumes that are greater than those of the optionable stocks, and 
find that the pattern of the price declines is similar to the main result. Besides, only 14% of the 
sample has reported insider sales on or right after the lockup expirations, but the magnitude of 
price declines around the expiration dates for the optionable and non-optionable stocks are 
almost identical. The fact that the prices of non-optionable stocks decline on the lockup 
expiration date without insider sales suggests that non-optionable stocks do not lack outside 
                                                 
4 Mayhew and Mihov (2005) also documents that the option volume is rare immediately after the option listing. 
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investor attention. Second, the prices of the optionable stocks may decline early relative to the 
actual expiration dates because of an early release of the lockup agreement. In order to rule out 
this alternative possibility, I use the insider trades before the lockup expiration as a proxy for 
early release sales5. The main results do not change after excluding the sample with early release 
sales. Last, I present evidence that my results are not induced by firm news such as earnings 
announcements prior to the lockup expiration. Specifically, the difference in earnings surprises 
between the optionable stocks and non-optionable stocks is insignificant, which is inconsistent 
with the information explanation for the timing of the price declines.  
The analysis on the net order imbalance in option market shows that option order 
imbalances are more negative during the event window than other times. This is generally 
consistent with the hypothesis that investors use options to trade on the fact of price declines 
prior to the lockup expirations. A regression analysis is further conducted to investigate the 
relation between these net order imbalances of options and stocks’ returns, and find that the price 
impact of option order flow is larger than the price impact of stock order flow during the ten-day 
event window prior to lockup expirations and also larger than the price impact of option order 
flow during other times. 
I also test the hypothesis that option trading can ameliorate short sale constraints in the 
underlying stock market. By using the equity loan fee, relative institutional ownership, and 
residual institutional ownership (Nagel, 2005) as proxies for the difficulty of short selling, I show 
that there are more (abnormal) bearish positions in the option markets when it is difficult to short 
sell the underlying equity. Also, the option net order flow is more closely related to the stocks’ 
returns for stocks that are difficult to short than for those are easy to sell short. These findings 
further support the idea that options can relax short sale constraints during the ten-day event 
window prior to the lockup expirations.  
These results are of interest for three reasons. First, using the IPO lockup expirations can 
avoid the reverse causality concern documented in the option listing literature about the impact 
of the existence of options on their underlying stocks. Some researchers (see, for example, 
Figlewski and Webb (1993), Danielsen and Sorescu (2001)) use the introduction of options as an 
                                                 
5 Brav and Gompers (2003) explain details about this measure. 
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instrument to test whether option trading relaxes short sale constraints. But Mayhew and Milhov 
(2005) point out that these tests may reveal some effect which is already underway before the 
option listing, leading to a reverse causality issue. This paper is not subject to such concern 
because there is no obvious reason to believe that the exchanges list options for IPO stocks due 
to a short-term underperformance around the IPO lockup expirations.  Moreover, I draw 
conclusions from the timing of the price decline around the lockup expiration date, not the fact of 
the price decline. Even if the possibility of future price declines creates investor interest in 
options and influences the exchanges’ options listing decisions, it seems extremely unlikely that 
the option listing decision is based on the timing of the price decline relative to the lockup 
expiration date. 
Second, I provide direct evidence that option trading serves to make the underlying stock 
prices more efficient, particularly in advance of the well-known fact of negative returns. One 
difference between this paper and most previous literature in this strand is the measure of the 
channel through which the option trading activity impacts the underlying stock market. I use a 
direct measure, the hedging trades executed by the option market makers, that is, delta-
equivalent order imbalance in option markets, rather than the put-call ratio (Pan and Poteshman, 
2006), the O/S ratio (Roll, Swartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2010), or the total order imbalance 
(Chan, Chung, and Fong, 2002; Cao, Chen, and Griffin, 2005). Measuring option trading activity 
by the delta-equivalent order imbalance is important, because the hedging activity of option 
market makers might be the principal channel through which the net order flow in the option 
markets passes to the stock market (Hu, 2013). Specifically, when there are net call sale orders or 
put purchase orders from the investors in the option markets, option market makers will take the 
opposite side and hedge by selling the underlying stocks. Thus, the bearish position in the option 
markets is transformed to short positions in the underlying stock market through option market 
makers’ delta-hedging. In addition, the analysis here controls for the pure stock order imbalance, 
that is, stock net order flow excluding those induced by option positions. This allows me to 
isolate the impact of option market order flows from the impact of the stock market order flows 
and avoid double counting. 
Finally, this paper is among the first to use the Open-Close data of three options 
exchanges (ISE, NASDAQ, and PHLX) to infer the delta-adjusted order flow. Most of the 
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previous literature studying the impact of option trading on the stock market uses the Berkeley 
Options database (Chan, Chung, and Fong, 2002; Cao, Chen, and Griffin, 2005) or the OPRA 
data (Vijh, 1990; Hu, 2012; Sinha and Dong, 2012), to compute the net order flow through an 
(adjusted) Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm. In contrast, knowing the opening or closing information 
for the trades can improve the estimates of informed trades in option markets6.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the 
background and related literature. Section 1.3 develops the hypotheses, and Section 1.4 describes 
the data used in this paper. Section 1.5 shows the main results, followed by three additional 
analyses addressing possible alternative explanations. Section 1.6 analyzes the relation between 
option trading and short sale constraints. Section 1.7 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Background and Related Literature 
1.2.1 Background 
This section illustrates important details of IPO lockup expirations related to my research 
question. IPO lockup provision is a contract between the underwriter and the issuer, prohibiting 
the insiders to sell their holdings without the permission of underwriters before a pre-determined 
date, usually 180 days after the IPO. The main purpose for the lockup provision is to mitigate the 
moral hazard problem among insiders (Brav and Gompers, 2003). Most lockup agreements 
prohibit the insiders7 from, directly or indirectly, selling, offering, contracting to sell, making any 
short sale, pledging or otherwise disposing of any shares of Common Stock or any securities 
convertible into or exercisable for or any rights to purchase or acquire Common Stock during the 
lockup period (Bartlett, 1995). In other words, the lockup expiration date is supposed to be the 
first day when insiders are able to sell their holdings, thus the floats and lendable shares to short 
sellers are increased. 
It is important to know that this agreement is not mandated by SEC and the underwriter 
can release the securities subject to this agreement at any time without notice. If the underwriters 
“break” the lockup, the insiders can sell their shares prior to the expiration dates. Brav and 
                                                 
6 The previous literature mentions that the closing trades may be less informative (Pan and Poteshman, 2006) since 
informed traders should happen to hold options in order to trade their information by closing their positions. 
7 Insiders include employees, their friends and family, and venture capitalists, defined by SEC. 
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Gompers (2003) document that early release sales are used extensively in their sample period, 
but the released shares are relative small. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, it is well documented that the stock prices 
decrease significantly around the lockup expiration dates without reversals. Given that the 
expiration dates are pre-specified and publicly known, this fact cast doubt about the efficiency of 
the financial market prior to the unlock days, and further motivates me to study the role of option 
trading in improving the efficiency of the underlying stock market. 
1.2.2 Theoretical Studies 
Two branches of the theoretical literature examine the question of whether information is 
incorporated into asset prices through option markets. Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) 
develop a multimarket sequential trading model to incorporate both stocks and options. They 
find that under certain conditions including high fraction of informed investors, large leverage in 
options, or low liquidity in the stock market, the informed traders are indifferent between trading 
in the stock market and trading in the option markets. Such investors employ mixed trading 
strategies in equilibrium so that the price discovery of the underlying stock occurs in both 
markets. Johnson and So (2012) add an exogenous short selling cost to the multimarket model. 
One difference in their model from Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) is that they assume a 
continuous signal space, which leads to an equilibrium of pure strategy instead of mixed strategy. 
They predict that informed investors are more likely to use options to trade on bad information 
than good. Both papers study whether option trades convey private information about the 
underlying stock, which is a key difference from my research setting. The fact that negative 
returns occur around the lockup expirations in this paper is public knowledge, but the stock 
market exhibits frictions prior to the lockup expirations.  
1.2.3 Empirical Studies 
This paper is mainly related to three strands of the empirical literature. First, whether price 
discovery occurs in the option markets has been extensively studied, but the empirical evidence 
is mixed8. On one hand, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) find asymmetry between the 
negative- and positive-position effects, that is, the negative-option position has a stronger impact. 
                                                 
8 Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013) provide a thorough literature review. 
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They interpret this as evidence that options are more attractive venues for investors trading on 
bad news than good. In addition, Pan and Poteshman (2006) find that stocks with high put-call 
ratios underperform those with low put-call ratios on the next day using new opening positions. 
On the other hand, Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) integrate both analysis of option trades and 
quotes, and find that new information is revealed through quote revisions instead of trades in the 
option market. Recently, Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013) conclude that information is 
revealed through stocks’ quotes revision rather than options’ using high-frequency data. In this 
study, I address the issue of whether option trading can improve the price efficiency for the 
underlying stock by relaxing the short sale constraints, rather than the predictive power of option 
trading on the stocks’ future returns or the “lead-lag” problem addressed in the previous studies. 
Several authors find that options help make markets informationally efficient.  Kumar, 
Sarin, and Shastri (1998) find that option listing improves the market quality through decreasing 
the variance of the pricing error and the adverse selection component of the spread, and 
increasing some liquidity measures. The price efficiency in this paper is neither measured from 
the perspective of market microstructure nor model dependent, but focuses on the price 
adjustment speed to the equilibrium level after the locked shares are released. In a more closely 
related paper, Jennings and Starks (1986) focus on the price adjustment during the first hour after 
the release of quarterly earnings, and find that the optionable stock prices adjust more quickly.  
This paper also relates to the literature on the effect of option trading on short selling 
activity in the underlying equity market. Early literatures address this issue by studying the 
impact of option introduction on short selling activity 9  and find that short interest and 
information efficiency of the underlying stocks increase after the option introduction (Figlewski 
and Webb, 1993; Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001). However, Mayhew and Mihov (2005) point out 
that these tests are subject to endogeneity problems and they show that the newly-listed options 
have very low volume and the signed volume is more bullish than bearish right after the 
introduction of options.  
Some other researchers use the 2008 short sale ban as an instrument to check whether 
option trading relaxes short sale constraints. They find either no evidence (Grundy, Lim, and 
                                                 
9 Mayhew and Mihov (2005) provide a literature review of the old works. 
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Verwijmeren, 2012; Battalio and Schultz, 2011), or that it takes time for puts or CDS to get the 
information incorporated in the stock price (Ni and Pan, 2012). The 2008 short sale ban is unique 
because even the option market makers came under strict regulation10. Specifically, regulators 
require that market makers “could not short if they knew a customer or counterparty was 
increasing an economic net short position in the shares of that stock” (Battalio and Schultz, 
2011), and the exemption that option market makers do not need to locate shares prior to 
transactions has been eliminated. Thus, it is not surprising that they find the options redundant 
during this time period. 
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) indirectly show that short sale constraints are 
still important, even in the presence of listed options, but this result may be subject to the non-
synchronous data problems (Battalio and Schultz, 2006). Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2009) 
point out that when the borrowing cost is too high, the relation between shorting cost and option 
trading may become significantly weak. They show evidence that option market makers can 
choose to fail to deliver the shares when they are hard to borrow, and that this occurs frequently 
in their sample which includes the years 1998 to 1999. 
Recent research (Hu, 2012; Johnson and So, 2012; Sinha and Dong, 2012) instead shows 
that the predictive power of the O/S ratios, or option signed orders on the future stock returns 
become more significant for the hard-to-borrow stocks compared to other stocks. These results 
support the view that informed traders choose to use options more frequently when the shorting 
cost is high, to the extent that they are accurate and robust.  
Finally, this paper is also related to the IPO lockup expiration literature. Field and Hanka 
(2001) and Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi (2001), document that stock prices decrease 
significantly without reversals around the lockup expiration dates. Although they find that the 
fraction of locked-up shares is significant in explaining the price drop, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis of a downward-sloping demand curve, the stock price declines cannot be fully 
explained by this. For Internet stocks, Ofek and Richardson (2003) argue that the price drop 
upon lockup expiration is due to short sale constraints and investor heterogeneity. Their 
argument is consistent with Miller (1977) in that short sale constraints prevent investors with 
                                                 
10 Battalio and Schultz (2011) describe the timeline of the 2008 ban in details.  
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negative beliefs from short selling and further lead to optimistically biased stock prices during 
the lockup period. When the lockup agreement expires, the supply of the shares increases and the 
short sale constraints loosen, leading to declines in stock prices. The focus of this paper is not to 
investigate the reasoning for abnormal returns around the event dates; rather, it focuses on the 
extent to which option trading causes the optionable stock price to behave differently from non-
optionable stocks around the lockup expiration dates. 
Two other related papers work on the shorting activity of IPO stocks. Edwards and 
Hanley (2010) focus on the short selling during aftermarket trading of IPOs, and find that short 
selling occurs on the offer day despite the possible short sale constraints and quickly approaches 
an “equilibrium” level on the fifth trading day. They also find that the short selling profits during 
the first three months are rarely greater than zero, even before considering the lending fees. 
Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) document that the shorting cost is trivial around the IPO lockup 
expiration. But these two papers use either the initial offering period for IPOs between 2005 and 
2006, or a short-term and special period data from1998 to 1999. In contrast, this paper covers 
most IPOs from 1996 to 2012 and I find that the equity loan fee is particularly high during the 
ten days before the lockup expiration dates and drops after the expirations. 
1.3 Hypotheses  
The goal of this paper is to provide direct evidence that option trading can improve the price 
efficiency of the underlying stocks prior to the lockup expiration. In this section, I develop three 
testable hypotheses to address this question. 
Option markets provide an alternative trading venue for investors to trade based on their 
information or beliefs. Textbooks list several advantages of option trading compared to trading 
the underlying stocks 11 . Also, a few theoretical and empirical papers predict and present 
evidence that rationale agents trade their information, particularly negative information, in the 
option markets (Black, 1975; Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998). This paper focuses on the 
publicly known fact about negative returns around IPO lockup expiration. It is well documented 
that the IPO stocks’ prices drop by 1.5% on average without reversals around the lockup 
expiration. Hence, with tradable options, rational investors have an extra trading venue to profit 
                                                 
11 Cox and Robinstein (1987) have listed nine benefits of option trading. 
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from this knowledge by purchasing puts or selling calls before the lockup expiration to trade 
these negative returns. These bearish positions further contribute to the net order flows in the 
underlying stock market and impact the underlying stocks’ prices through option market makers’ 
delta-hedging trades. Conversely, for those stocks without any tradable options, investors may 
not be able to trade on the negative belief due to short sale constraints. This leads to the first and 
main hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Optionable stocks’ prices should drop earlier prior to the lockup expiration 
than non-optionable stocks’ prices.  
Even if the optionable stock’s price declines early, it is still possible that the price 
discovery occurs in the stock market for these stocks. It may be easier for investors to understand 
the equity instrument than options. Options may also have higher proportional transaction costs 
and less liquidity than stocks. Thus, direct evidence for the importance of option trading requires 
a further investigation on the direction of the option net order flow and the relation between these 
option order imbalance and the contemporaneous stock returns, leads to my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Assuming the option market makers execute instant delta-hedging trades, 
the option order imbalance should be more negative during the event window than other times. 
In addition, these option order imbalances should be more closely related with contemporaneous 
stock returns after controlling for the pure stock order imbalance during the ten-day event 
window prior to unlock days than other times. 
One important function of the option markets is that it provides an alternative venue for 
short sellers (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Figlewski and Webb, 1993; Senchack and Starks, 
1993). On one hand, it is well known that during the lockup period, insiders agree not to sell 
their shares, resulting in a limited number of shares tradable in the market and high borrowing 
cost for the underlying stocks. On the other hand, option market makers have low short selling 
costs compared to ordinary investors in the stock market. Thus, investors who want to exploit the 
negative returns around the lockup expirations may choose to trade options rather than stocks 
before the unlock days to circumvent high shorting costs, thereby raising bearish positions in the 
option markets. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: The option order imbalance is more bearish for stocks that are more 
difficult to sell short, and the option order imbalance should be more closely related with the 
stocks’ returns for stocks that are difficult to sell short than those are easy to.  
1.4 Data 
To test the hypotheses developed in the Section 1.3, it requires three main datasets including the 
price and trading information for the IPO stocks and the associated options, and the short sale 
data. 
1.4.1 IPO Stocks Dataset 
I construct the dataset for the IPO stocks combining the SDC Platinum, CRSP data, and TAQ 
data. The IPO data are extracted from SDC Platinum and missing data are filled in using the 
Edgar database of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This dataset includes the issuing 
date, lockup expiration date, offering price, venture backed condition, and locked-up shares. The 
stocks’ daily return, share code, and shares outstanding came from the CRSP dataset, and the 
stock intraday data came from TAQ dataset. Stocks with (1) offer price less than $5, (2) data 
indicating that no shares are subject to lockup, or indexes, units, ADRs, REITs, closed end funds, 
ETFs and foreign firms are excluded from the sample. There are a total of 2,671 IPOs lockup 
expiration events from 199612 to June of 2012 in the sample.  
Using OptionMetrics and Option Clearing Corporation (OCC) listing information13, I 
identify the IPO stocks with tradable options before the lockup expiration. Among the full 
sample, 354 stocks have options listed at least 45 days prior to the lockup expiration dates14. 
Figure 1.1 shows the frequency of option listing for these IPO stocks. More than half of the 
optionable stocks have options listed within one month after the IPO. Table 1.1 presents the 
                                                 
12 OptionMetrics data starts from year of 1996. 
13 I use the first trade date in OptionMetrics as the option’s listing date. Errors are corrected using OCC listing 
information. 
14 Option exchanges have established guidelines for selecting an underlying stock for option exchange transactions. 
During my sample period, the listing requirements include: (1) public float should be at least 7 million shares; (2) 
number of shareholders should be at least 2 thousands; (3) trading volume should be at least 2.4 million during the 
last 12 months; and, (4) stock price should be $7.5 per share or higher for the majority business days during the 3 
calendar months prior to listing. A close analysis of the IPO stocks during my sample period reveals that 1662 
stocks are eligible for option listing at least 45 days prior to the lockup expiration days, but only 21% of them 
actually have the tradable options.  
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summary statistics by year. The trends in IPOs follow closely with the economy cycle. On 
average, about 57% of the shares are not tradable during the lockup period and 43% are venture 
backed.  
The control sample is constructed by selecting a non-optionable stock for each optionable 
stock through matching on lockup share ratios, venture backed condition 15 , industry 
classification16, market capitalization and trading volume, because these firm characteristics are 
potentially important determinants of stock returns around lockup expirations. To accomplish 
this match, I first match the venture backed condition and industry classification. Then I restrict 
the difference in the fraction of locked-up shares and the market value between the treatment and 
control observations to be less than 40%. If there are multiple control stocks, I keep the one with 
the smallest sum of squared percentage difference in market capitalization and volume. No 
control stock is used twice.  Finally, the primary sample consists of 265 IPO stocks that have 
traded options and a matching sample of 265 similar stocks without listed options prior to lockup 
expiration. Table 1.2 summarizes the distribution of market capitalization and locked-up shares 
for optionable and comparable non-optionable stocks. As expected, the market capitalization and 
the fraction of locked-up shares for optionable and non-optionable stocks are almost the same.  
1.4.2 Option Dataset 
Three options datasets are used in this paper – Open-Close data, OptionMetrics and options 
intraday trade data. There are currently ten option exchanges according to OCC: the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Boston Options Exchange (BOX), the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), the International Securities Exchange (ISE), NASDAQ, the New York Stock 
Exchange ARCA (NYSE), the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), the Better Trading System 
(BATS), NOBO Exchange, C2 Options Exchange. The Open-Close data is provided by three 
exchanges, that is, ISE, NASDAQ, and PHLX, which have about 27.43%, 5%, and 16.92% of 
the total volume respectively (Hu, 2012).  The ISE data is available from May of 2005 and the 
other two datasets are available from January of 2009. I assume that these three exchanges which 
account for more than 40% of the total volume are representative for the whole option market. 
                                                 
15 Gao (2011) shows that insiders sell aggressively in IPOs with venture backing. 
16 Here, I use the Fama-French five industry classification. 
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This assumption is reasonable since Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2004) document that the 
option market became a national system since 2002.  
Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson and Poteshman (2007) and Pan and Poteshman (2006) describe 
the Open-Close data. There are four types of investors:  firm proprietary traders, public 
customers of full-service brokers, public customers of discount brokers, and other public 
customers. And for each type of investor, the volume data is grouped into opening new positions 
or closing existing positions, and also into buying positions or selling positions. These data are 
now publicly available. I construct the non-market maker’s net new opening positions for each 
option contract, that is, open-to-buy volume minus open-to-sell volume. Then, using the delta 
from OptionMetrics 17 , I compute the delta-adjusted option volume for each stock-day 
observation following the methodology of Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007). 
Another important dataset in this paper is the intraday options data, which are exploited 
to address the endogeneity problem arising due to “feedback trading” in daily data and to derive 
the net order imbalance across all options markets. This dataset18 is provided by Trade Alert 
LLC, a specialized option market data vendor. This dataset contains the trades19 for all equity 
options from option exchanges participating in OPRA plan. Seven exchanges, AMEX, BOX, 
CBOE, ISE, NASDAQ, NYSE, and PHLX joined this plan before February 2010, and BATS 
joined the plan after then.  
The intraday options trade data records include the date, time stamp (to the second), 
option symbol, exchange indicator, and trade price. The direction of the trades is assigned using 
the quote rule20. As reported by Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013), about 80% of the 
option trades occur at the best bid or ask, so the quote rule is a reasonable way to infer the trade 
direction. Tests using the Open-Close and intraday options databases are restricted to years from 
2005 to June of 2012. 
                                                 
17 For missing values, I use Black-Scholes model combined with an estimate of historical volatility to derive the 
delta. 
18 See Battalio and Schultz (2006), Battalio and Schultz (2011), and Hu (2012) for a more detailed discussion of the 
characteristics of this trades data. 
19 Only large trades are available before 2008 in this dataset. 
20 The tick test is also used for the trades occur at the middle of the bid-ask spread, and the result does not change. 
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1.4.3 Short Selling Data 
The equity lending data is provided by Markit (formerly “Data Explorers”) who aggregates 
information on institutional lending from several market participants including hedge funds, 
investment banks, and prime brokers21. This dataset contains daily lending data on loan fees22, 
available loan supply and loan outstanding since July 2006. The institutional ownership, 
extracted from Thomson Reuters Database, is also used to measure the short sale constraints. 
1.5 Main Results  
I begin this section with an analysis of the timing of price decline for IPO stocks with tradable 
options and for the control stocks without listed options prior to the lockup expirations. Although 
crude, comparison of the price declines for optionable with the price declines for non-optionable 
stocks is one of the few ways to generate some insights as to the impact of option trading on the 
underlying stock markets. The analysis next considers and dismisses three alternative 
explanations for the main findings. Finally, using both Open-Close data and intraday options 
data, I calculate the actual option order imbalances during the event window and run several 
daily and intraday multivariate regressions to investigate the impact of the option order 
imbalance on the stocks’ contemporaneous returns controlling for the pure stock order 
imbalances.  
1.5.1 Comparison of Mean Differences between Optionable and Non-Optionable Stocks 
Given that lockup expiration dates and the significant price declines around these dates are well-
known knowledge, rational investors are likely to trade on this fact about negative returns in the 
option markets by purchasing puts or selling calls. Ultimately, these bearish positions will be 
finally conveyed to the underlying stock market by option market makers’ delta hedging. Thus, 
the optionable stocks should experience price declines earlier, and further they should incur more 
negative returns than the non-optionable stocks before the lockup expiration dates. In order to 
test this hypothesis, I construct a control sample of stocks without tradable options.  
                                                 
21 D’Avolio (2002), and Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002)’s lending data are from a large lender, while my data is 
based on a collection of multiple lenders. Johnson and So (2012) use the same data source as mine, but their data 
frequency is monthly instead of daily. 
22 Loan fees equals to federal fund rate minus the rebate rates if there is any positive rebate. 
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I use the ten days prior to the expiration as the event window, and thirty days before this 
time period as the benchmark window. The lockup expiration date is denoted as day 0, so the 
event window is days [-10, -1] relative to day 0 and the benchmark window is days [-40, -11] 
relative to day 0. Hypothesis 1 predicts that, the CAR during days [-10, -1] is more negative for 
optionable stocks than for non-optionable stocks.  
Figure 1.2 plots the CARs for the two sub-samples and Table 1.3 reports the CARs and 
the mean differences in CARs between the treatment and control sample23. The optionable stocks 
start to drop 10 days before the expiration dates and have significantly negative CAR during 
days [-10, -1] on average. In contrast, the non-optionable stocks’ prices start to decline on day -4 
before the lockup expiration dates and the average CARs during days [-10, -1] is small and 
insignificant. Column 5 and Column 6 in Table 1.3 report the Wald test for the difference of the 
CARs between the two sub-samples. On the day immediately before the expiration, that is, day -
1, the difference is large, -2.99%, and significantly negative. In addition, the magnitude of the 
average point estimate of the CAR difference on day -1 is the largest through the time period [-
10, +10]. This difference gradually vanishes after the expiration and becomes insignificant on 
day +2, implying that the prices for both sub-samples decline to their equilibrium level after the 
lockup period respectively. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that option trading 
facilitates the incorporate of information into the stock prices prior to the unlock days, and 
further make the price of the optionable stock more efficient than the price of the non-optionable 
stock.  
The fact that public information gets incorporated in the stock price through option 
trading during 10 day prior to the lockup expirations seems to violate the “Efficient Market 
Hypothesis”, which predicts that the information should be reflected as soon as the option is 
listed.  Two potential factors impede the immediate price adjustments. First, limits to arbitrage 
may lead to under-reaction to the public information. Two critical assumptions under “Efficient 
Market Hypothesis” are that arbitrage is riskless and arbitrageurs are capital unconstrained. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) points out that these assumptions are unlikely to apply in practice 
and the price anomaly may persist due to limits of arbitrage. A bunch of empirical works provide 
                                                 
23 In untabulated results, I find a similar timing pattern after considering the equity loan fee using a subsample when 
the loan fee data is available (i.e. between July 2006 and June 2012).  
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evidence of the existence of limits to arbitrage (for example, Mou (2011), Lou, Yan, and Zhang 
(2013)). During the lockup period, insiders are not allowed to sell, and the heterogeneity of 
investors’ expectations may be highest (Duffie, Garleanu, and Petersen, 2002). The arbitrageurs 
may face the risk of noise trading (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, they may find it more 
profitable to trade later than earlier. The Sharpe Ratios of shorting strategies using options during 
the lockup period provide evidence to support this hypothesis. I form three trading strategies by 
writing call options without dividend payments prior to the lockup expirations: (1) forming on 
the option listing dates, (2) forming in one month after the option listing dates, and (3) forming 
on 10 days prior to unlock dates. Assuming the investors trade on fact of price declines upon 
lockup expirations, call options expiring beyond 10 days after unlock dates are excluded. Panel 
A in Table 1.4 shows that, on average, the Sharpe Ratios of “Strategy 3” are almost always larger 
than those for the other two strategies using the actual option trades data, except for the two ITM 
groups. The call option returns may be skewed and the Shape Ratios reported here may 
oversimplify risk. To address this point, I also report in Panel B, the Sharpe Ratios for trading 
strategies of writing calls and purchasing puts simultaneously. Considering that put options may 
be exercised early, these Sharpe Ratios provide a lower bound of the investment performance. 
The results further show that “Strategy 3” has the largest Sharpe Ratios among the proposed 
trading strategies, except for the ATM group. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that limits to arbitrage contributes to the delayed revelation of public information in option 
markets. 
Another reason is that option market is illiquid immediately after introduction. Table 1.5 
summarizes the option trading volume for both calls and puts during three time periods: on the 
option listing dates, one month after option listing, and 10 days prior to the lockup expiration 
dates. The total trading volume on 10 days prior to unlock days is more than 10 times as large as 
that within one month after option listing dates. These results, to some extent, are consistent with 
the hypothesis that investors trade aggressively in option markets during a short time period prior 
to the expiration dates. This view is also confirmed by evidence in Section 1.5.4 that the net 
order flow in options market is more negative during the ten-day event window than the 
benchmark window prior to the event window.  
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1.5.2 Conditional Mean Differences in the Matched Samples 
As mentioned above, matching procedures are imperfect methodologies for constructing control 
samples. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest controlling for differences between treatment 
and control samples by estimating regressions that include as covariates the variables used in 
matching the samples. Following this approach, I employ a vector of control variables X 
consisting of the variables used in the matching procedure (venture backed condition, industry, 
percentage locked shares, market value and average trading volume during event window) and 
additional relevant variables including daily percentage spread, Amihud (2002) Illiquidity 
measure, volatility during first 30 days after IPO, and Book-to-Market ratio. The regression 
model is as follows: 
                          CARs = a0 + a1OPTs + a2Xs + εs                                                (1) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠  is the cumulative abnormal return for stock 𝑠  during the event window, 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑠is an option listing dummy that takes the value 1 for optionable stocks, and 𝑋𝑠 is a vector of 
control variables. The estimates of the coefficients 𝑎1  are estimates of the mean differences 
between the treatment and control sample, that is, they are estimates of the effect of existence of 
options on the stock price changes around the lockup expirations, conditional on matching 
variables and other relevant factors. If the option trading makes the underlying stock price more 
efficient then I expect 𝑎1 < 0 for days [-10, -1] and 𝑎1 > 0 for days [0, +10] relative to unlock 
days, implying that the optionable stock prices decline early prior to unlock days and non-
optionable stocks “catch up” on and after unlock days.  
Table 1.6 presents the point estimates for the coefficient of the option dummy 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑠. The 
dependent variables in Panel A and Panel B are 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 during days [-10, -1] and days [0, +10] 
relative to unlock days respectively. Both coefficients are significant and the signs are opposite. 
Conditional on the controlling variables, the price declines for optionable stocks are 310 basis 
points larger than the price declines for non-optionable stocks prior to lockup expirations. 
Subsequently, the non-optionable stocks decrease more, and almost “catch up” with the 
optionable stocks during ten days after the lockup expirations. Together, these regression results 
strengthen the main findings in the previous section that the availability of tradable options 
allows the underlying stock prices to decline to equilibrium level more quickly compared with 
the non-optionable stock prices. 
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1.5.3 Alternative Explanations 
In this section, I will conduct three analyses to mitigate the concern that there might be other 
explanations for my findings above. The different timing of the stocks’ price declines for these 
two sub-samples may be due to investor attention, early release sales, or fundamental 
information, rather than the availability of the tradable options. I first investigate outside investor 
attention for the treatment and control samples. Then, I consider whether the findings result from 
early release sales for the IPO stocks by comparing the ten-day CARs prior to the lockup 
expirations for the optionable and matched non-optionable stocks without early release sales. I 
next analyze firm news such as earnings surprises prior to the lockup expiration dates. 
1.5.3.1 Outside Investor Attention 
An alternative explanation for the delayed price adjustment for the non-optionable stocks is that 
these stocks have less outside investor attention than optionable stocks. I conduct two analyses to 
address this concern. 
First, following Jennings and Starks (1986), I repeat matching procedure while restricting 
a proxy for investor attention, volume, to be larger for control firms than for treatment firms. 
Trading volume has been strongly suggested as proxy for investor attention in empirical studies 
(Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000; Barber and Odean, 2008; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2009; et al.). 
This procedure results in 243 matched pairs. As shown in Table 1.7, the results are similar to the 
main findings. The CARs become largest on one day prior to lockup expirations and gradually 
decrease then after. Second, if outside investors pay less attention to non-optionable stocks, we 
should expect the price declines for non-optionable stocks are mainly due to insider sales. 
However, for non-optionable (optionable) stocks in my sample, only 14% (20%) 24  of the 
observations are associated with insider sales on and right after the unlock dates. While, as the 
main results show, the stock prices for non-optionable stocks start to decline from day -4 and 
“catch up” with the optionable stocks by day +10. This indicates that the outside investor 
attention for non-optionable stocks is not limited. Thus, my main findings cannot be explained 
by different outsider investor attention for treatment and control samples. 
                                                 
24 This is consist with the finding in Field and Hanka (2001) which document that only 58 out of 344 IPOs have 
reported insider sales around the unlock dates. 
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1.5.3.2 Early Release of the Lockup Agreement 
In this section I investigate whether early equity sales by insiders may lead to early price declines 
for IPO stocks. Brav and Gompers (2003) document that early release sales are used extensively 
in their sample period (from 1988 to 1999), although the released shares are relatively small, 
about 5% of the locked-up shares on average. They argue that early release sales may be a signal 
of less moral hazard and asymmetric information in the IPO firms. If this is true, the market 
quality for these stocks may be better than other stocks without early release sales. Also, the 
locked-up shares that are released prior to lockup expirations make the short selling less 
expensive. Thus, the different return patterns between optionable stocks and non-optionable 
stocks found in Table 1.3 may be contaminated by the effect from early release sales. In order to 
disentangle the impact of early release sales from the impact of outsiders’ trading, and to control 
for the variation in market quality, I use the insiders’ trades prior to the lockup expirations as a 
measure of early release25 and repeat the main test excluding these observations. 
Following Brav and Gompers (2003), I extract the insiders’ transactions from individual 
reports mandated by the SEC. To do so, I collect data from Form 3 “Initial Statement of 
Beneficial Ownership of Securities” and Form 4 “Changes in Beneficial Ownership of 
Securities”. Early release sales exclude the early sales associated with employee benefit plan, 
derivative transactions, Section 16 (b) transactions and other trades that are clearly unrelated 
with the early release. The sample of insider sales consists of 4539 events by 815 IPO lockups.  
Summary statistics show that in my sample period, early release is also used extensively 
since 30.5% of the IPOs have early sales by the insiders. However, the size of these early sales is 
quite small and the average (median) sales relative to the locked-up shares are only 2% (0.3%). 
Excluding these IPOs with early release of the lockup agreement, Table 1.8 presents the 
comparison results of the CARs. The return patterns of the two sub-samples are similar to Table 
1.3. The difference of cumulative abnormal returns becomes largest on day -1, that is, one day 
prior to the expiration dates and it is significant at 10% level. After the lockup expiration dates, 
the deviation gradually narrows and become insignificant on day 0. These results are consistent 
                                                 
25 As mentioned in Brav and Gompers (2003), this measure does not include “the sales by low-level employees, 
shares distribution by venture capital partnerships, or effective share sales via hedging techniques such as forwards, 
puts, collars, or borrowing against shares”. 
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with my main findings in Section 1.5 and are consistent with the view that the availability of 
tradable options makes the underlying stock prices more efficient than those without tradable 
options. 
1.5.3.3 Firm News prior to the Lockup Expirations 
To eliminate the possibility that the stocks’ return patterns are explained by news, I analyze the 
earnings announcements around lockup expirations. Specifically, if the optionable stocks happen 
to have bad news and non-optionable stocks have good news prior to the lockup expirations, then 
such different news contents may lead to the different timing. I measure firm news prior to the 
lockup expiration using the earnings surprise if there is any during that time period. Earnings 
surprise is defined as the firms’ actual EPS minus the analyst consensus EPS forecast 
immediately prior to the announcement, scaled by the beginning of quarterly stock price. 
I extract the earnings announcement data from I/B/E/S. The results show that the IPO 
stocks in my sample rarely have earnings announcements (EA) during the 40-trading days prior 
to the lockup expirations. Specifically, only 30% of the optionable stocks have EA during days [-
40, -1] and among these announcements, about 20 % of the announcements occurs during days [-
10, -1]. For non-optionable stocks, the results are similar, that is, 32% of the sample have EA 
during days [-40, -1] and 25% of the announcements are during days [-10, -1]. Table 1.9 reports 
the earnings surprise for optionable stocks and non-optionables prior to the unlock days. The 
average earnings surprise for optionable stocks is positive, inconsistent with the argument that 
optionable stocks have bad news prior to the lockup expiration. Further, the difference in average 
earnings surprise between optionable stocks and non-optionable stocks is insignificant. All of 
these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the different timing of the stock price decline 
in Table 1.3 are not driven by firm news, at least the information content released by the earnings 
announcements.  
1.5.4 Net Order Flow in Option markets  
In this section, I provide supporting evidence that option trading contributes to early price drop 
for the optionable stocks by studying the direction of the option net order flow during the event 
window prior to the lockup expirations. I expect that there should be more bearish positions 
during the event window than other times, such as days [-40, -11]. In order to test this 
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hypothesis, I report the (abnormal) order imbalances and cumulative (abnormal) order 
imbalances in option markets during the ten-day event window in Table 1.10.  
For each stock on each event day, the net order flow is derived by aggregating the delta-
adjusted volumes through all option series which are obtained from the intraday options data, as 
in formula (2). This net order flow considers all trades in the database, including both opening 
and closing positions. The abnormal net order flow is calculated using the average net order flow 
over the previous 30 trading days as a benchmark, that is, from -40 day to -11 day relative the 
expiration day 0. All of the order flows are normalized by the shares outstanding. 
In Table 1.10, the net order imbalances in the option markets are consistently negative 
during the ten-day event window prior to lockup expirations, on average, ranging from -0.09 
basis points to -0.94 basis points of the shares outstanding. The cumulative net order flows 
during days [-10, -1] is significantly negative, about -4.8 basis points of the shares outstanding. 
The cumulative abnormal net order flows during days [-10, -1] is also negative, and the 
magnitude is even larger, about -5.5 basis points of the shares outstanding26. By comparison, 
these levels are not trivial since Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson and Poteshman (2007) report that the 
daily net opening volume is positive, on average, 0.009 basis points for firm proprietary traders 
or full-service customers and 0.026 basis points for discount customers respectively, using the 
option data from CBOE. They find similar result for the closing volume. Hu (2012) derives the 
daily net volume of -0.016 basis points using all firms in the intraday options dataset. By 
comparison, my finding shows that the net volume during the ten-day event window is lower and 
negative, which contrasts the generally prevailing option market conditions. 
In addition, my result shows that during the event window prior to lockup expiration, the 
option market is dominated by short positions. This is different from the period after the option 
introduction during which Mayhew and Mihov (2005) have documented that there are more bull 
positions than bearish positions. More importantly, the abnormal order imbalances are negative 
throughout the ten-day event window. In other words, the net order imbalances in option markets 
                                                 
26 Since September 2008, the exemption that option market makers do not need to locate shares before transactions 
has been eliminated. This may result in an increasing short selling cost faced by option market makers. However, by 
repeating the analysis in Table 1.8 using a sub-sample after September 2008, I find that the sign of the cumulative 
(abnormal) net order flows during days [-10, -1] is negative, and the magnitude is still large, about -3.7 (-4.2) basis 
points of the shares outstanding. This confirms that after this change in short selling regulation, investors still use 
options to trade on their bearish belief around the IPO lockup expirations. 
23 
 
before the lockup expirations are more negative than other times. This implies that rational 
investors trade on their negative belief using options during the period prior to unlock days, thus 
leading to an increase in the bearish option order flows.  
1.5.5 Daily Stock Returns and Option Order Imbalance  
Even though I have shown that the optionable stocks’ price drop early compared to the non-
optionable stocks, it is still possible that the price discovery occurs in the underlying stock 
market, leading to the different timing of price declines. In order to examine this possibility, I 
run a multivariate regression, to analyze the impact of the option order imbalance on the stocks’ 
contemporaneous returns after controlling for the pure stock order imbalance during the event 
window and other times.  
1.5.5.1 Empirical Strategy 
I use the following cross-sectional regression model to investigate the price impact of the option 
order imbalance: 
𝐴𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛱 ∗ 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡                         (2) 
𝐴𝑅𝑠,𝑡 is the abnormal return for stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡, with the CRSP value-weighted index
27 
as benchmark. 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1  are the controlling variables including lagged stock abnormal returns, 
lagged order flows in options and stock market, which control for inventory effects and 
momentum. 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 are the net order flows in option and stock market respectively, 
which are defined as follows. To ensure the variables are comparable across firms, all order 
flows are normalized by the total number of shares outstanding.  
The definition of option order imbalance follows Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and 
Poteshman (2007)28 using the delta-adjusted volumes: 
𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 = ∑
100×|∆𝑠,𝑡
𝑗
|×𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡
𝑗
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑟
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝑗=1                      (3) 
                                                 
27 I also use the NASDAQ value-weighted index as the benchmark and get a similar result. 
28 They also use the measure of delta-adjusted open interest, which is not available in my dataset. 
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𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡
𝑗   denotes the signed trading volume of 𝑗th call or put for the underlying 
stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡. For intraday options data, the value is positive if the trade is initiated by the 
buyer and negative if the trade is initiated by the seller. For Open-Close data, it is positive if the 
trade is opening (closing) to buy and negative if the trade is opening (closing) to sell. Let 𝑁𝑠,𝑡 be 
the number of call or put contracts on stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡,  𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑟  be the total number of shares 
outstanding for stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡, and ∆𝑠,𝑡
𝑗
 be the delta of call or put contracts on stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡. 
This measure converts the option volume into an equivalent number of shares of the underlying 
stocks. I use both the Open-Close data, which covers three exchanges, and intraday options trade 
data, which covers the almost all option markets, but does not contain opening or closing 
information, to calculate this measure. The implied volatility, delta, and interest rate zero curves 
are extracted from the OptionMetrics database. Missing deltas are computed using the Black-
Scholes model and the historical volatility of stock returns for the previous 30 trading days. 
The stock order imbalance is derived from the widely used adjusted Lee-Ready (1991) 
algorithm on the TAQ data. The pure stock order imbalance is defined as the total stock order 
imbalance minus the stock order imbalance which are induced by option trades, OOIs,t :  
𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 = ∑
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡
𝑗
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑟
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝑗=1 − 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡                       (4) 
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠,𝑡
𝑗
 means the signed trading volume of the 𝑗th trade for stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡. 
Again, it is positive if the trade is buyer-initiated and negative if seller-initiated. This measure is 
different from the extant literature which use the total stock order flow as a controlling variable 
(Chan, Chung, and Fong, 2002; Cao, Chen, and Griffin, 2005). 
1.5.5.2 Empirical Results 
Table 1.11 presents the regression results for model (2). The first two columns are based on the 
intraday options data which covers all of the options exchanges, but without any information of 
identifying the opening or closing positions. The results show that during the event window, that 
is, days [-10, -1], the option order imbalance is significantly and positively related with the 
contemporaneous stocks’ returns after controlling for the pure stock order flow. Specifically, one 
unit change in option order imbalance leads to 35 basis point (0.033%×10.611) change in 
abnormal stock returns. More important, the magnitude of the point estimate is almost 5 times as 
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large as the estimate for the pure stock order imbalance. In contrast, during other times, that is, 
days [-40, -11], the point estimate of the coefficient before the option order imbalance is much 
smaller than that for the event window. And, one unit change in option order imbalance only 
leads to 11 basis point (0.032%×3.360) change in abnormal stock returns. These results imply 
that the option net order flow is much more closely related with the stocks’ contemporaneous 
returns during the event window than other times, consistent with the second hypothesis. This 
further supports the results in the previous section that the option trading plays an important role 
in improving the price efficiency for the underlying stocks prior to the lockup expirations after 
controlling for the pure stock order imbalance. 
The next two columns of Table 1.11 use only the opening positions from the Open-Close 
data which covers three option exchanges, ISE, NASDAQ, and PHLX29. I repeat the regression 
using the opening positions which are deemed to be informative (Pan and Poteshman, 2006). 
Taking account for the fact that the trading volume from these three exchanges may represent 
more than 40% of the whole market, the point estimate for the coefficient before the option order 
imbalance may be even greater than that for the pure stock order imbalance. These results are 
basically consistent with the results based on the intraday options transaction data, and I will use 
the intraday options transaction data for the following sections to reflect the trading activity in 
the whole option markets. 
A potential concern about the regression results in Table 1.11 is that they may be subject 
to an endogeneity problem. The presumption in this test is that the causation runs from order 
flow to prices. As the microstructure literature points out, this causality may be confounded by 
the feedback trading during a lengthy period, for instance, daily interval in Table 1.11. There are 
two ways to mitigate this concern. First, the focus of the previous analysis is the comparison of 
the relative price impact of option order imbalance to pure stock order imbalance between other 
“normal” times and the event windows. There may be an endogeneity problem for both time 
periods, but it is less likely that the influence of this problem varies over time and across 
markets. In this sense, the endogeneity issue does not affect my interpretation of the results in 
                                                 
29 I also run the regression using the sample after 2009, from when the Open-Close data in NASDAQ, PHLX, and 
ISE are all available. The results still hold. 
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Table 1.11.  The second way is to investigate the results in the intraday level, which will be 
explained in details in the next section. 
1.5.6 Intraday Stock Returns and Option Net Order Flow 
To address the potential endogeneity problem in Table 1.11, I repeat the same analysis using a 
short time interval, for example, half an hour or fifteen minutes. The right hand side variable is 
defined as the log stock returns based on the midpoints of NBBO prices during the specified time 
interval. On the left-hand side, I add one more control variable, the percentage bid-ask spread 
from Hu (2012).  
Table 1.12 reports the regression results from the intraday analysis. In the first two 
columns which are based on half-hour intervals, the relative price impact of option order 
imbalance to pure stock order imbalance during the ten-day event window is four times as large 
as the relative price impact during other “normal” times. The results are similar for the 15-minute 
intervals. All of the findings are consistent with those in Table 1.11 and resolve the endogeneity 
issue to some extent. This again supports the hypothesis that option order imbalance plays a 
more important role than pure stock order imbalance in the price discovery of the underlying 
stocks well before the lockup expirations. 
1.6 Option Trading and Short Sale Constraints  
The analysis presented in this section test whether option trading can relax the short sale 
constraints as lockup expiration approaches. I first report the option net order flow for short-sale 
constrained stocks and non-constrained stocks, respectively, and compare the differences. The 
net order flows conditional on the short sale constraints provide direct evidence that rational 
investors choose to use options when the short selling is expensive. I expect more negative 
option order imbalance for stocks with heavier short sale constraints. Next, I run a daily 
multivariate regression to analyze the influence of short sale constraints on the relation between 
the option order imbalance and stocks’ contemporaneous returns. If options are attractive to 
rational investors when the short selling is expensive, I should expect that option order 
imbalance to be more closely related to the stocks’ returns when it is hard to sell short than when 
it is easy to do that.  
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1.6.1 Measure of Short Sale Constraints 
Three measures are adopted for the short sale constraints. The first one is shorting cost or 
transacted loan fee provided by Markit. Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) explain the details about 
this measure. Specifically, I use the weighted-average loan fee as a proxy for the short selling 
cost. The loan fee is defined as the federal fund rate minus the rebate rates if there is any positive 
rebate. The second measure is often used in previous literature, institutional ownership (hereafter 
referred to as INST), which is the sum of stock holdings of all reporting institutions for a firm 
and quarter in the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database. Low levels of INST 
correspond to high short selling costs since stock loans tend to be scarce and, hence, short selling 
is expensive when INST is low. The third one is the residual institutional ownership (hereafter 
referred to as RI), following Nagel (2005). I define RI as the percentage of shares held by 
institutions for firm 𝑖  in the nearest previous quarter, adjusted for size in cross-sectional 
regressions. 𝑅𝐼𝑖 is the residual 𝜀𝑖 from the following cross-sectional regression model: 
                           logit(INSTi)  =  log (
INSTi
1−INSTi
) = α +  β1SIZEi +  β2 (SIZEi
2) + εi                      (5) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the quarterly institutional holdings for firm 𝑖 , normalized by the shares 
outstanding. Again, low level of 𝑅𝐼𝑖 corresponds to high short-sale cost. I match the INST and RI 
in the nearest previous quarter relative to the unlock days to each firm. 
1.6.2 Option Order Imbalance and Short Sale Constraints 
If option markets circumvent short sale constraints as lockup expiration approaches, one may 
expect option net order flow to be more negative for stocks that are difficult to sell short than 
those that are easy to sell short. During the lockup period, the insiders agree not to trade the 
shares they own, so the tradable shares in the market are limited, which further leads to a limited 
borrowable shares and high borrowing cost in the equity lending market. In addition, close to the 
end of the lockup period, the desire to sell short may increase due to the well-known negative 
returns around the expiration dates. If the rational investors trade these negative returns in the 
option markets to circumvent high shorting cost, I expect that the option order imbalance should 
be more bearish for stocks with heavier short sale constraints.  
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Table 1.13 compares the option net order flows between the sub-samples with low levels 
of proxies for short sale constraints and high levels of proxies for short sale constraints. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, the net order flows are almost always negative for more 
constrained stocks during the ten-day event window prior to the lockup expirations through three 
panels. The less constrained stocks rarely have negative abnormal order imbalances in the option 
markets during the same period. In addition, the cumulative abnormal order imbalances during 
days [-10, -1] in the option markets for the more constrained stocks are significantly negative 
using the loan fee and relative institutional ownership to measure the short sale constraints, and 
the point estimates on average are -0.01% and -0.05% of shares outstanding respectively. 
Together, these results support the idea that prior to lockup expirations rational investors use 
option markets more frequently when the short selling cost is high, implying that option trading 
can relax short sale constraints. 
1.6.3 Price Impact of Option Trading and Short Sale Constraints 
To examine whether option trading can relax short sale constraints, I pool the observations 
during the ten-day event window and run the cross-sectional regression using model (6):  
𝐴𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛱 ∗ 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠,𝑡 
+𝛿 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡                         (6) 
    Specials,t is a dummy variable that equals to one when the stocks are difficult to sell short and 
zero otherwise. The focus of this analysis is the coefficient for the interaction item between 
option order imbalance and short sale constraints. I expect the estimate for this coefficient to be 
positive and statistically significant. 
Table 1.14 reports the regression results. Column (1) is based on the measure of the loan 
fee. Consistent with the third hypothesis in Section 1.3, when the loan fee is high, that is, the 
stocks are difficult to sell short, the price impact from option order imbalance is significantly 
positive, and more positive than when the fee is low. For the other two measures, which are 
available quarterly, I match the holdings in the closest previous quarter to my data and obtain 
similar results. The coefficient before the interaction item is always significantly positive, 
implying that the price impact of option trading on the underlying stocks is greater for short-sale 
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constrained stock than for unconstrained stocks. During the event window option trading plays a 
more important role in improving price discovery when short sale cost is high. 
1.7 Conclusion 
There is little direct evidence in the literature showing that option trading activity plays an 
important role in making stock markets more efficient. Although it is impossible to have 
perfectly complete markets, the existence of options makes it easier for some investors having 
negative views to place synthetic short positions. Such option positions are ultimately 
transmitted to the underlying stock market through option market makers’ delta hedging, and 
impact the underlying stock prices. 
 In this paper, I examine the effect of option trading on the price efficiency of the 
underlying stocks before a well-known fact of negative returns around the IPO lockup 
expirations. I first compare the stocks’ return patterns between optionable stocks and matched 
non-optionable stocks, and find that optionable stocks’ prices decline at least ten days prior to the 
expiration dates and non-optionable stocks’ prices decline around the expirations. In a cross-
sectional regression, I find that after controlling for the pure stock order imbalances, option net 
order flows are more closely related to the stocks’ contemporaneous returns during the event 
window than during other “normal” times. More importantly, I find that the option cumulative 
(abnormal) order imbalances are constantly negative during the ten-day event window. This 
implies that although there may be increasing hedging cost during the period before the lockup 
expiration, rational investors still choose options to trade their belief of negative returns.  
 I also test the link between the role of option trading in the price efficiency of the 
underlying stock and the short sale constraints in the equity lending market. Using a pooled 
regression, I find that option net order flow has more price impact on the underlying stocks that 
are difficult to sell short than those are easy to sell short. Also, the option cumulative (abnormal) 
order imbalances during the ten-day event window are more negative for stocks with high level 
of short sale constraints than those with low level of constraints. 
Additional analyses show that the differential timing of stock price declines between 
treatment and control firms during the event window are not due to investor attention, early 
release of the lockup agreement, or firm news. Only a small subset of my sample has reported 
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insider sales on and right after lockup expirations, indicating that non-optionbale stocks are not 
subject to limited outside investor attention. In addition, a restricted matching using a proxy for 
investor attention does not affect my main findings. Interestingly, the IPO firms in my sample 
use early release sales extensively, but the released shares are quite small. After excluding these 
observations with early release sales, the main result still holds. 
My findings have implications that option trading does improve the price efficiency of 
the underlying stocks under some conditions, for example, short sale constraints. From the 
market designers’ perspective, some investors use stocks to trade their information or belief, 
while others may use the options as extra venues to trade on their belief in advance of negative 
returns. From the IPO firms’ perspective, the early price declines for optionable stocks may 
conflict with the original purpose of lockup provisions, so my findings caution the managers 
about the impact from option trading. 
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1.8 Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1: Option Listings for IPO Stocks 
The frequency of options listing for the IPO stocks after the initial issuing dates through the lockup 
expiration dates. The sample period is from 1996 to 2012. The sample consists of 354 IPO stocks having 
tradable options prior to the lockup expirations during the sample period. Option listing dates are 
identified by first record dates in the OptionMetrics database, and corrected for any error using Option 
Clearing Corporation (OCC) listing information. The days on the horizontal axis are the days relative to 
the IPO dates. 
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Figure 1.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around IPO Lockup Expirations 
This figure presents the average CARs for the optionable IPO stocks and for the matched non-
optionable stocks during the twenty-day period around the IPO Lockup Expiration. There are 
265 optionable stocks and 265 non-optionable stocks. The matching procedure considers the 
following dimensions: (1) Same Fama-French 5 industry-code; (2) Same Venture-backed 
condition; (3) Close locked-up shares %; (4) Close trading volume; (5) The smallest distance in 
years; (6)An upper bound of 20% in market capitalization (in year 1996). The days on the 
horizontal axis are the days relative to the lockup expirations dates, that is, day zero is the lockup 
expiration day. 
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
This table describes the sample used in the main analysis. There are 2671 IPO lockup expiration 
events during the sample period from 1996 to June of 2012. The Columns present the number of 
lockup expirations, average lockup period, average locked-up shares, percentage of optionable 
stocks, and percentage of stocks that are venture backed, by year. 
 
Year 
Num. of 
Lockup 
Expiration 
Lockup 
Days 
Shares 
Lockup 
Optionable 
Stocks 
Venture 
Backed 
1996 483 207 46.80% 2.10% 48.40% 
1997 386 210 52.60% 1.30% 37.00% 
1998 303 215 60.30% 2.60% 28.70% 
1999 156 212 63.10% 9.00% 38.50% 
2000 219 190 62.80% 11.00% 57.10% 
2001 95 183 66.90% 11.60% 60.00% 
2002 60 188 63.70% 44.10% 44.10% 
2003 27 193 62.60% 10.70% 32.10% 
2004 131 174 58.70% 11.50% 55.00% 
2005 176 169 49.90% 28.00% 39.40% 
2006 180 186 52.60% 20.00% 38.30% 
2007 163 199 59.30% 21.50% 39.30% 
2008 90 206 65.20% 21.10% 48.90% 
2009 10 180 36.00% 80.00% 80.00% 
2010 73 179 59.40% 52.10% 31.50% 
2011 89 180 69.40% 48.90% 38.60% 
June-2012 30 174 74.40% 60.00% 46.67% 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Optionable and Matching Non-Optionable Stocks on 
IPO Lockup Expiration Dates 
This table describes the matched sample and matching procedure. The sample consists of 265 
optionable stocks and 265 non-optionable stocks. Matches require same venture-backed 
condition, same industry classification and close percentage of locked-up shares (i.e. the 
deviation in percentage of locked-up shares is less than 40%), and the match then minimizes the 
sum of squared percentage difference in market capitalization and squared percentage difference 
in volume, restricting an upper bound of 25% for each square.   
 
  Mean Median 
Market Value ($ millions) 
 
  
   Option 1110 863 
   Nonoption 912 752 
Locked Shares (%) 
 
  
   Option 59.5 68.5 
   Nonoption 61.9 69.7 
Volume (thousands) 
 
  
   Option 313 236 
   Nonoption 267 195 
Spread (%) 
 
  
   Option 0.65 0.24 
   Nonoption 0.84 0.39 
Analysts Coverage   
   Option 5 4 
   Nonoption 4 4 
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Table 1.3: Optionable versus Non-Optionable Stocks: CARs 
The average CARs for matched optionable and non-optionable stocks are reported from day -10 
to +10, where day 0 is the lockup expiration date. Matches require the same venture-backed 
condition, the same industry classification and close percentage of locked-up shares, that is, the 
deviation in percentage of locked-up shares is less than 40%; the match then minimizes the sum 
of squared percentage difference in market capitalization and squared percentage difference in 
trading volume, restricting  an upper bound of 25% for each square. Abnormal returns are 
derived using the CRSP value-weighted average return as the benchmark. The first two columns 
report the CAR for optionable stocks and the next two columns are for the non-optionable stock. 
The last two columns present the difference between the two CARs and the t-stat. There are 265 
matched treatment and control sample. 
  Optioned Stocks 
Non-Optioned 
Stocks 
    
Event 
Day 
CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
CAR 
diff 
t-stat 
-10 -0.08% -0.34 0.15% 0.54 -0.23% -0.61 
-9 -0.52% -1.47 0.46% 0.94 -0.98% -1.67 
-8 -0.61% -1.45 0.86% 1.46 -1.46% -2.03 
-7 -0.98% -2.10 0.65% 1.07 -1.63% -2.14 
-6 -1.12% -2.10 0.73% 1.10 -1.85% -2.14 
-5 -1.48% -2.43 0.64% 0.86 -2.12% -2.10 
-4 -1.92% -3.19 -0.16% -0.22 -1.75% -1.83 
-3 -2.21% -3.80 -0.01% -0.01 -2.20% -2.46 
-2 -2.76% -4.42 -0.11% -0.15 -2.65% -2.84 
-1 -3.48% -5.42 -0.49% -0.62 -2.99% -3.06 
0 -3.73% -5.25 -1.12% -1.31 -2.61% -2.48 
1 -3.81% -5.04 -1.18% -1.27 -2.62% -2.34 
2 -3.24% -4.32 -0.96% -1.01 -2.27% -2.00 
3 -2.75% -3.67 -1.07% -1.12 -1.68% -1.45 
4 -2.69% -3.52 -1.61% -1.53 -1.08% -0.88 
5 -2.88% -3.62 -1.52% -1.36 -1.36% -1.04 
6 -2.86% -3.45 -1.95% -1.67 -0.91% -0.66 
7 -3.05% -3.46 -2.19% -1.83 -0.86% -0.59 
8 -3.27% -3.66 -2.28% -1.88 -0.99% -0.68 
9 -3.21% -3.54 -2.48% -1.94 -0.73% -0.49 
10 -3.02% -3.26 -2.89% -2.16 -0.13% -0.08 
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Table 1.4: Annual Sharpe Ratio of Trading Strategies Prior to the Lockup Expiration 
This table reports sharpe ratio of trading options portfolios to expiration for various trading 
strategies and strike groups. Options (1) with ex-dividend dates before expirations (less than 10% 
of the complete sample), (2) violating no-arbitrage restriction, (3) expiring beyond 10 days after 
IPO lockup expiration dates, and (4) with zero volume, are eliminated. Returns on writing Call 
(Purchasing Put) options are computed from best bid (best offer) price, and benchmarked with 
the risk-free interest rate. Each option contract is assigned to a strike group based on its value of 
K/S and the cutoff points are 0.85, 0.95, 1.05, 1.15. Trading Strategy 1 assumes that investors 
form the trading strategy on the dates when the options for the underlying stocks are firstly 
listed, and the trading periods end on the option expiration dates. Strategy 2 assumens investors 
start trading in 1 month after the option listing dates until expiration. Strategy 3 assumes 
investors start on 10 days prior to unlock dates until option expiration dates. Panel A reports the 
sharpe ratio on trading strategies of writing calls, and Panel B reports the sharpe ratio on trading 
strategies of writing calls and purchasing puts. 
  
Panel A: Writing Calls 
  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Moneyness bins 
(R=K/S) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
R<=0.85     0.084 0.004 -0.517 0.017 
0.85<R<=0.95 0.006 0.006 0.246 0.022 0.230 0.026 
0.95<R<=1.05 0.067 0.005 -0.145 0.007 0.051 0.103 
1.05<R<=1.15 0.004 0.004 0.299 0.041 0.379 0.172 
R>=1.15 0.183 0.045 -0.471 0.066 0.550 0.175 
              
Panel B: Writing Calls and Purchasing Puts 
  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Moneyness bins 
(R=K/S) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
R<=0.85     0.239 0.272 0.843 0.581 
0.85<R<=0.95 -0.047 -0.047 0.128 0.193 0.549 0.264 
0.95<R<=1.05 0.569 -0.139 -1.514 -0.047 -0.487 0.000 
1.05<R<=1.15 -0.006 -0.006 0.312 -0.026 0.355 -0.003 
R>=1.15 -0.156 -0.129 0.058 -0.166 0.148 -0.066 
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Table 1.5: Summary of Calls and Puts Expiring Immediately after Unlock Dates 
This table summarizes the sample size and total trading volume of the calls and puts based on 
IPO stocks for various strike groups on three event dates. Each call is assigned to a strike group 
based on its value of K/S and the cutoff points are 0.85, 0.95, 1.05, 1.15. Only the options that 
expire within 10 days after IPO lockup expirations are included. Three event dates are (1) Initial 
option listing date, (2) 1 month after option listing date, (3) 10 days prior to the IPO unlock 
dates. 
 
    Calls Puts 
Moneyness bins (R=K/S) 
Option 
Listing 
dates 
1 
month 
after 
Option 
Listing 
date 
10 days 
prior to 
unlock 
dates 
Option 
Listing 
dates 
1 month 
after 
Option 
Listing 
date 
10 days 
prior to 
unlock 
dates 
R<=0.85 Num. of Obs. 11 21 52 11 21 53 
  Trading Volume 1 250 1074 564 556 6720 
 
0.85<R<=0.9
5 Num. of Obs. 13 27 37 13 27 38 
  Trading Volume 14 82 1529 34 126 5759 
 
0.95<R<=1.0
5 Num. of Obs. 14 18 43 14 18 43 
  Trading Volume 469 664 8995 426 581 6584 
 
1.05<R<=1.1
5 Num. of Obs. 12 22 42 13 22 42 
  Trading Volume 184 293 8184 110 263 951 
 
R>=1.15 Num. of Obs. 14 21 46 14 21 46 
  Trading Volume 694 465 3045 187 141 829 
All Trades Num. of Obs. 65 109 222 65 109 222 
  Trading Volume 1362 1754 22827 1321 1667 20843 
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Table 1.6: Conditional Mean Differences in CARs 
Estimates of the mean effect of the existence of options in the matched sample, controlling for 
the variables used in matching (venture backed condition, industry, percentage locked shares, 
market value and average trading volume during event window) and additional relevant variables 
(daily percentage spread, Amihud (2002) Illiquidity measure, volatility during first 30 days after 
IPO, and Book-to-Market ratio). The regression Model behind this table is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑠 + 𝑎2𝑋𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 is the cumulative abnormal returns for stock s during the event window, that is, days [-10, 
-1] for Panel A and days [0, +10] for Panel B, 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑠is an option listing dummy that takes the 
value 1 for optionable stocks, and 𝑋𝑠 is a vector of control variables. This table reports the 
estimate for coefficient of 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑠 dummy, the associate t-statistics, 95% confidence interval, the 
number of observation and 𝑅2 of the regression. Each treatment is matched to one control 
sample, so the sample size is twice the number of observations in Table 1.3. (***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is CARs during days [-10, -1] 
  
Coefficient 
Estimate 
t-stat 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Num. of 
Observation 
R-Square 
Option Dummy -0.031*** -2.93 -0.052 -0.010 530 0.05 
  
     
  
Panel B: Dependent Variable is CARs during days [0, +10] 
  
Coefficient 
Estimate 
t-stat 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Num. of 
Observation 
R-Square 
Option Dummy 0.026** 1.97 0.000 0.052 530 0.05 
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Table 1.7: Optionable Stocks versus Non-Optionable Stocks: CARs, Restricting Volume 
This table presents the average CARs for 243 matched optionable and non-optionable stocks 
during days [-10, +10], where day 0 is the lockup expiration date. Matches require the same 
venture-backed condition, the same industry classification and close percentage of locked-up 
shares; the match then minimizes the absolute percentage difference in volume, while restricting 
the volume for control sample greater than the volume for treatment. Abnormal returns are 
derived using the CRSP value-weighted average return as the benchmark. The first two columns 
report the CARs for optionable stocks and the next two columns are for the non-optionable 
stocks. The last two columns present the difference between the two CARs and the t-stat. 
 
  Optioned Stocks 
Non-Optioned 
Stocks 
    
Event 
Day 
CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
CAR 
diff 
t-stat 
-10 -0.07% -0.28 -0.34% -1.00 0.28% 0.63 
-9 -0.43% -1.32 -0.21% -0.40 -0.22% -0.36 
-8 -0.51% -1.22 0.25% 0.39 -0.75% -1.01 
-7 -0.75% -1.64 0.11% 0.16 -0.86% -1.07 
-6 -0.82% -1.55 0.64% 0.85 -1.46% -1.60 
-5 -1.14% -1.82 0.73% 0.94 -1.86% -1.84 
-4 -1.52% -2.43 0.20% 0.24 -1.72% -1.71 
-3 -1.58% -2.72 0.47% 0.56 -2.06% -2.09 
-2 -1.75% -2.87 0.73% 0.81 -2.47% -2.37 
-1 -2.00% -3.34 0.54% 0.56 -2.54% -2.32 
0 -2.43% -3.73 -0.06% -0.05 -2.38% -2.03 
1 -2.40% -3.45 -0.14% -0.13 -2.27% -1.87 
2 -2.03% -2.80 -0.62% -0.57 -1.41% -1.16 
3 -1.41% -1.90 -0.77% -0.70 -0.64% -0.52 
4 -1.37% -1.80 -1.15% -0.97 -0.22% -0.16 
5 -1.70% -2.12 -1.19% -0.94 -0.51% -0.36 
6 -1.77% -2.12 -1.61% -1.27 -0.16% -0.11 
7 -2.04% -2.33 -1.19% -0.92 -0.85% -0.58 
8 -1.95% -2.17 -1.20% -0.91 -0.75% -0.49 
9 -1.86% -2.04 -1.56% -1.12 -0.30% -0.19 
10 -1.54% -1.71 -2.08% -1.40 0.54% 0.33 
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Table 1.8: Optionable Stocks versus Non-Optionable Stocks: CARs, Excluding Early 
Release 
This table presents the average CARs for 170 matched optionable and non-optionable stocks 
during days [-10, +10], where day 0 is the lockup expiration date. The stocks that release the 
lockup agreement early (Brav and Gompers, 2003) are excluded. Matches require the same 
venture-backed condition, the same industry classification, no early release sales and close 
percentage of locked-up shares, that is, the deviation in percentage of locked-up shares locked up 
is less than 40%; the match then minimizes the absolute percentage deviations in market 
capitalization with an upper bound of 20%. Abnormal returns are derived using the CRSP value-
weighted average return as the benchmark. The first two columns report the CARs for optionable 
stocks and the next two columns are for the non-optionable stocks. The last two columns present 
the difference between the two CARs and the t-stat. 
 
  Optioned Stocks 
Non-Optioned 
Stocks 
    
Event 
Day 
CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
CAR 
diff 
t-stat 
-10 0.03% 0.09 -0.32% -0.85 0.35% 0.71 
-9 -0.27% -0.57 0.15% 0.26 -0.41% -0.59 
-8 -0.15% -0.29 0.73% 0.89 -0.88% -0.89 
-7 -0.08% -0.14 0.93% 1.10 -1.01% -0.96 
-6 -0.16% -0.26 1.14% 1.25 -1.30% -1.11 
-5 -0.36% -0.49 0.92% 0.90 -1.28% -0.96 
-4 -0.77% -1.04 1.18% 1.22 -1.95% -1.51 
-3 -1.16% -1.60 1.44% 1.34 -2.60% -1.91 
-2 -1.09% -1.41 1.26% 1.18 -2.35% -1.70 
-1 -1.71% -2.16 1.21% 1.09 -2.92% -2.06 
0 -1.97% -2.50 0.74% 0.62 -2.71% -1.83 
1 -1.66% -1.97 0.47% 0.34 -2.13% -1.27 
2 -1.07% -1.27 0.55% 0.38 -1.62% -0.95 
3 -0.45% -0.54 0.44% 0.32 -0.90% -0.55 
4 -0.49% -0.57 -0.04% -0.03 -0.44% -0.27 
5 -0.68% -0.75 0.19% 0.13 -0.87% -0.51 
6 -0.80% -0.89 -0.39% -0.25 -0.41% -0.23 
7 -1.02% -1.09 -1.05% -0.67 0.02% 0.01 
8 -1.18% -1.24 -1.60% -0.99 0.41% 0.22 
9 -1.35% -1.36 -2.15% -1.24 0.80% 0.40 
10 -1.09% -1.05 -1.94% -1.14 0.86% 0.42 
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Table 1.9: Earnings Surprises prior to the IPO Lockup Expirations 
This table presents the earnings surprises for samples with earnings announcements (EA) prior to the IPO 
Lockup Expiration dates. Earnings surprise is defined as the firms’ actual EPS minus the analyst 
consensus EPS forecast immediately prior to the announcement, scaled by the beginning of quarterly 
stock price.  
 
Earnings Surprises before the Lockup Expirations 
 
Mean T-stat S.D. Median 
All sample having EA during days of [-40, -1] 
Non-optionable -0.01% -0.19 1.58% 0.08% 
Optionable 0.15% 3.59 0.45% 0.09% 
Difference -0.16% 
   p-value (t-test) 0.28 
   All sample having EA during days of [-10, -1] 
Non-optionable -0.02% -0.19 1.06% 0.10% 
Optionable 0.14% 2.01 0.33% 0.03% 
Difference -0.16% 
   p-value (t-test) 0.47       
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Table 1.10: Average Net Order Flows in Option Markets prior to the Lockup Expirations 
This table presents the average net order flows in option markets during the ten-day window 
prior to Lockup expirations. For each stock on each event day, the net order flow is derived by 
aggregating the delta-adjusted volumes through all option series. The abnormal net order flow is 
benchmarked by the average net order flows over the previous 30 days, that is, from -40 day to -
11 day relative to the expiration day 0. All of the order flows are represented as percentage of 
shares outstanding. 
 
Day 
Abnorma
l Net 
Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulativ
e 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Net 
Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulativ
e Net 
Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Turn
over 
-10 -0.0098 -0.93 -0.0098 -0.93 
-
0.0091 -0.87 -0.0091 -0.87 
0.99
8 
-9 -0.0013 -0.52 -0.0111 -1.03 
-
0.0006 -0.25 -0.0098 -0.92 
1.40
6 
-8 -0.0077 -1.12 -0.0188 -1.46 
-
0.0071 -1.06 -0.0168 -1.35 
1.12
9 
-7 -0.0061 -1.08 -0.0249 -1.52 
-
0.0055 -0.98 -0.0223 -1.42 
1.12
0 
-6 -0.0046 -0.73 -0.0295 -1.47 
-
0.0039 -0.65 -0.0263 -1.38 
1.18
3 
-5 -0.0022 -0.66 -0.0317 -1.48 
-
0.0016 -0.50 -0.0278 -1.39 
0.94
4 
-4 -0.0025 -0.92 -0.0342 -1.55 
-
0.0019 -0.72 -0.0297 -1.46 
0.91
8 
-3 -0.0070 -0.93 -0.0412 -1.89 
-
0.0063 -0.83 -0.0360 -1.79 
1.00
7 
-2 -0.0100 -2.18 -0.0512 -2.06 
-
0.0094 -2.19 -0.0454 -2.00 
1.10
2 
-1 -0.0034 -0.60 -0.0546 -2.45 
-
0.0028 -0.47 -0.0481 -2.42 
1.14
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 1.11: Option Order Imbalance and Daily Stock Returns 
The regression results in this table are based on the following model: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + Π ∗ 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡 
 
The dependent variable is daily abnormal returns using the CRSP value-weighted average returns 
as the benchmark. The independent variables are delta-equivalent option order imbalance 
(OOIB), pure stock order imbalance (SOIB), and the controlling variables including lagged 
option order imbalance, lagged pure stock order imbalance and lagged stock return. For the first 
two columns, the option volumes are from intraday options data over the complete option 
markets. The order flows cover both opening and closing positions and normalized by the 
shares outstanding for the underlying stocks. For the last two columns, the option volumes are 
from Open-Close dataset provided by CBOE, NASDAQ, and PHLX exchanges. All of the order 
flows cover opening positions only and normalized by the shares outstanding for the underlying 
stocks. T statistics are reported in parentheses, based on firm-clustered standard errors. ***, **, * 
indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Var.: Abnormal Stock Returns 
  Open and Close Trades Open Trades Only 
  [-40, -11] [-10, -1] [-40, -11] [-10, -1] 
Option OIB 3.360*** 10.611*** 9.434** 19.147** 
  (5.34) (5.50) (2.18) (2.35) 
Stock OIB 2.784*** 2.411* 4.46*** 5.165*** 
  (5.20) (1.90) (6.47) (3.64) 
Lagged OOIB -0.466 -6.201 -2.463 -6.101 
  (-0.24) (-1.24) (-0.90) (-1.18) 
Lagged SOIB -0.566** -0.465 -0.549** 
-
1.511*** 
  (-2.48) (-0.94) (-2.15) (-3.12) 
Lagged Return 0.038 0.067 0.034 0.017 
  (1.02) (1.36) (0.78) (0.36) 
Constant -0.002** -0.003** -0.001 
-
0.004*** 
  (-2.26) (-2.13) (-1.44) (-2.72) 
Observations 1812 631 1559 542 
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.13 
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Table 1.12: Option Order Imbalance and Stock Returns over 30-min. and 15-min. Intervals 
The regression results in this table are based on the following model: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + Π ∗ 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1 + δ ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡 
 
The dependent variable is the log returns using the midpoint of NBBO prices during 30-minute 
and 15-minute intervals. The independent variables are the delta-equivalent option order 
imbalance (OOIB), pure stock order imbalance (SOIB), and the controlling variables including 
lagged option order imbalance, lagged stock order imbalance, lagged stock return and the 
percentage bid-ask spread for specified time intervals. The options volumes are from intraday 
options data over the complete option markets. The order flows cover both opening and closing 
trades and normalized by the shares outstanding for the underlying stocks. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses, based on firm-clustered standard errors. ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Var.: Stock Returns 
  30 minutes interval 15 minutes interval 
  [-40, -11] [-10, -1] 
[-40, -
11] [-10, -1] 
Option OIB 2.169*** 3.759*** 1.728*** 2.972*** 
  (3.33) (5.16) (3.00) (5.48) 
Stock OIB 1.110** 0.856** 1.076** 0.677** 
  (2.44) (2.34) (2.02) (2.07) 
Lagged OOIB -0.077 -0.064 -0.023 -0.015 
  (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.11) (-0.10) 
Lagged SOIB 0.188 -0.013 0.165 0.028 
  (0.84) (-0.07) (0.89) (0.24) 
Lagged Return 0.010** 0.003 0.006** 0.004 
  (2.24) (1.00) (2.56) (1.10) 
Spread 0.016 -0.048 -0.003 -0.160 
  (0.09) (-0.28) (-0.03) (-1.59) 
Constant -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.10) (-2.16) (-1.04) (-0.64) 
Observations 25650 9028 39779 14250 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 1.13: Options Net Order Imbalances by Short Sale Constraints 
This table reports the net and cumulative abnormal order imbalances in option markets during the ten-day 
event window prior to the IPO lockup expiration dates, sorted by short sale constraints. Three measures of 
short sale constraints are used. Panel A is using the loan fee in the equity lending market. Panel B and 
Panel C are using the residual institutional ownership (Nagel, 2005) and relative institutional ownership. 
The full sample is divided into two groups: low (<50%) and high (>50%). Day 0 is defined as the 
expiration day. Option Order Imbalance is defined as the delta-adjusted volumes across all options series 
and Abnormal Option Imbalance is calculated using the average order imbalance over days [-40, -11] as 
the benchmark. All of the order imbalances are normalized by shares outstanding.  
 
Panel A: Net Order Imbalance and Loan Fee 
  High Loan Fee Low Loan Fee 
Day 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Net 
Order Imb. t-stat 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Net 
Order Imb. t-stat 
-10 -0.0029 -0.33 -0.0029 -0.33 0.0025 1.18 0.0025 1.18 
-9 -0.0060 -1.23 -0.0089 -1.13 0.0035 1.24 0.0060 1.31 
-8 -0.0109 -0.70 -0.0197 -1.11 -0.0048 -1.62 0.0012 0.22 
-7 -0.0212 -1.82 -0.0410 -1.47 0.0025 1.20 0.0037 0.61 
-6 -0.0133 -0.95 -0.0542 -1.33 -0.0006 -0.43 0.0032 0.57 
-5 -0.0046 -0.65 -0.0588 -1.28 -0.0020 -1.24 0.0011 0.18 
-4 -0.0075 -1.37 -0.0663 -1.39 -0.0013 -0.68 -0.0001 -0.02 
-3 -0.0042 -0.44 -0.0705 -1.63 0.0069 1.84 0.0068 0.90 
-2 -0.0256 -2.51 -0.0961 -1.86 0.0002 0.23 0.0070 0.95 
-1 -0.0015 -0.12 -0.0976 -2.16 -0.0070 -1.18 0.0000 0.00 
Panel B: Net Order Imbalance and Residual Institutional Ownership (RI) 
  Low RI High RI 
Day 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Net 
Order Imb. t-stat 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Net 
Order Imb. t-stat 
-10 0.0088 1.23 0.0088 1.23 0.0009 0.26 0.0009 0.26 
-9 -0.0058 -1.25 0.0029 0.34 -0.0008 -0.29 0.0001 0.01 
-8 0.0000 0.01 0.0030 0.31 -0.0005 -0.11 -0.0004 -0.07 
-7 -0.0082 -1.96 -0.0052 -0.49 0.0058 0.78 0.0054 0.61 
-6 -0.0022 -0.46 -0.0074 -0.63 -0.0010 -0.18 0.0044 0.34 
-5 0.0040 1.05 -0.0034 -0.29 -0.0025 -0.82 0.0018 0.13 
-4 -0.0075 -1.33 -0.0109 -0.83 -0.0006 -0.19 0.0012 0.08 
-3 0.0037 0.46 -0.0072 -0.47 -0.0066 -1.05 -0.0054 -0.34 
-2 -0.0076 -1.49 -0.0148 -0.84 -0.0106 -1.59 -0.0160 -0.77 
-1 -0.0179 -1.96 -0.0327 -1.77 0.0023 0.29 -0.0137 -0.71 
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Table 1.14: Options Net Order Imbalances by Short Sale Constraints (Continued) 
Panel C: Net Order Imbalance and Relative Institutional Ownership 
  Low Institutional Ownership High Institutional Ownership 
Day 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Net 
Order Imb. t-stat 
Abnormal 
Net Order 
Imb. t-stat 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Net 
Order Imb. t-stat 
-10 0.0069 0.94 0.0069 0.94 0.0028 0.92 0.0028 0.92 
-9 -0.0056 -1.22 0.0012 0.14 -0.0010 -0.34 0.0018 0.58 
-8 0.0001 0.02 0.0014 0.14 -0.0005 -0.13 0.0012 0.25 
-7 -0.0094 -2.15 -0.0080 -0.70 0.0070 0.97 0.0082 1.09 
-6 -0.0061 -1.18 -0.0141 -1.04 0.0029 0.56 0.0112 1.08 
-5 0.0015 0.38 -0.0126 -0.89 0.0000 0.00 0.0112 1.00 
-4 -0.0096 -1.71 -0.0222 -1.38 0.0015 0.47 0.0127 1.00 
-3 0.0020 0.25 -0.0202 -1.07 -0.0049 -0.80 0.0078 0.71 
-2 -0.0128 -2.06 -0.0330 -1.47 -0.0053 -0.95 0.0025 0.17 
-1 -0.0183 -1.99 -0.0513 -2.16 0.0027 0.35 0.0052 0.48 
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Table 1.15: Price Impact of Option Net Order Imbalance and Short Sale Constraints 
This table shows the point estimates for the following regression model: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛱 ∗ 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 
+𝛿 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑠,𝑡 means abnormal stock returns for stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡, 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑠,𝑡 are net order 
imbalances in the option market and stock market for stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡  respectively. The controlling 
variables 𝑋𝑠,𝑡−1 include net order imbalances in the option markets and stock market for stock 𝑠 on day 
𝑡 − 1, and lagged stock returns. 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠,𝑡 is a dummy variable equals to one if the stock 𝑠 is difficult to 
sell short during the event window and zero otherwise. Three variables are used to measure the short sale 
constraints: (1) loan fee which is defined as the rebate rate minus the federal fund rate; (2) residual 
institutional ownership (Nagel, 2005); (3) relative institutional ownership, normalized by shares 
outstanding. T statistics are reported in parentheses, based on firm-clustered standard errors. ***, **, * 
indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
OOIB 3.151 5.156** 5.502*** 
  (1.49) (2.51) (2.69) 
SOIB 2.277*** 2.594*** 2.636*** 
  (4.64) (5.29) (5.40) 
Lagged OOIB -6.656 -10.346* -10.611* 
  (-1.08) (-1.68) (-1.72) 
Lagged SOIB -0.730 -0.853* -0.843 
  (-1.44) (-1.66) (-1.64) 
Lagged Returns 0.091** 0.091** 0.092** 
  (2.01) (2.00) (2.03) 
Special -0.005 0.002 0.002 
  (-1.46) (0.50) (0.63) 
OOIB× Special 13.756*** 9.398** 8.055** 
  (3.65) (2.32) (2.00) 
Constant 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.24) (-1.37) (-1.46) 
Observations 470 470 470 
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.09 
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Chapter 2  
New Evidence on the Financialization of Commodity Markets 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade financial institutions and retail investors have dramatically increased their 
exposures to commodities, and often have net long positions that in aggregate comprise large 
fractions of futures open interest in many commodities.30   These investments include strategies 
that track indexes of commodity futures, exchange-traded funds and exchange-traded notes based 
on either individual commodities or commodity indexes, and over-the-counter (OTC) 
commodity-linked notes (CLNs).  The period of most rapid growth in index strategies and other 
financial commodity investment approximately coincided with the 20072008 boom in 
commodity prices, leading to a debate among both policymakers and academics about whether 
the flows of financial commodity investors impacted commodity futures prices and return 
dynamics, and the growth of a related empirical literature. 31   The hypothesis that the flows of 
financial commodity investors did impact the commodity markets is referred to as the 
“financialization of commodity markets.”  Despite recent contributions by Tang and Xiong 
(2012), Singleton (2013), Hamilton and Wu (2013, 2014), Basak and Pavlova (2014), and 
Cheng, Kirilinko, and Xiong (2014), the question of whether and the extent to which the flows of 
financial investors have impacted commodity futures and spot prices remains unresolved.  
We provide new evidence by analyzing issuances of OTC CLNs.  Each of the sample 
CLNs is issued by, and is an obligation of, a financial institution and has a payoff linked to the 
price of a single commodity, commodity futures contract, commodities index, or basket of 
commodities futures.  It is standard practice for CLN issuers to hedge their liabilities by 
establishing long positions in the commodities futures markets or in commodity swaps which are 
                                                 
30 Gilbert (2010), Stoll and Whaley (2010), Barclays Investment Bank (2013, Figure 54), and Barclays Investment 
Bank (2014, Figure 28) present estimates of the futures market share of commodity index investments, which are a 
subset of financial commodity investments. Barclays Capital estimated that commodity assets under management 
(AUM) were $424 billion at the end of 2012, of which a total of about $220 billion was invested in strategies that 
track commodities indexes (Barclays Investment Bank 2013).  Total commodity AUM were estimated to be $325 
billion at the end of June 2014 (Barclays Investment Bank 2014). 
31 Irwin and Sanders (2011), Bos and van der Molen (2012), Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012), and Cheng and Xiong 
(2013) survey the literature and summarize the policy debates. 
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then re-hedged in the futures markets.  The trades establishing and unwinding these hedges are 
the mechanisms by which investors’ demands for commodity exposure get passed to or 
withdrawn from the futures markets.  A CLN issuer’s exposure to the underlying commodity 
price begins on the CLN pricing date and typically ends on the determination date (sometimes 
called the observation, valuation, or calculation date) a few days prior to the maturity date, 
leading us to look for impacts of the hedge trades on or about the pricing and determination 
dates.   We find that the underlying futures prices increase on the pricing dates when the hedge 
trades are likely to be executed, and decrease on the determination dates when the hedge trades 
are likely to be unwound. 
The OTC CLN issuances provide a useful dataset to study the impact of investor flows 
for several reasons.  First, the offering documents include the CLNs’ pricing and determination 
dates and indicate they were priced at the close of regular trading in the underlying commodity 
futures.  Since the issuers pass investor demand through to the futures markets by hedging their 
CLN liabilities close to when the notes are priced, and unwind the hedges on or close to the 
determination date, we know approximately when the investor flows are passed through to and 
withdrawn from the futures market.    
Second, it seems unlikely that investors purchase OTC CLNs based on information about 
subsequent changes in futures prices because most CLNs are poor vehicles for speculating on 
commodity prices.  The issuers must embed the costs of structuring, marketing, and hedging the 
CLNs in their issue prices, negatively impacting CLN returns. The CLNs generally provide little 
or no embedded leverage, are not exchange-traded, and have a very limited secondary market.  It 
seems unlikely that investors sophisticated enough to possess valuable information about future 
commodity prices choose to trade on that information using high-cost, unlevered CLNs with a 
limited secondary market rather than low-cost, liquid futures contracts, exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs), or exchange-traded notes (ETNs).32  If investor flows into OTC CLNs are not based on 
information, then the hedge trades that pass these flows to the futures market also are not.  
Further, it is difficult to see how the determination date trades that CLN issuers carry out to 
                                                 
32 Consistent with this, the internet appendix documents that only a few of the CLN issues based on individual 
commodities appear in the portfolios of commodity mutual funds. 
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unwind their hedges can be based on information about the determination date returns, because 
the issuers specify these dates during the structuring of the notes, which takes place one or more 
years prior to the determination date.   
  Third, the issuer ordinarily will execute the hedge trades regardless of changes in futures 
prices, eliminating in most cases the “reverse causality” in which commodity futures price 
changes possibly affect the trades that are executed.  It may be that in some cases the issuer 
either does not execute the hedge trades, does so only partially, or delays doing so, perhaps due 
to the issuer’s private information about future commodity prices.    The issuer’s exposure is the 
opposite of the investors’, so to the extent a CLN issuer does this the issuer will benefit from 
decreases in commodity futures prices on the pricing date and increases in commodity prices on 
the determination date.  Thus, the increases (decreases) in commodity prices we find on the 
pricing (determination) dates are unlikely to be explained by a hypothesis that the CLN issues 
cause other market participants to make inferences about the issuers’ information.   
Finally, by using the CLN data we bring an entirely new dataset to bear on the question, 
and are able to avoid relying upon the sometimes criticized CFTC data on the positions of 
commodity index traders (CITs).  The new CLN data also allow us to analyze the impact of new 
flows into the commodity futures markets, rather than rolling activity that transfers positions 
from one contract to another.    
We find average price impacts of 34, 39, and 49 basis points around the pricing dates of 
the CLN issues with proceeds greater than or equal to $2, $5, and $10 million, respectively, and 
find similarly-sized negative price impacts on the determination dates when the hedges are 
unwound, providing evidence that investment flows that do not convey information about 
fundamentals nonetheless impact commodity futures prices.  As expected, the price impacts 
increase in the issue sizes, and there is no evidence that the returns are reversed within 20 trading 
days. We find similar price impacts for high-commission products, which are unlikely to be due 
to information-based trading.    We also find the price impacts were greater during the financial 
crisis period, when many financial market participants were financially constrained.   
For most of the commodity markets we consider, the prices of the front-month futures 
contracts serve as proxies for spot prices.  This, combined with the lack of evidence of price 
reversals within 20 trading days, suggests that spot prices are also impacted.  We confirm this by 
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documenting similar price impacts in the spot prices for the underlying commodities (primarily 
the London-traded metals) for which reliable spot price data exist. 
Much of the prior literature studying whether flows from financial investors have 
impacted the prices and return dynamics of commodities futures relies on vector autoregressions 
and tests of whether CIT flows imputed from CFTC data Granger cause commodity futures 
returns.  For example, Singleton (2013) uses these data on CIT flows and finds a positive relation 
between lagged investor flows and crude oil futures prices, while Brunetti and Reiffen (2011) 
present evidence that CITs affected risk premia in the three largest agricultural futures markets.  
In contrast, Hamilton and Wu (2013, 2014) find limited evidence to support the hypothesis that 
CIT flows predict commodity futures prices, and Stoll and Whaley (2010) find no evidence that 
lagged CIT flows Granger cause futures returns for 12 agricultural futures contracts. 
 As argued by Cheng, Kirilenko and Xiong (2014), these studies are premised on a strong 
assumption that CITs initiate trades and thus drive price changes.  However, to the extent that 
financial traders accommodate producers’ hedging needs their position changes should be 
negatively correlated with price changes.  Due to the multiple motives for trades that imply 
different relations between CIT flows and price changes, tests of Granger causality and 
contemporaneous correlations may lack power to identify the price impacts of the CIT trades. 
Cheng, Kirilenko and Xiong (2014) use fluctuations in the VIX to isolate trades initiated by CITs 
and find that conditioning on changes in the VIX to isolate trades due to fluctuations in CIT’s 
risk absorption capacity reveals positive correlations between CIT position changes and futures 
prices.   Our use of the CLN issuances is a different, complementary, approach to identify a set 
of trades initiated by financial traders.  
Our finding that non-information based trades impact commodity prices is consistent 
with two recent strands of theoretical literature.    Models that emphasize funding constraints of 
financial intermediaries and limits to arbitrage imply that the introduction of new demand from 
financial commodity investors can impact prices (e.g., Kyle and Xiong 2001, Gromb and 
Vayanos 2002, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009, He and Krishnamurthy 2013, Etula 2013, and 
Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai 2013).  As Singleton (2013; p. 11) points out, “in any 
market setting where there are limits to the amount of capital investors are willing to commit to 
an asset class … large increases in desired long or short positions by any class of investors can 
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potentially impact prices.” Hong and Yogo (2012) rely on similar reasoning in arguing that 
inelastic demand for futures positions can explain their finding that open interest predicts 
subsequent changes in futures prices.  
The other strand is found in a recent model by Sockin and Xiong (2014) in which 
investors are not able perfectly to observe fundamentals and commodity prices serve as signals to 
guide producers’ production decisions and commodity demands. In this model, commodity 
market trades that are not based on information about current or future fundamentals can be 
misinterpreted as conveying information about them, causing some agents to change their 
commodity demands and impacting commodity prices.   This model offers an explanation for 
how flows of investment capital into and out of commodity futures markets during the 2000’s 
might have contributed to commodity price movements.  Singleton (2013) also emphasizes the 
importance of accounting for agents’ expectations in explaining movements in commodity prices 
during the same period. 
2.2 The U.S. Public Market for Commodity-Linked Notes 
The OTC CLNs in our sample are issued by and are obligations of financial institutions and have 
payoffs linked to the price or change in price of a commodity or commodity futures contract, 
commodity index, or basket of commodities or commodity futures. 33    There are also 
commodity-linked exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and privately offered CLNs that are not 
included in our sample, either because our arguments that investor flows are unlikely to be based 
on information do not apply to them (the ETNs) or we do not have access to data on the issues 
(the privately offered CLNs).34  We do not consider ETFs because, similar to the ETNs, their low 
fees and liquid secondary market trading imply that sophisticated investors with information 
about future commodity prices or commodity market fundamentals might act on this information 
by trading them.   
 CLN issuers file pricing supplements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which makes them available publicly through its EDGAR database.  Each 
                                                 
33 The sample issuers are ABN AMRO, AIG, Bank of America, Barclays, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Eksportfinans, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley, RBC, Swedish Export Credit, UBS, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. 
34 Our main results are stronger if we include the ETNs because the futures contacts underlying several of the large 
ETN issues experienced extremely large returns on their pricing dates.   
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pricing supplement includes the terms of the CLN, such as the maturity date, coupon rate, 
embedded fees, and information about the embedded options that determine the final payoff to 
the investor.  The pricing supplements also include the pricing and determination dates.  The 
issuers price and sell the notes on the pricing date, typically a few days before the issue date.  
The price of the underlying commodity or commodity futures contract on the determination date, 
a few days prior to the maturity date, determines the maturity payoff.  The issuers typically 
hedge the notes on or about the pricing date, and unwind the hedges on the determination date.  
When the hedge transaction involves a commodity swap or swaps, the swap counterparties 
typically re-hedge in the futures markets.   
We construct the sample by first identifying all issuers of U.S. publicly registered 
CLNs.35  After identifying the 20 banks and other issuers, we collect the 424(b) fillings for each 
issuer from the SEC’s EDGAR website. We then process those filings to identify all CLN issues 
and extract the details required for the analysis including the pricing date, determination date, 
maturity date, product name, proceeds amount, reference commodity, commodities, or 
commodity index, and coupon rate.36  
The terms of the CLNs vary across products.  The first sample CLN issue dates to 
January 17, 2003, when Swedish Export Credit Corporation offered “90% Principal Protected 
Zero-Coupon GSCI Excess Return Indexed Notes.”  These notes promised to return to investors 
90% of the principal amount plus a possible additional return linked to the performance of the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index,37 and did not pay any other interest.  The first sample CLN 
referencing a single commodity consists of the “Principal Protected Notes linked to Gold 
Bullion” issued by UBS during May 2003.  These notes promised full principal payment at 
maturity plus a possible additional return based on changes in the gold price.   
                                                 
35 We identified the issuers by finding every financial institution that issued a commodity-linked note included in 
Mergent’s FISD database, where we identify commodity-linked notes as those for which Mergent lists both the 
keywords “commodity” and “link.”  This procedure will identify all issuers, unless there is some issuer for which 
Mergent incorrectly labeled every CLN issue.  We confirmed the list of issuers by verifying that it includes every 
issuer of the commodity-linked ETNs listed on both the AMEX website and www.quantumonline.com. 
36 We exclude several issues by Swedish Credit Corporation because those issues were remarketing efforts of 
previously issued notes and the documents do not indicate the dates on which the additional notes were marketed 
and sold. 
37 This is the former name of the index now known as the S&P GSCI. 
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The Accelerated Return Notes (ARNs) linked to the Silver Spot Price sold by Bank of 
America on February 25, 2010 are an example of a popular product type.  These ARNs had a 
face value and issue price of $10 per unit, paid no coupon, and matured on May 3, 2011.  The 
starting value of the reference commodity, the silver spot price as determined by London Silver 
Market Fixing Ltd., was $15.92 on the pricing date.  The notes’ payoff at maturity is based on 
the ending value, which is the silver spot price as of the calculation date, April 26, 2011.   If the 
change in the spot price from the pricing date to the calculation date is positive the investors 
receive the face value plus an additional payment equal to the product of the face value and three 
times the percentage increase, capped at 34.26%.  If the percentage change in the spot price is 
negative then the principal amount returned to investors is reduced by the product of the 
percentage change and the face value.  
Table 2.1 presents the annual number and aggregate proceeds (in thousands of U.S. 
dollars) of CLN issues during our sample period.  Annual issuance statistics are aggregated 
based on the sector of the notes’ underlying commodities: Agriculture (corn, cotton, wheat, 
soybeans, coffee, sugar, live cattle, lean hogs, soybean oil, soybean meals, red wheat, and 
cocoa), Energy (WTI crude, Brent crude, natural gas, heating oil, and unleaded gasoline), 
Industrial Metals (aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc), Platinum and Palladium, and Gold 
and Silver.  The table also presents the category “Diversified Index and Commodity Baskets” 
comprising CLNs having payoffs linked to diversified indexes such as the Dow-Jones-UBS 
Commodity Index, S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, Deutsche Bank Liquid Commodity 
Index, among others.  Sample CLNs based on a basket or sub-index restricted to a single 
commodity sector are included with the CLNs in that sector.38 
The full sample comprises 2,776 CLN issues, of which 871, or 31%, are ETNs that are 
excluded from subsequent analyses.  The rightmost column of Table 2.1 presents the annual 
CLN proceeds across all issuers.  Across the full sample, spanning 2003 through January 14, 
2014, the proceeds total nearly $71 billion.  The total proceeds of CLN issues during the 2007-
2008 commodity price boom exceed $30 billion, accounting for approximately 42% of the total 
amount issued during the entire sample period.  Similar to estimates of CIT’s position sizes by 
                                                 
38 For example, a CLN based on the S&P GSCI-Energy sub-index would be included with the CLNs based on 
individual energy commodities. 
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Stoll and Whaley (2010), CLN issuance proceeds declined dramatically in 2009 to $13.2 billion.  
The number of CLN issues, however, remains large at 300 to 565 issues per year for the 
remainder of the sample period.   
Scanning across the columns of Table 2.1, approximately 10% of the sample CLNs 
reference agricultural commodities, 36% energy, 7% industrial metals, 1% platinum and 
palladium, and 15% gold and silver.  The remaining 31% of the sample reference indexes or 
baskets diversified across multiple sectors.  Among sectors, CLNs referencing Energy and Gold 
or Silver, which have 723 and 657 observations respectively, are the most numerous.  The 
bottom rows of Table 2.1 report the mean proceeds per issue for each of the reference categories.  
CLNs referencing industrial metals tend to be the largest with mean proceeds of over $47 
million.  CLNs referencing platinum and palladium, commodities which are not included in the 
major indexes, tend to be the smallest with average proceeds of approximately $24 million 
across 33 issues.  Just 274, or 9.9%, of the CLNs are “Bear” products that provide negative 
exposure to the underlying commodity price.  These are predominantly ETNs, and are not 
included in our analyses.  Internet Appendix Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present additional descriptive 
statistics. 
2.3 Price Impact of CLN Issuers’ Hedging Trades 
Unless the market supply of futures contracts is perfectly elastic, large buy (sell) trades will raise 
(lower) futures prices.  This price impact should be increasing in the size of the issue (e.g., the 
price impact must be zero if the trade size is zero), and there is a theoretical argument that the 
price impact of a trade should be linear in the size of the trade (Huberman and Stanzl 2000).  For 
these reasons, we expect to see significant price impacts around the pricing dates of CLN issues 
with large proceeds.  Also, because the hedging trades associated with an index-linked product 
are spread across many different contracts, price impacts around the pricing dates of the index 
products are likely smaller and possibly undetectable. 
We measure the price impact of the hedging trades using either the daily abnormal return 
or the raw return on the reference commodity’s front-month futures contract.   For each sample 
CLN issuance, i, with pricing or determination date t, we define the abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) to 
the front-month futures contract on the CLN reference commodity as 
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  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,            (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the day t return to the front-month commodity contract for the underlying 
commodity, defined as the difference in log daily closing futures prices: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = log(𝐹𝑖,𝑡) −
log(𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1),  and tiR ,ˆ  is a benchmark return.   
Our first benchmark follows the standard approach in equity market event studies and 
uses a linear factor model: 
 
      𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 0 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐸𝑀+𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆&𝑃𝑅𝑆&𝑃,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡 
      (2) 
 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑋,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖,𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡
 
+ 𝛽
𝑖,𝑙𝑎𝑔
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
 
Most of the covariates are motivated by the choices made by Singleton (2013) and Tang 
and Xiong (2012).  They point out that demand stemming from the growth in emerging market 
Asian economies has been an important factor in commodity prices over the sample period.  
Thus, we include the returns to the MSCI Emerging Markets Asia Index, 𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝑡, to capture the 
impact of changes in expectations about growth in emerging market Asian economies on 
commodities prices.  Because the futures contracts trade in the U.S. and the U.K., we account for 
non-synchronicity in close-to-close returns from different time zones by including the next day 
return to this index, 𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝑡+1.   Inclusion of the S&P 500 index return, 𝑅𝑆&𝑃,𝑡, captures changes in 
demand due to changes in expectations about U.S. economic growth.  We include the returns to 
the U.S. Dollar Index futures contracts, 𝑅𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡 , consistent with Tang and Xiong (2012) who 
control for the strength of the U.S. Dollar, as the dollar’s strength influences demand for 
commodities and the dollar is the most common settlement currency for commodity transactions.  
Next, we include the return to the JP Morgan Treasury Bond Index, 𝑅𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑,𝑡, to capture the link 
between commodity demand and fluctuations in interest rates, as in Tang and Xiong (2012).  We 
include the contemporaneous percentage change in the VIX index, 𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑋,𝑡 , to control for the 
contemporaneous relation between commodities prices and innovations to the VIX index found 
in Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2014).  We also include two additional macroeconomic control 
variables.  The first is the Baltic Dry Index, 𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑡 , which measures changes to the cost of 
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transporting raw materials by sea and proxies for commodity demand. 39   The second 
macroeconomic control is the 10-year breakeven inflation rate change, 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 , as computed by 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010).  Controlling for inflation is potentially important since, 
historically, nominal commodity price changes covary positively with inflation.  Finally, we 
include the lag of the commodity futures returns to account for autocorrelation in the return 
series.  With the exception of the change in the breakeven inflation rate, the data are from 
Datastream and Bloomberg.40 
For each sample observation, we estimate the benchmark model from a short period 
consisting of the sixty trade days immediately preceding the pricing date because evidence in 
Tang and Xiong (2012) suggests that commodity market correlations were not stable over time.  
For each observation, the benchmark return 
tiR ,
ˆ is computed from the estimated slope 
coefficients from Model (3) and the values of the right-hand side variables on the issuance date 
(X) plus the intercept, i.e. 
      XR ti   0,
ˆ .                         (3) 
The commodity futures event-time abnormal return in equation (1) above is obtained by 
subtracting the benchmark return computed using equations (2) and (3) from the log return.41   
Because the benchmark model might be poorly specified, we also use the raw futures 
returns, i.e. a benchmark of zero.  The results using the raw returns provide comfort that the 
empirical results are not driven by a mis-specified benchmark model. 
 Although the pricing supplements specify the pricing and determination dates, the exact 
timing when the issuers place and unwind their hedge trades is not clear.   For example, an issuer 
may execute the entire initial delta hedge trade near the close of trading on the pricing date, to 
coincide with the setting of the offering price, and may unwind it near the close of trading on the 
                                                 
39 Bakshi, Panayotov, and Skoulakis (2010) find that growth in the BDI predicts global economic growth. 
40 Breakeven inflation data are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm 
41 As expected, the averages of the estimates of the equity return coefficients on REM,t , REM,t+1 , and RS&P,t are 
positive, being about  0.11, 0.07, and 0.14, respectively, for a sum of about 0.32. The averages of the coefficients on 
RUSD,t , RTbond,t , and Rt1 are 0.56, 0.31, and0.05.  For the other coefficient estimates the cross-sectional averages 
are close to zero.  The average R2 is about 0.37, indicating that the factor model is successful in capturing a non-
trivial part of the variation in futures returns. 
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determination date, to coincide with the determination of the CLN payoff.  Alternatively, the 
issuer may attempt to reduce the price impact by delaying part of the trade until the next day.  
Should an issuer hedge the CLN with instruments other than futures contracts, such as 
commodity swaps, the exact timing when the swap dealer re-hedges in the futures market is also 
uncertain. 42  For these reasons, we focus on the price impacts on the pricing and determination 
dates, referred to as Day 0, and the cumulative impact over the two-day event window spanning 
the pricing date and the next trading day, Days [0,1].  We also report the price impact on the day 
after the pricing or determination date, Day 1. 
2.3.1 Pricing Date Event Study 
Table 2.2 presents the price impacts around the pricing dates for sample CLNs referencing 
individual commodities.   In this analysis it is desirable to exclude the many very “small” issues 
with proceeds of only a few hundred thousand dollars for which the hedge trades will be too 
small to impact prices materially.  Because there are few a priori reasons to prefer one cutoff to 
exclude the small issues over another, we report results for subsamples with proceeds of least $2, 
$5, and $10 million.43  In addition, because Mou (2010) finds that the “roll” of the S&P GSCI 
produces downward price pressure on the front-month futures contracts for the commodities 
included in the index and corresponding upward price pressure for the next-month contracts 
during the 5-day period prior to the beginning of the roll period, in the main analyses we restrict 
the sample to include only the issues having pricing dates that do not fall within either the S&P 
GSCI roll period or the five previous trading dates.44  Table 2.4 of the Internet Appendix presents 
                                                 
42 This is illustrated by the following statement that appeared in a feature article in the May 2006 issue of Futures 
Industry magazine: 
Keith Styrcula, chairman of the Structured Products Association, explains that one way a CLNs issuer can 
hedge its commodity exposure is through a total return swap with either its own swaps desk or a third party. The 
counterparty will then lay off the risk in the futures market. “At the end of the day, much of the hedging winds 
up creating open interest and volume in the underlying futures contracts. All roads lead to enhanced liquidity on 
the futures exchanges.”  (O’Hara 2006) 
43 The price impacts associated with small issues are reported in the internet Appendix.  As expected, the point 
estimates are small and not significantly different from zero. 
44 The S&P GSCI “rolls” from the front-month futures contracts to longer-dated contracts during a roll period that 
spans the 5th to 9th business days of each contract maturity month.  During this period, 20% of the index rolls each 
day.  Mou (2010) interprets his finding that the roll produces downward and upward price pressure on the front-
month and next-month contracts during the 5-day period prior to the beginning of the roll period as evidence that 
traders front-run the roll. 
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the results inclusive of the issues occurring during the roll period or the preceding five trading 
dates. 
Examining the first two rows of Table 2.2, both the pricing date abnormal returns and the 
two-day returns during Days[0,1] are positive and statistically significant.  The pricing date 
abnormal returns relative to the factor benchmark range from 22 basis points for CLNs with 
proceeds of at least $2 million to 36 basis points for CLNs having proceeds of at least $10 
million, and the pricing date t-statistics range from 3.23 to 3.47 .  The point estimates of the 
average abnormal returns on Day 1 are generally positive though insignificant, consistent with 
issuers delaying a portion of the hedge trade to Day 1.  The average abnormal returns for the 
two-day window Days[0,1] range from 34 to 45 basis points and are statistically significant, with 
t-statistics between 3.18 and 3.61.   
Table 2.2 also presents the number of positive abnormal returns in each subsample, and 
the last row provides the probability that, under the null hypothesis that the probability of a 
positive return is 0.5, the number of positive abnormal returns equals or exceeds the number 
reported in the table.  Specifically, the probability reported for date t is  
Prob   knk
n
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
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
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

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where tx  is the number of positive returns observed on date t in the sample, 
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




)1( is the probability of k  positive abnormal returns out of a total of n observations, 
and 5.0p is the probability of a positive abnormal return under the null hypothesis that positive 
and negative returns are equally likely.  All p-values for the pricing date, Day 0, and  two-day 
abnormal return on Days[0,1], are significant at conventional levels, indicating that the numbers 
of positive abnormal returns are significantly larger than the number of non-positive returns for 
each sub-sample.  For example, the subsample of issues with proceeds of at least $10 million 
contains 122 issues with positive abnormal pricing date returns out of the 215 issues in the 
subsample.  Under the null hypothesis the probability that 122 out of 215 returns are positive is 
less than 3%. 
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The lower half of the table reports similar but stronger results based on the zero 
benchmark. The pricing date average raw returns for the various subsamples are between 29 and 
42 basis points, 5 to 7 basis points greater than the average abnormal returns computed from the 
factor model benchmark, and the associated t-statistics exceed four. The average two-day raw 
returns are between 38 and 52 basis points, also greater than the corresponding abnormal returns, 
and have t-statistics between 3.71 and 3.97.  Further, the raw returns are positive with greater 
frequency than the abnormal returns, and the p-values for the numbers of positive returns on the 
pricing date and the two-day window around the pricing date are all less than 1%.   
For all products having proceeds greater than $10 million, the two day abnormal returns 
average 45 basis points, compared to 34 basis points for all CLN issuances having proceeds of 
least $2 million.  Although not reported in the table, the average abnormal returns for issues with 
proceeds between $2 and $10 million and between $2 and $5 million are 25 and 20 basis points, 
respectively.  Since the size of the hedge trade size will be positively correlated with the 
proceeds, these point estimates are consistent with the interpretation that the abnormal returns are 
caused by the price impact of the issuers’ hedging trades.   Regression results reported below 
find that large issues have significantly greater price impact.  
Possible sample selection bias represents a potential concern about the results in Table 
2.2.  Although we do not know of any cancelled issue, it might be that issuers tend to cancel or 
withdraw offerings when there is a large decrease in the underlying commodity price. 45   
Regression analyses presented in the internet Appendix find no evidence that either the 
probability of an issue or the issue proceeds are positively correlated with past returns.  This 
finding that issues are not positively correlated with lagged returns does not support the idea that 
negative returns on the pricing date would cause issues to be cancelled.46  
                                                 
45  Conversations with bankers from the structuring desks at large financial institutions experienced with the 
structuring and issuance of retail note issuances indicate that the returns on the underlying commodity do not factor 
into the issuer’s selection of the pricing and issue date.  The issuer’s focus is on obtaining investor commitments for 
the notes.  This, however, does not exclude the possibility that customer interest is correlated with past changes in 
commodity prices. 
46 The internet appendix also documents that small issues and issues of index-linked notes are not associated with 
positive returns on the pricing date.  Because any selection bias, if it exists, is likely also to apply to these issues, this 
also suggests that the potential selection bias is not important. 
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2.3.2 Determination Date Event Study 
To address the potential selection bias, we examine the returns around the determination date 
when the issuer unwinds the hedge.  The determination date is set when the issuer structures and 
markets the CLN one or more years prior to the determination date, and the one or two-day 
returns on or around it are not plausibly subject to any selection bias.  The analysis of the price 
impacts on the determination dates also addresses any concerns that the pricing date price 
impacts are driven by information conveyed to the market by investor purchases of the CLNs.   
Our determination date sample is smaller than the pricing date sample for several reasons.  
First, many of the CLNs had not yet matured when we collected the data.  Second, many have 
caps or floors.  If the cap or floor ends up “in-the-money” the hedge is unwound gradually over 
time as the cap or floor becomes in-the-money, not on the determination date.  We exclude such 
CLNs from the determination date sample. Third, some issues are auto-callable in the event that 
the underlying commodity price reaches a specified level on one of a specified set of dates, and 
we also exclude these.  Thus, the determination date sample consists of (a) issues without caps, 
floors, or autocall features, (b) non-autocallable issues with caps or floors that are out-of-the-
money on the determination date, and (c) autocallable issues for which the underlying 
commodity price did not reach the call price at any time during the life of the CLN and any caps 
or floors were out-of-the-money on the determination date.  For these issues we can be confident 
that the hedge trade was unwound on or close to the determination date. 
Table 2.3 shows that the returns around the determination dates are nearly the mirror 
image of those on the pricing dates, though not as highly significant due to the smaller sample 
sizes.  The determination date (Day 0) abnormal returns are 14, 34, and 37 basis points for 
the three subsamples of increasing proceeds, with the latter two point estimates being statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  Similar to the pricing date analysis, the point estimates indicate 
continuations on Day 1. Average abnormal returns for the two day window, Days[0,1], are 27, 
49, and 51 basis points across the subsamples of increasing issue proceeds, with the latter two 
point estimates also being statistically significant at the 5% level.  The point estimates are 
consistent with the hypothesis that larger unwind trades are associated with larger price declines, 
though the small size of the determination date sample prevents the differences in the abnormal 
return of the different subsamples from being statistically significant.     
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The average raw returns in the bottom half of Table 2.3 are of similar magnitudes to the 
average abnormal returns.  The determination date returns for the three subsamples are 12, 38, 
and 42 basis points, with the latter two estimates carrying t-statistics of 2.50. The average two-
day raw returns are 18, 41, and 39 basis points, with the latter two estimates being 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The counts of negative returns below the t-
statistics reveal that at least half of the abnormal and raw returns are negative for each 
subsample, though given the smaller sample sizes non-parametric tests for the number of returns 
less than zero similar to that in equation (5) are significant at conventional levels for only a few 
cases. 
2.3.3 Returns over longer horizons 
Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the average abnormal and raw returns of the front-month futures 
contracts for  days 2 through 10 following CLN pricing dates, as well as cumulative returns 
during the intervals [2,10],  [2,15], and [2,20],  for the subsamples of different sizes.  Panel B 
presents the corresponding returns following the determination dates.  Each panel also reports t-
statistics in parentheses below the average returns.  Often, especially for the energy futures 
contracts that have monthly expirations, the 20-day horizons extend past the maturity of the 
contract that is the front-month contract.  In these cases, after the original front-month contract 
has matured we use the returns of the next contract that becomes the front-month contract as the 
previous contract matures. 
The results in Table 2.4 provide no evidence that the positive two-day returns during the 
window [0,1] are reversed during days 2 through 20.  For the pricing date sample in Panel A, the 
average abnormal and raw returns across days 2 through 10 are generally small and more often 
positive than negative.  The cumulative abnormal returns for days [2,10], [2,15], and [2,20] in 
the final three columns are positive except for the subsample of CLNs having proceeds of at least 
$10 million during days [2,15] and [2,20], and the magnitudes of these reversals are small (17 
and 6 basis points) relative to the 45 basis point price impact during days [0,1] and are 
insignificant (t-statistics of 0.45 and0.13). The cumulative raw returns are positive for all 
intervals [2,10], [2,15], and [2,20]  and all subsamples.  They are statistically significant at the 
5%, 5%, and 10% levels over the interval [2,10] for the three subsamples, and are statistically 
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significant at the 5% level over the interval [2,20] for the subsample of issues with proceeds of at 
least $2 million. 
The average returns following the determination date shown in Panel B also provide no 
evidence of reversals.  Both the abnormal and raw returns on days 2 through 10 are negative for 
at least half of the days for each subsample, and the cumulative returns for days [2,10], [2,15], 
and [2,20] are negative for the two subsamples of larger issues .  Although none of these 
cumulative returns are significantly different from zero, the generally negative point estimates in 
Panel B suggest continuation of the two-day returns over the interval [0,1] rather than reversals.  
The lack of evidence of reversals is consistent with recent models in which financial institutions 
have funding constraints and there are limits to arbitrage. 47   We pursue this issue in Section 2.4. 
The results are also consistent with the model of Sockin and Xiong (2014) in which 
informational frictions lead commodity market participants to misinterpret commodity demand 
that is not related to macroeconomic fundamentals as conveying information about future 
macroeconomic growth, impacting market prices. 
2.3.4 Impacts on spot prices 
For most of the sample commodities the prices of the front-month futures contracts serve as 
proxies for the spot prices.  For example, a majority of the spot price data available on 
Bloomberg for the sample commodities consist of the S&P GSCI Spot Price indexes, which are 
identified as “S&P GSCI Spot Brent Crude,”  “S&P GSCI Spot Copper,” “S&P GSCI Spot 
Corn,” etc.  These data are widely used and cited as measures of commodity spot prices.  
However, these S&P GSCI Spot Price indexes are constructed from the prices of the 
commodities’ front-month futures contracts. Thus, the results showing price impacts in the front-
month futures contracts also apply to standard, widely used benchmarks for commodity spot 
prices. The results in Table 2.4 showing no reversals over Days[2,20]  are evidence that the price 
                                                 
47 The lack of reversals we find also is consistent with some of the index inclusion literature.  Shleifer (1986) finds 
that stocks experience large, positive abnormal returns when added to the S&P 500, and interprets this as evidence 
that demand curves for individual stocks slope downward.  Shleifer (1986) finds no evidence of post-issuance 
reversals during the period after index investing became prominent, implying the price impacts are permanent.  
Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) find permanent price impacts to stocks in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index 
when the exchange re-weighted the index constituents.  However, Harris and Gurel (1986) find evidence of reversals 
following S&P 500 index inclusions over longer horizons. 
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impacts continue to the futures contract maturities,  at which time spot-futures arbitrage forces 
the spot and futures prices to be identical or nearly so.   
Table 2.5 confirms that spot prices are impacted by examining price changes in the set of 
commodities for which high-quality price data from markets for immediate delivery are 
available. These commodities are the metals with spot trading on the London Metals Exchange, 
along with corn, wheat, and soybeans traded for immediate delivery in Chicago.48  The results in 
Panel A show that average abnormal and raw two-day (Days[0,1]) returns  are between 31 and 
41 basis points and 50 and 67 basis points, respectively, for the different subsamples.  The sizes 
of the various subsamples are considerably smaller than those used in the main results in Table 
2.2, but the t-statistics nonetheless show significance at conventional levels, ranging from 2.38 to 
4.49.   
For comparison, Panel B presents the average abnormal and raw future returns for the 
same issues.  The two-day futures returns are similar to the two-day spot returns, with the futures 
returns being slightly larger in some cases and slightly smaller in others.  The largest difference 
between the spot and futures returns is for the abnormal returns in the subsample with proceeds 
of at least $10 million, where the average futures return is only 9 basis points greater than the 
average spot return.  This is the smallest subsample, and the difference is not statistically 
significant.  These results showing that spot prices for immediate delivery are affected and move 
together with front-month futures prices are unsurprising because movements in futures prices 
combined with lack of movement in spot prices would result in arbitrage opportunities if the 
cash-and-carry arbitrage relations were satisfied prior to the pricing dates. 
A related mechanism by which changes in futures prices can get transferred to spot prices 
is as follows.  Because financial traders carry large net long positions and their open interest is 
large relative to total open interest, the net futures position of other traders must be short.  
Market participants can hedge their net short futures positions by buying and storing the physical 
commodity.49   Issuers’ demand for additional long positions to hedge their CLN issues requires 
                                                 
48 We drop three issues for which spot price data are not available on the pricing date. 
49  Anecdotal evidence from the financial press suggests that hedging by buying and storing the physical 
commodities is important, with dealers such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley holding 
large inventories owned by themselves and their clients (Crittenden and Berthelsen 2013), and the existence of large 
physical inventories controlled by financial institutions that are withheld from the spot market has been controversial 
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increases in the short positions of other traders, which will be passed through to the spot market 
by traders who hedge their short futures positions by buying and storing the physical commodity.  
This is a possible mechanism by which the order flow of financial traders is passed through to 
the markets for physical commodities. 
2.3.5 Price impacts across the futures term structure 
Liquidity considerations suggest that issuers will execute most of the hedge trades in the front-
month futures contracts.  Some of the CLN payoffs are based on the cumulated returns to the 
front-month contracts, providing another reason for issuers of such CLNs to hedge using the 
front-month contracts.  On the other hand, hedging using the front-month contracts creates the 
need to roll the hedge to later-maturing contracts as contracts mature.  In addition, issuers have 
an incentive to distribute the hedge trades across the futures term structure so that the price 
impacts in different futures contracts are about the same.  For example, if hedge trades cause 
price impact in the front-month contract but prices of later-maturing contracts are unaffected, the 
issuer can reduce its hedging costs by shifting some of the hedge trade to later-maturing 
contracts.  This suggests that there will also be price impacts in later-maturing contracts.  In 
addition, even if the issuer executes the hedge trade in the front-month contract, other traders 
executing calendar spread trades will pass the demand to later-maturing contracts, providing 
another reason to expect some price impact in later maturing contracts. 
The three panels of Table 2.6 present the pricing date price impacts for the front-month 
and next two futures contracts in the three subsamples with proceeds greater than or equal to $2 
million, $5 million, and $10 million, respectively.  For the next contract the average abnormal 
and raw returns are positive and either smaller than or approximately equal to those for the front-
month contract, and the Day 0 and Days[0,1] returns are significantly different from zero.  
Similarly, for the third contract the average abnormal and raw returns are positive and either 
smaller than or approximately equal to those for the second contract, and the Day 0 and 
Days[0,1] returns are significantly different from zero.  These results are as expected. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Fitzpatrick 2013, Trindle 2013). Shumsky (2013) discusses the stockpiling of physical metals inventory in 
warehouses by commodities trading firms hedging short futures positions.    
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2.4 Cross-sectional regressions 
We next use cross-sectional regressions explaining the abnormal returns on Days[0,1] to explore 
potential explanations for the price impacts documented above. 
2.4.1 Financial constraints and limits to arbitrage 
 Recent models view financial intermediaries as the marginal investors in financial markets, 
especially in the commodities market (Etula 2013 and Adrian, Etula, and Muir 2014).  These 
models emphasize the role of financial intermediaries as sophisticated arbitrageurs whose risk 
positions ameliorate mispricings of similar securities (Mitchell and Pulvino 2012).  Consistent 
with this , Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) find that deleveraging of broker-dealers is associated 
with financial market anomalies .  This view implies that the price impacts should be increasing 
in the size of the hedge trades due to limits to financial intermediaries’ capacity to take the other 
side of the trades, and also that they should be larger during the recent financial crisis when 
financial intermediaries experienced funding constraints.  
The cross-sectional regressions employ several proxies for the magnitude of the hedge 
trade and corresponding order imbalances. 50   The first proxy is for the number of futures 
contracts the CLN issuer would need to trade in order to hedge completely its CLN liability.  We 
normalize the number of futures contracts by the open interest in the two nearest futures 
contracts, since these are the most liquid futures contracts (Mou 2010), and call the normalized 
variable RelativeIssueSize.   Assuming the option elasticity (V/F)×(F/V) is the same across 
CLNs, where V is the CLN proceeds and F is the futures price of the front-month futures 
contract, RelativeIssueSize captures the cross-sectional variation in the hedge trade size relative 
to the open interest in the reference commodity futures contracts.  The financialization 
hypothesis predicts that the abnormal returns in the individual commodity futures around CLN 
pricing (determination) dates are positively (negatively) correlated with RelativeIssueSize.  
Column (1) of Panels A and B of Table 2.7 presents estimates of the regression model 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 0 + 1 × 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,                     (5) 
                                                 
50 Direct estimation of the sizes of the hedge trades for the sample CLNs would require many pricing models, one 
for each variety of CLN.  Since CLN structures can require complex pricing models to account for embedded option 
features, implementing pricing models for all or most of our sample of CLNs is not reasonably feasible. 
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where the dependent variable, 𝐴𝑅𝑖 , is the two-day abnormal return to the reference 
commodity’s front-month futures price for the ith CLN defined in Section 2.3.  The coefficient 
estimate for RelativeIssueSize of 0.536 and t-statistic of 6.40 for the pricing date subsample in 
Panel A indicate that this proxy for hedge trade size is positively and significantly related to the 
pricing date abnormal returns.  The estimated coefficient is also economically significant.  To 
illustrate, the mean and standard deviation of RelativeIssueSize are 0.33% and 1.26%, 
respectively.  At its mean value, RelativeIssueSize corresponds to an abnormal return of 30 basis 
points, and a one standard deviation increase in RelativeIssueSize corresponds to a 97 basis point 
abnormal return. 
The determination date results in Panel B are similar.  The point estimate of 1.177 on 
RelativeIssueSize is highly significant with a t-statistic of 3.0.  While the point estimate is larger 
in Panel B, the mean of RelativeIssueSize is smaller, at 0.19% and its standard deviation is 
0.415%.  With all variables at their means, the average unwind trade corresponds to a 24 basis 
point abnormal return, and a one standard deviation increase in RelativeIssueSize maps to a 73 
basis point change in the abnormal return.  
RelativeIssueSize is an imperfect proxy for the hedge trade size.  An alternative proxy is 
the abnormal futures trading volume around the CLN pricing or determination date.  We define 
AbnormalVolume as the number of contracts traded in the reference commodity’s front month 
futures contract during the two-day window around the CLN pricing or determination date, Days 
[0,1], minus the trailing 60-day average daily futures contract volume.  For comparison across 
commodities, we normalize the abnormal volume by open interest in the two front contracts.  
Column (2) of Table 2.7 presents the results for the regression model 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 0 + 𝛾2 ×  𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖.                       (6) 
The point estimate of 0.0054 for the pricing date sample in Panel A indicates that the size 
of the abnormal return is positively related to the average two-day AbnormalVolume.  In Panel B, 
the coefficient estimate is nearly the mirror image, 0.0064, indicating that the unwind trades are 
correlated with price declines on the determination date.   
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We also estimate an alternative specification, including as covariates the volume during 
the two-day event window (2-DayVolume) and twice the average volume over the previous 60 
days (2×AverageVolume), because the price impact might be smaller in commodities generally 
having higher trading volumes; AverageVolume is multiplied by 2 to be consistent with the 
variable 2-DayVolume.  Both of these variables are normalized by the open interest in the two 
front-month contracts.  Column (3) of Table 2.7 presents the estimates for the regression model 
i430 )2()-2(   umeAverageVolDayVolumeARi .                 (7) 
Consistent with the previous results and the interpretation that CLN issuers’ hedge trades 
impact prices, the pricing date (Panel A) coefficient estimate for 2-DayVolume is positive and 
significant at the 5% level.  Similarly, the determination date (Panel B) coefficient estimate for 
2-DayVolume is negative and significant.  The coefficient estimates on 2×AverageVolume in 
both Panels A and B are consistent with the interpretation that the price impacts are smaller for 
commodity futures normally having higher trading volume.   
The results in columns (4) through (6) extend the analysis by incorporating the role of 
financial intermediaries’ funding constraints.  Specifically, based on the leverage factors in 
Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) we define the crisis period to be the fourth quarter of 2008 
through the end of 2009, and include in the regressions a crisis dummy variable that takes the 
value one during the crisis and zero otherwise.51  The point estimates on the crisis period dummy 
variable are positive for the pricing dates (Panel A) and negative for the determination dates 
(Panel B).  The estimates are statistically significant in 5 of the 6 specifications.  According to 
these estimates, after controlling for proxies for the hedge trade size, abnormal returns around the 
pricing date are approximately 83 basis points larger during the crisis period.  Around 
determination dates, the abnormal returns are 228 basis points lower during the crisis period.   
Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2014) find that financial traders reduced their net long 
positions during the crisis period while hedgers accommodated the reduction by reducing net 
short hedges.  The finding that the CLN determination date crisis period point estimates are 
larger in magnitude (228 basis points) than the corresponding pricing date estimates (+83 basis 
                                                 
51 We select this range because the leverage factor is consistently negative over this period.  The results are robust to 
extending the crisis period to include the second and third quarters of 2008. 
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points) is consistent with the idea that unwinding of the hedge trades conducted during the crisis 
competed with liquidations of other financial investors and corresponded to larger price declines.  
We also note that point estimates of the coefficients on the proxies for the hedge trade size 
generally become more precise after including the crisis period indicator.    
If one assumes that uncertainty about future fundamentals was greater during the crisis 
period then the results are also consistent with the model of Sockin and Xiong (2014) in which 
commodity market participants can misinterpret commodity trades that are not based on 
information as conveying information about future fundamentals, causing them to affect prices. 
The internet appendix confirms the regression results regarding the price impacts during 
the crisis period by reporting the results of an event study that looks at the average abnormal 
returns in pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis subsamples.  The pricing date average abnormal and 
raw returns during the two day window Days[0,1] are larger during the crisis period compared to 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, consistent with the regression results. 
2.4.2 High versus low-commission CLNs 
Some of the OTC CLNs have low or zero commissions.  Our conversations with bankers from 
the structuring desks of major financial institutions confirm that institutional investors often face 
lower fee schedules when purchasing structured products than other, less sophisticated investors.  
These low-commission CLNs might be reasonable speculative vehicles for fixed income money 
managers whose mandates forbid investing in ETFs or derivatives.  To the extent that such fixed 
income managers have valuable information about future commodity prices, their purchases of 
low-commission CLN issues might convey information to the market. 
 The regression results reported in columns (7) to (9) of Table 2.7 Panel A address this 
possibility by repeating the pricing date regression analyses with the addition of a dummy 
variable that takes the value one for a high commission issue and zero for a low commission 
issue.  A CLN issue is considered to be high commission if the commission rate disclosed in the 
pricing supplement is greater than or equal to one percent.  The null hypothesis that neither the 
low nor high-commission CLN issues convey information to the market implies that the 
coefficient on the high-commission dummy variable should be zero, while the alternative 
hypothesis that the low-commission issues convey information implies that it should be negative.  
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The results in Panel A show that the coefficient on the high-commission dummy variable in 
column (7) is not statistically significantly different from zero and the point estimate is actually 
positive, providing no evidence that low-commission CLN issues convey information to the 
market.  The estimates on the high commission dummy variable in regressions (8) and (9) are 
also insignificant, with t-statistics of only 0.62 and 0.060.  Internet Appendix Table 2.6 
confirms this finding by presenting the results of an event study comparing the pricing date 
returns of the high and low-commission issues.   
2.5 Conclusion 
The hedge trades of financial institutions issuing CLNs are new inflows to the commodities 
futures market reflecting investor demand for exposure to commodity prices.  They have 
significantly positive and economically meaningful impacts on commodity futures prices around 
the pricing dates of the CLNs when the hedge trades are executed, and significantly negative 
price impacts around the determination dates when the hedge trades are unwound.  Regression 
analyses show that the abnormal futures returns are positively correlated with proxies for the size 
of the issuers’ hedge trades, and larger during the financial crisis period.      
The prices of the front-month futures contracts that are the focus of the analysis are 
widely used proxies for commodity spot prices.  We confirm that the CLN issues also impact 
commodity spot prices by also examining the changes in the spot prices of the commodities for 
which high-quality spot price data are available.  
These findings are consistent with models in which financial institutions have funding 
constraints and there are limits to arbitrage, and support the view that the trades of financial 
institutions play an important role in price formation in the commodities futures markets.  The 
results are also consistent with the model of Sockin and Xiong (2014) in which informational 
frictions prevent commodity market participants from observing fundamentals, causing them to 
misinterpret demand for commodity positions that is not based on information or related to 
macroeconomic fundamentals as conveying information about future macroeconomic growth, 
impacting market prices.  
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2.6 Tables 
Table 2.1 
Numbers of Issues and Total Proceeds of the Commodity-Linked Notes, by Year 
Numbers of issues and aggregate proceeds of U.S. commodity-linked notes (CLNs) issued each year between January 1, 2003 and January 14, 2014. The sample 
consists of all CLNs with pricing supplements in the S.E.C.’s EDGAR database issued by the banks and other financial intermediaries identified as CLN issuers.   
The issuers consist of every financial institution that issued a commodity-linked note included in Mergent’s FISD database during the sample period, and the 
sample was then constructed by searching the EDGAR database for the issuers’ CLNs.  We categorize the sample into six groups according to the type of 
underlying commodity: agricultural, energy, industrial metals, platinum and palladium, gold and silver, and diversified indexes and commodity baskets.  The 
category diversified indexes includes products based on the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index, S&P GSCI, the Deutsche Bank Liquid Commodity Index, and 
other commodity indices. CLNs based on sub-indexes or baskets of individual commodities specified by the issuer that include commodities in only one sector are 
included with the issues based on commodities in that sector.   The proceeds are in thousands of dollars. 
Underlying 
Commodity 
Agriculture Energy 
Industrial 
Metals 
Platinum and 
Palladium 
Gold and Silver 
Diversified Index 
and Commodity 
Baskets 
Full Sample 
Year No. Proceeds No. Proceeds No. Proceeds No. Proceeds No. Proceeds No. Proceeds No. Proceeds 
2003 0   0   0   0   1 26,000 4 283,840 5 309,840 
2004 0   1 73,020 0   0   2 20,651 14 508,016 17 601,687 
2005 10 397,699 0   0   0   2 7,200 31 627,406 43 1,032,305 
2006 12 44,490 15 603,043 1 15,000 0   10 152,800 53 3,220,735 91 4,036,067 
2007 17 1,111,729 37 864,977 12 1,113,000 0   7 130,655 112 3,606,139 185 6,826,500 
2008 25 3,182,529 34 8,999,389 13 2,462,750 3 225,000 20 2,428,132 186 5,743,194 281 23,040,994 
2009 28 956,595 37 9,270,339 16 54,027 1 50,000 51 1,213,710 153 1,701,632 286 13,246,303 
2010 9 309,954 39 479,971 16 285,669 7 191,665 66 1,669,858 161 1,812,544 298 4,749,661 
2011 43 970,141 63 1,140,344 27 588,888 27 247,179 96 907,706 185 2,491,470 441 6,345,729 
2012 11 134,337 195 975,031 11 99,676 9 21,131 212 1,660,213 100 1,185,669 538 4,076,058 
2013 9 43,048 285 2,934,062 1 800 16 61,951 182 1,964,181 72 957,261 565 5,961,303 
2014* 0 0 17 336,000 0 0 1 1,275 8 140,000 0 0 26 477,275 
Total 164 7,150,522 723 25,676,176 97 4,619,810 64 798,201 657 10,321,107 
 
1,071  
22,137,906 
 
2,776  
70,703,721 
Mean Proceeds 43,601   35,513   47,627   12,472   15,709   20,670   25,470 
*The sample includes issues through January 14, 2014. 
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Table 2.2 
Average Returns of Underlying Commodity Futures Around CLN Pricing Dates 
Average returns of underlying commodity front-month futures contracts around the pricing dates of the CLNs 
based on individual commodities.  The table reports the average abnormal and raw returns to the front-month 
futures contracts of the CLNs' underlying commodities on the pricing date (Day 0), the next trading day (Day 1), 
and during the two-day window Days[0,1] for three different subsamples based on the issue proceeds.  The 
average abnormal returns are based on the factor model in equation (2).  Below the average returns are t-statistics 
for the hypothesis that the average returns are equal to zero.   The table also reports the number of positive returns 
for each sub-sample and the corresponding p-value for a test of the hypothesis that the probability of a positive 
return is 0.5.  CLNs based on commodity sub-indexes that include commodities in only one commodity sector are 
included with the issues based on individual commodities in that sector.  Issues priced during the S&P GSCI roll 
impact periods, i.e. starting from five business days prior to the “Goldman Roll” until the end of the roll period, 
and ETNs are excluded.  
Sample Subset: Proceeds ≥ $2 Million   Proceeds ≥ $5 Million   Proceeds ≥ $10 Million 
Sample Size (N): N = 486   N = 335   N = 215 
Event Day: [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
                        
Regression Benchmark                     
Abnormal Return 0.22% 0.11% 0.34%   0.26% 0.13% 0.39%   0.36% 0.10% 0.45% 
(t-statistic) (3.35) (1.66) (3.61)   (3.23) (1.61) (3.48)   (3.47) (1.01) (3.18) 
Number > 0 262 254 259   184 176 182   122 109 118 
p-value 0.0466 0.1704 0.0798   0.0401 0.1910 0.0630   0.0280 0.4458 0.0862 
                        
Raw Return (Zero Benchmark)                     
Return 0.29% 0.09% 0.38%   0.32% 0.08% 0.40%   0.41% 0.11% 0.52% 
(t-statistic) (4.34) (1.33) (3.97)   (4.06) (1.05) (3.71)   (4.07) (1.22) (3.75) 
Number > 0 287 256 278   200 172 195   135 113 135 
p-value 0.0000 0.1284 0.0009   0.0002 0.3311 0.0016   0.0001 0.2477 0.0001 
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Table 2.3 
Average Returns of Underlying Commodity Futures Around  CLN Determination Dates 
Average returns of underlying commodity front-month futures contracts around the determination dates of the CLNs based on 
individual commodities.  The table reports the average abnormal and raw returns to the front-month futures contracts of the 
CLNs' underlying commodities on the pricing date (Day 0), the next trading day (Day 1), and during the two-day window 
Days[0,1] for three different subsamples based on the issue proceeds.  The average abnormal returns are based on the factor 
model in equation (2).  Below the average returns are t-statistics for the hypothesis that the average returns are equal to zero.   
The table also reports the number of positive returns for each sub-sample and the corresponding p-value for a test of the 
hypothesis that the probability of a positive return is 0.5.  CLNs based on a commodity sub-index that includes commodities in 
only one commodity sector are included with the issues based on individual commodities in that sector.  Issues with 
determination dates during the S&P GSCI roll impact periods, i.e. starting from five business days prior to the “Goldman Roll” 
until the end of the roll period, and ETNs are excluded.  
Sample Subset: Proceeds >= $2 Million   Proceeds >= $5 Million   Proceeds >= $10 Million 
Sample Size (N): N = 114    N = 69   N = 42 
Event Day: [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
                        
Regression Benchmark                     
Abnormal Return -0.14% -0.13% -0.27%   -0.34% -0.15% -0.49%   -0.37% -0.14% -0.51% 
(t-statistic) (-1.07) (-0.95) (-1.33)   (-2.05) (-0.88) (-2.07)   (-2.15) (-0.86) (-2.22) 
Number < 0 57 63 58   40 38 36   26 23 25 
p-value 0.5373 0.1514 0.4627   0.1142 0.2352 0.4050   0.0821 0.3220 0.1400 
                        
Raw Return (Zero Benchmark)                     
Return -0.12% -0.06% -0.18%   -0.38% -0.03% -0.41%   -0.42% 0.02% -0.39% 
(t-statistic) (-0.98) (-0.42) (-0.93)   (-2.50) (-0.16) (-1.65)   (-2.50) (0.14) (-1.83) 
Number < 0 61 63 57   42 35 36   30 23 26 
p-value 0.2561 0.1514 0.5373   0.0456 0.5000 0.4050   0.0040 0.3220 0.0821 
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Table 2.4 
Longer Term Average Returns of Underlying Commodity Futures Following the CLN Pricing and Determination Dates 
Average returns of CLNs' underlying commodity front-month futures contracts on and following the pricing (Panel A) and determination (Panel B) dates for 
CLNs based on individual commodities.  The two panels report the average returns on the CLNs' underlying futures contracts for up to 20 days following the 
pricing or determination date for three different subsamples based on the issue proceeds.  Event days are relative to the pricing (Panel A) or determination 
(Panel B) date.  Each section of the table first reports the average abnormal returns based on the factor model in equation (2), and below them the 
corresponding t-statistics for tests of the hypothesis that the average returns are equal to zero.  The average raw returns and their associated t-statistics are 
below the abnormal returns.  CLNs based on a commodity sub-index that includes commodities in only one commodity sector are included with the issues 
based on individual commodities in that sector. Issues priced during the S&P GSCI roll impact periods are excluded from the sample in Panel A and issues 
with determination dates during the S&P roll impact period are excluded from the sample in Panel B.  ETNs are excluded from both samples.   
Panel A:  Pricing Date Analysis 
  Event Days [0,1] 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [2,10] [2,15] [2,20] 
Proceeds 
≥ $2 
milllion                  
486 obs. 
Abnormal 
returns 0.34% -0.02% 0.07% 0.05% -0.02% 0.24% 0.03% 0.02% -0.05% 0.04% 0.37% 0.10% 0.28% 
(t-statistic) (3.61) (-0.26) (0.90) (0.62) (-0.23) (3.41) (0.43) (0.33) (-0.56) (0.55) (1.51) (0.36) (0.83) 
              Raw returns 0.38% -0.05% 0.14% 0.09% -0.03% 0.22% 0.10% 0.05% -0.04% 0.04% 0.52% 0.41% 0.65% 
(t-statistic) (3.97) (-0.67) (1.81) (1.10) (-0.33) (2.98) (1.31) (0.77) (-0.52) (0.50) (2.31) (1.51) (2.05) 
Proceeds 
≥ $5 
million                
335 obs. 
Abnormal 
returns 0.39% 0.01% 0.08% 0.11% 0.08% 0.22% 0.02% -0.01% -0.07% 0.05% 0.49% 0.10% 0.32% 
(t-statistic) (3.48) (0.14) (0.85) (1.25) (0.85) (2.57) (0.21) (-0.14) (-0.63) (0.56) (1.68) (0.27) (0.79) 
              Raw returns 0.40% -0.08% 0.16% 0.13% 0.06% 0.23% 0.08% 0.05% -0.06% 0.03% 0.60% 0.18% 0.46% 
(t-statistic) (3.71) (-0.93) (1.65) (1.33) (0.65) (2.57) (0.95) (0.53) (-0.62) (0.32) (2.19) (0.56) (1.19) 
Proceeds 
≥ $10 
milllion                     
215 obs. 
Abnormal 
returns 0.45% -0.03% 0.02% -0.11% 0.13% 0.27% -0.09% 0.10% -0.04% 0.10% 0.36% -0.17% -0.06% 
(t-statistic) (3.18) (-0.28) (0.14) (-1.05) (1.13) (2.74) (-0.84) (0.95) (-0.29) (0.90) (1.10) (-0.45) (-0.13) 
              Raw returns 0.52% -0.07% 0.14% -0.03% 0.17% 0.25% -0.04% 0.09% 0.02% 0.09% 0.62% 0.08% 0.21% 
(t-statistic) (3.75) (-0.71) (1.11) (-0.22) (1.38) (2.46) (-0.36) (0.80) (0.15) (0.83) (1.80) (0.19) (0.45) 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
Longer Term Average Returns of Underlying Commodity Futures Following the CLN Pricing and Determination Dates 
 
 
Panel B: Determination Date Analysis 
  Event Days [0,1] 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [2,10] [2,15] [2,20] 
Proceeds 
≥ $2 
milllion                 
486 obs. 
Abnormal 
returns -0.27% -0.22% -0.12% 0.19% 0.20% -0.15% -0.13% -0.02% 0.04% 0.14% -0.07% 0.19% 0.35% 
(t-statistic) (-1.33) (-1.48) (-0.77) (1.74) (1.50) (-1.12) (-0.70) (-0.17) (0.25) (1.23) (-0.15) (0.40) (0.58) 
              Raw returns -0.18% -0.12% -0.16% 0.14% 0.15% -0.12% 0.01% -0.04% 0.02% 0.13% 0.01% 0.16% 0.55% 
(t-statistic) (-0.93) (-0.77) (-0.86) (1.35) (1.10) (-0.88) (0.04) (-0.26) (0.09) (1.17) (0.02) (0.29) (0.88) 
Proceeds 
≥ $5 
million                
335 obs. 
Abnormal 
returns -0.49% -0.45% -0.27% 0.09% 0.33% -0.30% -0.33% 0.04% 0.11% 0.00% -0.78% -0.44% -0.43% 
(t-statistic) (-2.07) (-2.34) (-1.22) (0.58) (1.83) (-1.85) (-1.57) (0.20) (0.57) (0.02) (-1.43) (-0.74) (-0.60) 
              Raw returns -0.41% -0.30% -0.23% 0.03% 0.23% -0.29% -0.18% 0.16% 0.06% -0.05% -0.58% -0.46% -0.10% 
(t-statistic) (-1.65) (-1.51) (-0.96) (0.21) (1.34) (-1.81) (-0.84) (0.81) (0.25) (-0.37) (-0.96) (-0.66) (-0.12) 
Proceeds 
≥ $10 
milllion                     
215 obs. 
Abnormal 
returns -0.51% -0.50% -0.23% 0.04% 0.26% -0.36% -0.14% -0.02% 0.23% -0.08% -0.78% -0.01% -0.16% 
(t-statistic) (-2.22) (-2.30) (-0.84) (0.21) (1.19) (-1.77) (-0.52) (-0.07) (0.97) (-0.52) (-1.17) (-0.01) (-0.18) 
              Raw returns -0.39% -0.37% -0.16% 0.04% 0.17% -0.41% -0.15% 0.07% 0.21% -0.11% -0.71% -0.32% -0.28% 
(t-statistic) (-1.83) (-1.67) (-0.50) (0.21) (0.79) (-1.96) (-0.51) (0.27) (0.74) (-0.76) (-0.87) (-0.33) (-0.25) 
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Table 2.5 
Average Returns of Underlying Commodity Spot Prices Around CLN Pricing Dates 
Average returns of underlying commodity spot prices around the pricing dates of the CLNs based on individual 
commodities for which reliable spot price data are available.  The table reports the average abnormal and raw 
spot price returns on the CLNs' underlying commodities for the pricing date (Day 0), the next trading day (Day 
1), and the two day window Days[0,1]for three different subsamples based on the issue proceeds.  The abnormal 
returns are based on the factor model in equation (2).  Below the returns are t-statistics for the hypothesis that 
the average returns are equal to zero.   The table also reports the number of positive returns for each sub-sample 
and the corresponding p-values for tests of the hypothesis that the probability of a positive return is 0.5.  Panel 
B presents the futures returns for the sample CLNs included in the spot price analysis.  CLNs based on a 
commodity sub-index that includes commodities in only one commodity sector are included with the issues 
based on individual commodities in that sector.  Issues priced during the S&P GSCI roll impact periods and 
ETNs are excluded.  
Panel A: Spot Price Returns 
Sample Subset: Proceeds ≥ $2 Million   Proceeds ≥ $5 Million   Proceeds ≥ $10 Million 
Sample Size (N): N = 235   N = 166   N = 117 
Event Day: [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
Regression Benchmark                       
Abnormal Return 0.13% 0.19% 0.31%   0.21% 0.19% 0.39%   0.26% 0.15% 0.41% 
(t-statistic) (1.31) (1.90) (2.38)   (1.82) (1.84) (2.79)   (1.90) (1.31) (2.47) 
Number > 0 129 122 124   95 89 96   68 59 68 
p-value 0.0755 0.3009 0.2169   0.0370 0.1967 0.0260   0.0478 0.5000 0.0478 
Raw Return (Zero Benchmark)                     
Return 0.15% 0.34% 0.50%   0.26% 0.36% 0.61%   0.30% 0.37% 0.67% 
(t-statistic) (1.60) (3.38) (3.85)   (2.30) (3.59) (4.49)   (2.50) (3.16) (4.38) 
Number > 0 131 145 141   94 107 108   69 76 79 
p-value 0.0448 0.0002 0.0013   0.0514 0.0001 0.0001   0.0320 0.0008 0.0001 
 
 
  
77 
 
Table 2.5 (cont.) 
Average Returns of Underlying Commodity Spot Prices Around CLN Pricing Dates 
 
 
Panel B: Futures Returns for this Subsample 
Sample Subset: Proceeds ≥ $2 Million   Proceeds ≥ $5 Million   Proceeds ≥ $10 Million 
Sample Size (N): N = 235   N = 166   N = 117 
Event Day: [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
Regression Benchmark                       
Abnormal Return 0.29% -0.01% 0.28%   0.30% 0.11% 0.40%   0.37% 0.13% 0.50% 
(t-statistic) (3.14) (-0.11) (2.33)   (2.68) (1.07) (2.78)   (3.07) (1.21) (3.19) 
Number > 0 133 115 129   94 89 95   67 61 70 
p-value 0.0251 0.6522 0.0755   0.0514 0.1967 0.0370   0.0694 0.3559 0.0208 
Raw Return (Zero Benchmark)                     
Return 0.33% 0.11% 0.44%   0.35% 0.20% 0.55%   0.43% 0.28% 0.71% 
(t-statistic) (3.50) (1.19) (3.31)   (3.23) (1.95) (3.89)   (3.80) (2.45) (4.59) 
Number > 0 142 122 137   98 88 103   71 66 79 
p-value 0.0008 0.3009 0.0065   0.0121 0.2425 0.0012   0.0130 0.0977 0.0001 
 
  
78 
 
 
Table 2.6 
Average Returns Across Futures Term Structure Around CLN Pricing Dates 
Average returns across the futures term structure of underlying commodity futures contracts around the pricing 
dates of the CLNs based on individual commodities.  Panels A, B, and C report the average returns for the pricing 
date (Day 0), the next day (Day 1), and the two-day window Days[0,1] for the three shortest-term futures contracts  
for the subsamples of CLNs having proceeds of at least $2, $5, and $10 million, respectively.  Each panel first 
reports the average abnormal returns based on the factor model in equation (2) and the t-statistics for the hypothesis 
that the average returns are zero.  Below these are the average raw returns and associated t-statistics.   CLN’s based 
on a commodity sub-index that includes commodities in only one commodity sector are included with the issues 
based on individual commodities in that sector. Issues priced during the S&P GSCI roll impact periods and ETNs 
are excluded. 
Panel A: Proceeds ≥ $2 million (486 observations) 
  Front-Month   Second-Month   Third-Month 
  [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
Abnormal return 0.22% 0.11% 0.34%   0.21% 0.05% 0.26%   0.17% 0.04% 0.21% 
(t-statistic) (3.35) (1.66) (3.61)   (3.24) (0.75) (2.95)   (2.32) (0.63) (2.28) 
Raw return 0.29% 0.09% 0.38%   0.30% 0.07% 0.37%   0.26% 0.06% 0.32% 
(t-statistic) (4.34) (1.33) (3.97)   (4.51) (1.09) (3.90)   (3.50) (0.87) (3.15) 
                        
Panel B: Proceeds ≥ $5 million  (335 observations) 
    Front-Month     Second-Month     Third-Month 
  [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
Abnormal return 0.26% 0.13% 0.39%   0.24% 0.06% 0.30%   0.23% 0.06% 0.29% 
(t-statistic) (3.23) (1.61) (3.48)   (3.04) (0.77) (2.76)   (2.99) (0.78) (2.74) 
Raw return 0.32% 0.08% 0.40%   0.34% 0.07% 0.41%   0.33% 0.06% 0.39% 
(t-statistic) (4.06) (1.05) (3.71)   (4.31) (0.89) (3.72)   (4.28) (0.84) (3.67) 
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Table 2.6 (cont.) 
Average Returns Across Futures Term Structure Around CLN Pricing Dates 
 
 
Panel C: Proceeds ≥ $10 million  (215 observations) 
    Front-Month     Second-Month     Third-Month 
  [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1]   [0] [1] [0,1] 
Abnormal return 0.36% 0.10% 0.45%   0.33% 0.02% 0.34%   0.32% 0.02% 0.33% 
(t-statistic) (3.47) (1.01) (3.18)   (3.41) (0.20) (2.55)   (3.38) (0.19) (2.53) 
Raw return 0.41% 0.11% 0.52%   0.42% 0.10% 0.52%   0.41% 0.09% 0.50% 
(t-statistic) (4.07) (1.22) (3.75)   (4.45) (1.14) (3.88)   (4.44) (1.06) (3.82) 
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Table 2.7 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics from regressions of the pricing date abnormal returns of the CLNs’ underlying commodity front-month futures contract 
on proxies for the size of the hedge trade and other variables. The sample consists of CLNs linked to individual commodities, excluding the issues priced 
during the GSCI roll impact period and ETNs. For each commodity-pricing date pair, the dependent variable is the two-day (Days [0,1]) abnormal return of 
the front-month futures contract for the CLN’s underlying commodity, based on the factor model in equation (2).  Model (1) uses the Relative Issue Size, 
defined as total proceeds divided by dollar open interest of the two-nearest expiring futures contracts, as a proxy for the  hedge size trade. Model (2) uses 
Abnormal Volume, computed as the average volume in the reference commodity’s front month futures contract during the two-day window around the CLN 
issuance, Days [0,1], minus the trailing 60-day average daily futures volume in those contracts.  Model (3) regresses the abnormal returns on the volume 
during the two-day event window (2-DayVolume) and twice the 60-day average volume  (2 × AverageVolume).  Regressions (4) to (6) repeat (1) to (3) but 
include a crisis period dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the end of 2009.  Regressions (7) to (9) add a high-
commission dummy that takes the value one for any CLNs having commissions and fees greater than or equal to 1% of the proceeds.  The independent 
variables, AbnormalVolume, 2-DayVolume, and AverageVolume are normalized by the open interest in the two-nearest expiring futures contracts. 
Panel A: Pricing Date Analyis 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal 
Futures Return 
Regression Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Relative Issue Size 0.5360***     0.5203***     0.5335***     
  (6.40)     (6.09)     (6.09)     
Abnormal Volume   0.0054**     0.0055**     0.0055**   
    (2.30)     (2.36)     (2.36)   
2-day Volume     0.0053**     0.0054**     0.0054** 
      (2.21)     (2.26)     (2.28) 
2 × Average Volume     
-
0.0056**     -0.0058**     
-
0.0057** 
      (-1.97)     (-2.06)     (-2.01) 
Crisis Dummy       0.0035 0.0083** 0.0083** 0.0037 0.0083** 0.0083** 
        (0.93) (2.17) (2.17) (1.03) (2.26) (2.26) 
High Commission Dummy             0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0015 
              (0.73) (-0.62) (-0.60) 
Constant 0.0012 0.0031** 0.0035 0.0009 0.0024** 0.0029 -0.0005 0.0034 0.0037 
  (1.05) (2.84) (1.30) (0.79) (2.08) (1.09) (-0.23) (1.61) (1.19) 
No. of observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 
R2 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 
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Table 2.7 (cont.) 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Panel B: Determination Date Analysis 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal 
Futures Return 
Regression Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relative Issue Size -1.1769***     -0.6748     
  (-3.00)     (-1.52)     
Abnormal Volume   -0.0064*     -0.0071**   
    (-1.87)     (-2.15)   
2-day Volume     -0.0061*     -0.0068** 
      (-1.72)     (-2.02) 
2 × Average Volume     0.0078*     0.0082* 
      (1.74)     (1.90) 
Crisis Dummy       -0.0166** 
-
0.0228*** 
-
0.0227*** 
        (-2.30) (-3.65) (-3.62) 
Constant -0.0001 -0.0031* -0.0035 0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0032 
  (-0.01) (-1.83) (-1.12) (0.06) (-0.96) (-0.72) 
No. of observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 
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Chapter 3  
The Price Impact of Large Hedging Trades 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Financial institutions that issue structured equity products (SEPs) based on individual U.S. 
common stocks hedge their liabilities on the SEPs by trading in the underlying common stocks.  
This paper provides direct evidence that the issuers’ hedging activity has economically 
significant impacts on the prices of the underlying stocks, which typically have large market 
capitalizations and high liquidity.  For some “brands” of SEPs, a conservative estimate is that the 
issuers' hedging trades raise the prices of the underlying common stocks by about 80 basis points 
on the pricing dates of the SEPs, with much of the price impact concentrated in the last 30 
minutes prior to the close of trading.  For one kind of SEP that typically references common 
stocks with market capitalizations falling in the largest NYSE decile, a conservative estimate of 
the price impact on the pricing date is about 130 basis points.  An 80 or 130 basis point impact 
on the price of a high market capitalization stock is clearly economically significant.  Thus, these 
results provide direct evidence that hedging of derivatives trades has important, economically 
significant impacts on the prices of even the very largest and most liquid U.S. common stocks. 
Whether, and the extent to which, the trading of equity derivatives impacts the prices of 
the individual common stocks has long been of interest.  Investors, exchange officials, and 
regulators have been concerned that listed options trading might impact underlying stock prices 
ever since individual equity options began trading in 1973.52  However, there is only limited 
evidence that the trading of equity derivatives on individual equities impacts the prices of 
underlying stocks, despite a substantial effort to identify the possible impact of such trading.53 
For example, Mayhew and Mihov (2005) find that the apparent effects of option introductions on 
the price levels of underlying common stocks found in earlier papers disappear when the price 
                                                 
52 Whaley (2003) contains an account of the early history of exchange-traded options. 
53 This literature is surveyed in Pearson, Poteshman, and White (2008).  A separate strand of literature examines the 
impact of futures trading on the volatility of underlying stock indices (e.g., Bessembinger and Seguin (1992) and 
Gulen and Mayhew (2000)), especially at index expiration (e.g., Barclay, Henderschott, and Jones (2006) and the 
references therein).  Researchers have also studied the possible impact of mortgage hedging and OTC derivatives 
dealers’ hedging on interest rates (Perli and Sack (2003), Chang, McManus, and Ramagopal (2005), Kambhu 
(1998), and Kambhu and Mosser (2004)). 
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level changes are benchmarked against the price changes of matched firms that do not have 
options introduced.  Somewhat similarly, Lamoureux and Panikkath (1994), Freund, McCann, 
and Webb (1994), and Bollen (1998) demonstrate that the apparent decrease in underlying stock 
volatility caused by option introduction reported in earlier papers likely stems from the 
conjunction of the facts that stock volatility is mean-reverting and options exchanges tend to 
introduce options following increases in volatility.  In particular, these researchers find that the 
decrease in underlying stock volatility following the beginning of option trading also occurs in 
samples of matched control stocks on which the exchanges do not introduce options. 
We are aware of only two studies that provide convincing evidence that the trading of 
derivatives based on individual common stocks influences the prices of the underlying stocks.  
Ni, Pearson, and Poteshman (2005) document that option market makers' rebalancing of delta 
hedges due to the rapid changes in option deltas as the time to expiration goes to zero causes 
stock prices to “pin” or cluster at option strike prices on option expiration dates,54 while Pearson, 
Poteshman, and White (2008) find that option market makers’ rebalancing of delta hedges due to 
changes in stock prices affects the volatilities of the underlying stock prices.  This existing 
evidence is indirect in the sense that these researchers do not observe the order imbalances due to 
hedge trading, and thus are not able to associate the order imbalances with the underlying stock 
price movements.  In addition, Ni, Pearson, and Poteshman (2005) and Pearson, Poteshman, and 
White (2008) study only the impacts of hedge rebalancing, not the impacts of the initial hedge 
trades that market makers enter into when new options positions are established.  Initial hedge 
trades are typically larger than the trades required to rebalance existing hedges, and thus seem 
likely to have larger impacts on the prices of the underlying stocks.  However, it is difficult to 
study the impact of the initial hedge trades using exchange-traded options because it is difficult 
to disentangle the price impact of the hedge trade from the possible price impact of any 
information contained in the fact that an option or options on the underlying stock just traded.  
The present paper using a sample of SEPs overcomes this difficulty while maintaining the 
advantage of knowing when the hedge trade is executed because, as explained below, the fact 
                                                 
54 The time derivative of the option delta can be very large for a near-the-money option with a short time to 
expiration, as the absolute value of the delta must go from approximately 0.5 to either 1 or 0, depending on whether 
the option expires in- or out-of-the-money. This mechanism causes pinning or “anti-pinning”, depending on whether 
the aggregate net position of option maker makers is purchased or written. 
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that a SEP is being sold to retail investors does not convey information about the fundamentals 
of the company whose stock serves as the reference asset. 
Publicly offered SEPs sold to retail investors provide a convenient laboratory to study the 
impact of derivatives hedging for several reasons. First, the offering documents are freely 
available, and, among other things, provide the pricing dates.  Knowledge of the pricing dates 
tells us approximately when the issuers execute the hedge trades, and thus allows us to identify 
the price impacts of the hedge trades. Second, a significant subset of the larger issues are 
consistently structured, making it feasible to implement valuation models for the SEPs.  The 
valuation models allow us to estimate the sizes of the initial delta hedges, and confirm that the 
order imbalances on the pricing dates estimated from TAQ data are consistent with the estimated 
sizes of the initial delta hedges.  Third, as discussed above, issuances of SEPs are unlikely to 
convey information to the market.  Because the SEPs are liabilities of the issuing financial 
institution (which hedges its exposure) and not of the company whose stock serves as the 
reference asset, the issues do not convey information held by the management of the company 
whose stock serves as the reference asset.  Also, SEPs are unlikely to convey private information 
held by the buyers, because the high embedded fees or “markups” on the SEPs make them 
inefficient vehicles for taking advantage of underpricing of their underlying stocks. Consistent 
with these arguments, the return reversals following the pricing date that we document below are 
a compelling piece of the evidence that the pricing date price impacts do not reflect information. 
This paper uses a two different samples of SEPs.   The first sample consists of two 
“brands” of SEPs, the SPARQS issued by Morgan Stanley, and the STRIDES, a similar product 
issued by Merrill Lynch (now Bank of America Merrill Lynch).  The SPARQS and STRIDES 
are well-suited for detailed analysis for several reasons.  First, issues of these products were 
structured consistently, so that variations of only one valuation model need be implemented. 
Second, they are relatively short-term: the SPARQS have mean (median) times to maturity and 
first call of 403 (385) and 212 (201) days, respectively, while the corresponding statistics for the 
STRIDES are 639 (731) and 318 (367) days.  These relatively short times to maturity and call 
imply that useful implied volatility information is available from the prices of traded options, 
allowing for the computation of accurate valuations and hedge ratios. The computed hedge ratios 
provide estimates of quantities of underlying stock that must be purchased on the pricing dates.  
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Third, for the SPARQS and STRIDES the elasticities of the product values with respect to the 
underlying stock price were larger than for the typical SEP, resulting in larger hedging trades and 
larger, easier to detect, price impacts.  Finally, there were large numbers of SPARQS and 
relatively large numbers of STRIDES, allowing for reasonably powerful tests. 
Our main finding using the first sample is that on the pricing date the average return on 
the underlying stocks is about 100 basis points.  On the next day there is a reversal of about 80 
basis points, which provides a more conservative estimate of the price impact of the hedging 
trades.  For the STRIDES, for which issue sizes tend to be larger, the pricing date price impact 
and next day reversal are about 160 and 130 basis points, respectively.  The reversals are 
compelling evidence that the price movements we observe are due to the hedging trades rather 
than to any information conveyed by the SEPs issues, and provide conservative estimates of the 
price impact of the hedging trades. 
We estimate the cumulative signed order imbalances in the underlying stocks on the 
pricing dates using data from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database available from the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and find that these TAQ-based estimates of the cumulative order 
imbalances are on average approximately equal to our model-based estimates of the required 
hedge trades.  Regression analyses show that the estimated cumulative order imbalances are 
highly correlated with the model-based estimates of the quantities of stock needed to hedge the 
SEPs. 
We use a second, larger sample to show that the main finding of price impacts is not 
restricted to SPARQS and STRIDES.  Specifically, we identify all publicly registered SEP issues 
between 1994 and 2009, and study the returns of the common stocks for which SEPs with gross 
proceeds greater than or equal to $5 million or $10 million were issued on a single day.  We find 
pricing date price impacts of about 30 or 45 basis points for issues with proceeds of at least $5 
million or $10 million, respectively, followed by significant reversals on the next day. The result 
of a smaller price impact in the total sample should be expected, because the typical SEP issue in 
the larger sample has considerably less sensitivity to the underlying stock price than do the 
SPARQS and STRIDES.  Thus, the required hedge trade involves a smaller purchase of the 
underlying stock. 
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For the first sample of SPARQS and STRIDES for which we implement valuation 
models, we know both the magnitude of the hedge trades and the resulting price movements 
attributable to them.  Thus, these results provide new estimates of the impact of trading volume 
on the prices of large-capitalization U.S. common stocks.  Interestingly, our estimates of the 
price impact of trading volume are large relative to some other estimates that have appeared in 
the literature, e.g. Obizhaeva (2009), which at first glance might seem puzzling.  One possible 
resolution of the puzzle stems from the observations that (i) the offering prices of the SPARQS 
are based on the closing stock price on the pricing date, and the payoffs of the STRIDES are 
decreasing in the volume-weighted average price on the pricing date; and (ii) the issuers execute 
the hedging trades on the pricing date, impacting both the closing price and the volume-weighted 
average price.  As we discuss in Section 3.5 below, these observations imply that the issuers do 
not have incentives to minimize the price impact of the hedging trades. 
The next section of the paper describes the SEPs used in the sample and the data sources.  
Section 3.3 contains the main results regarding the price impact of SPARQS and STRIDES 
hedge trades.  Section 3.4 considers the price impact for the universe of publicly issued 
structured equity products.  Section 3.5 briefly compares our estimates of price impact to the 
estimates of Obizhaeva (2009), which are the other estimates most comparable to ours.  Section 
3.6 briefly concludes. 
3.2 Sample and Data 
SEPs are equity-linked notes issued by an investment bank or investment banking subsidiary of a 
commercial bank, and have payments based on the stock price of another company, a stock 
index, or multiple stock prices or stock indexes.  This study restricts the sample to SEPs linked to 
individual equities.  SEPs are marketed primarily to retail customers, as noted by Pratt (1995) 
and Bethel and Ferrel (2007).55  Sometimes the issuing financial institution arranges for the SEP 
to be listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), NASDAQ, or the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) following issuance, providing at least some secondary market liquidity to the 
investors.  It is worth emphasizing that SEPs are liabilities of the issuing financial institutions, 
not the companies whose stocks serve as the reference assets. 
                                                 
55 We thank Gang Hu for verifying that at least one popular product, Morgan Stanley’s SPARQS, almost never 
appear in the extensive dataset of institutional trades used in Hu (2009). 
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SEPs are issued based on the issuers’ “shelf” registration statements, and each issue is 
described in a pricing supplement to the prospectus. The issuers file the pricing supplements 
describing the SEPs with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which makes 
them available through its EDGAR database.56 Each pricing supplement contain the terms of one 
or several SEPs, e.g. the maturity, coupon rate, any call provision or barrier, and the exchange 
ratio, multiplier, or other provision that determines the number of shares of the underlying 
common stock (or cash payment) received by the investor. The pricing supplement also indicates 
the pricing date and time (e.g., the close of trading) when the issue is priced.  All of the issues in 
our sample were priced as of the close of trading in the underlying stock on the pricing date.  
When a financial institution believes that there is demand for a SEP based on a particular 
common stock or stock index it can quickly structure, market, and price a product.  The SEPs are 
then sold to investors at about the time or shortly after they are priced, and actually issued 
several days later. The issuing firm hedges its liability on the SEP by buying shares of the 
underlying stock near the time when the SEPs are priced. 
The first sample, used in Section 3.3, consists of the SPARQS and STRIDES issued by 
Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch (now Bank of America Merrill Lynch), respectively. During 
our sample period the Morgan Stanley SPARQS were the most common of the publicly offered 
SEP’s based on individual equities.  From the first SPARQS issue in June of 2001 through June 
2009, Morgan Stanley issued 124 SPARQS based either on individual equities or American 
Depositary Receipts, with total proceeds of $3,162,820,380.  An example is the issue based on 
National Semiconductor that was priced and sold on April 23, 2004 and issued on April 30, 
2004.  These securities had a maturity of May 15, 2005, slightly more than one year after the 
issue date, a coupon rate of 10% per year, a face value and issue price of $23.105, equal to one-
half of the April 23 closing price of National Semiconductor.  Morgan Stanley could call these 
SPARQS at any time between October 30, 2004 and May 5, 2005, at an increasing schedule of 
call prices chosen so that if Morgan Stanley called the SPARQS the payments received by the 
investor, including the past interest payments already received, would provide an internal rate of 
return or “yield to call” of 20.5% per year.  If Morgan Stanley did not call the SPARQS, on the 
maturity date of May 15, 2005 the investor would receive at Morgan Stanley’s option either one-
                                                 
56 The SEC’s EDGAR database is accessible at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.  The pricing supplements are 
usually Form 424B3, but sometimes Form 424B2. 
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half share of National Semiconductor or a cash payment equal to one-half of the National 
Semiconductor closing share price on May 5, 2005.  Because the call feature limits the possible 
payoffs, a SPARQS is similar to a covered call position in one-half share National 
Semiconductor, where the high coupon of 10% per year is the mechanism through which the 
investor receives the call premium.  A difference between a SPARQS and an ordinary covered 
call position is that the SPARQS’ call price increases over time, creating an incentive for Morgan 
Stanley to call the SPARQS early even though National Semiconductor did not pay dividends.  
Exchange ratios of one, one-half, and one-fourth were also commonly used, so a SPARQS would 
typically roughly correspond to a covered-call position in one, one-half, or one-quarter share of 
the underlying common stock. 
Merrill Lynch’s STRIDES were similar, in that they also offered a high coupon, were 
callable at an increasing schedule of call prices, and roughly corresponded to covered call 
positions in some number of shares of the underlying stocks.  A difference is that the STRIDES 
most often had original times to maturity of approximately two years rather than one and were 
first callable after about one year rather than after about six months.  Other differences include 
the facts that many of the STRIDES were structured to have a principal amount of $25 rather 
than a fraction of the stock price, the final payments of the STRIDES were described in terms of 
a share multiplier based on the value-weighted average price on the pricing date, and the details 
of the determination of the final settlement differed. From the first issue in July of 1998 through 
September of 2008, Merrill Lynch issued 51 different STRIDES, with total proceeds of 
$2,487,704,000. Two of these issues were based on stock indexes rather than individual equities, 
and is not included in our sample.  Thus, our sample includes 49 STRIDES, with total proceeds 
of $2,469,704,000. Combining these with the SPARQS, the sample used in Section 3.3 consists 
of 173 issues with total proceeds of $5,632,524,380. 
Other data used include daily stock returns and other stock price data such as closing 
prices and shares outstanding from the daily price files maintained by the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP).  We use trade and quote data in the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database 
available from the New York Stock exchange to compute the intraday returns and estimate the 
intraday signed order volume that we use in some of our analyses.  Additionally, factor portfolio 
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returns come from Ken French’s website.57  Some of the analysis requires valuation models to 
compute the SEP’s deltas as-of the pricing dates. The necessary terms of the instruments are 
obtained from the pricing supplements.  Appropriate implied volatilities of the underlying stocks 
are from the option prices files from OptionMetrics LLC, while the necessary interest rates 
(LIBOR for various maturities) are downloaded from Bloomberg.  Past ex-dividend dates and 
dividend amounts used to estimate future dividend dates and amounts are from the CRSP daily 
file. 
Panel A of Table 3.1 lists the underlying common stocks that were used as the reference 
stocks for at least three different SPARQS or STRIDES.  Apple was the most common 
underlying stock, with nine SPARQS and two STRIDES issues based on it, followed by Intel 
and Cisco Systems with six and five issues, respectively, of either SPARQS or STRIDES.  The 
other companies listed in Panel A are mostly large-capitalization technology stocks, along with a 
few other well-known companies such as Best Buy, Boeing, and Exxon Mobil. 
Panel B presents the distributions of the SPARQS’ and STRIDES’ underlying stocks 
across NYSE market-capitalization quintiles, and also shows the fraction of the underlying 
stocks falling in the largest-capitalization decile.  Each stock is assigned to a size quintile based 
on cutoffs established by ranking all NYSE stocks by market capitalization at the end of the 
month immediately preceding the SEP issue.  Market capitalization is defined as the product of 
shares outstanding and the closing stock price. 
None of the underlying stocks are in either of the two smallest quintiles, and only 1.16% 
of the issues, specifically one SPARQS and one STRIDES, had underlying stocks in quintile 3.  
Slightly more than 86% of the entire sample of underlying stocks were in the largest quintile, 
with 64.7% in the largest decile.  The STRIDES have a more pronounced tendency to be based 
on large capitalization stocks than does the entire sample. Almost 94% of the STRIDES (46 of 
the total of 49) were based on stocks in the largest quintile, and 75.5% were based on stocks in 
the largest decile. 
Table 3.2 provides some summary information about the SPARQS and STRIDES. The 
median coupon rate was 8% for both varieties of SEP, with mean coupon rates being somewhat 
                                                 
57 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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greater.  As mentioned above, the SPARQS typically had maturities of one year (median = 385 
days) versus two years (median = 731 days) for the STRIDES, though the mean times to 
maturity were somewhat above one year (403 days) and somewhat less than two years (638 
days) for the SPARQS and STRIDES, respectively.  The yields to call were similar, though 
slightly higher for the SPARQS, with a median value of 20% versus 17% for the STRIDES. The 
two kinds of SEPs differed significantly in terms of the issue sizes.  The mean and median 
proceeds for the SPARQS were about $25.5 and $20.2 million, in contrast to mean and median 
proceeds of $50.4 million and $37.5 million for the STRIDES.  However, because the STRIDES 
tended to be based on underlying stocks with significantly larger market capitalizations, the 
ratios of the proceeds of the issues to the market capitalizations of the underlying stocks were 
about the same, with mean (median) values of 0.188% ( 0.096%) and 0.216% (0.085%) for the 
SPARQS and STRIDES, respectively. 
The larger sample used in Section 3.4 consists of nearly the entire universe of publicly 
issued structured equity products issued in the United States and linked to an individual equity.  
The analysis is restricted to publicly issued products because the data come from regulatory 
filings, prospectus pricing supplements.  To collect this broader sample, we first identify all 
issuers of structured equity products in the United States.58  After identifying all SEPs issuers, 
we use a PERL script to collect all 424(b) filings from the SEC’s EDGAR website for each 
issuer.59  We then process each document to identify all SEPs issues and extract issue details 
from filing, including the proceeds amount, the pricing date, and reference stock.  We restrict the 
sample to only those SEPs linked to a publicly traded stock. 
Following the data collection, we check the data by matching each sample to Mergent’s 
FISD database.  Our verification process checks for errors by searching for a match between our 
data and the FISD database for the issuer, pricing date, maturity date, reference asset, and 
proceeds.  If we do not locate a match on those four data items, we search for a three-item match 
based on any three of the four items.  In cases where three item match, we hand-check the fourth 
                                                 
58 Issuers are identified by searching Mergent’s FISD database for issues matching both keywords “Equity” and 
“Link”.  Additionally, we obtain a list of structured products from the website www.quantumonline.com.  
Additionally, we searched the AMEX website for listed SEPs. 
59  The complete list of issuers consists of ABN Amro, Barclays, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citibank, 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Eksportfinans, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), UBS, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. 
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data point.  For all issues without a 3-point match, we hand-check each observation by reading 
the pricing supplement.  Prior to 2005, we hand-check each observation due to the number of 
missing datapoints in the FISD convertible file. 
Table 3.3 presents the number of SEPs issues and total proceeds on an annual basis.  The 
total sample consists of 10,488 issues and roughly $55.4 billion proceeds.  The sample begins in 
1994, the earliest year pricing supplements are available on EDGAR.  The market for publicly 
registered SEPs has grown considerably from 1994 during which there were 5 issues totaling 
$246.8 million proceeds to 2009 when there were 2,044 issues totaling $4.5 billion proceeds.  
Deal flow peaked just prior to the financial crisis with over 3,300 deals during each year 2007 
and 2008.  Proceeds peaked during 2007 at over $11.4 billion.  Many SEPs issues, particularly in 
recent years, are small.  Table 3.3 also presents the number of issued and proceeds for two size 
cutoffs: deals with at least $5 million and $10 million.  During recent years (2007 through 2009), 
deals with proceeds at least $5 million comprise approximately 10% of the sample whereas 
nearly all deals up to 2002 had proceeds greater than $5 million.  Over the full sample, 1,675 
SEPs issues had proceeds of at least $5 million, totalling over $43 billion proceeds.  The sample 
includes 979 SEPs having proceeds of at least $10 million, totalling over $38.7 billion in 
proceeds. 
The design of many SEPs feature barrier options.  An example of such a structure comes 
from Citibank’s Equity LinKed Securities (ELKS).  To illustrate a representative ELKS, we 
consider the ELKS issued by Citigroup on May 24, 2006 with payoffs linked to the price of Intel 
(INTC) stock.  Citibank issued the ELKS for $10 each, raising total proceeds of $63.8 million.  
The ELKS feature a 9% coupon rate and mature after six months on November 30, 2006.  At 
maturity, the ELKS promise to pay the investor the final coupon amount plus the $10 par value.  
If at any time the stock price of Intel “touches” $15.21, meaning the traded price was less than or 
equal to this value, the ELKS mature for 0.55897 shares instead of $10.  The closing price of 
Intel stock on the pricing date was $17.89 per share, thus the down-and-in barrier price 
represents a 17.6% decline from the closing stock price on the pricing date.  It is worth noting 
that the sensitivity of the ELKs value to changes in the stock price at issuance is relatively low, 
implying that the hedge trade is a relatively small fraction of the proceeds. 
92 
 
Table 3.4 details the twenty most frequently used reference stocks in the SEPs sample 
and presents the number of SEPs linked to each stock and the total proceeds of the SEPs.  The 
most frequently referenced stock is Apple Computer, with 337 issues based on it.  SEPs linked to 
Apple Computer total approximately $1.9 billion, roughly 4% of the total sample proceeds.  The 
reference stocks tend to be large capitalization stocks, indicating that the price impacts we 
document occur in the prices of economically important stocks. 
Panel A of Table 3.5 presents the distribution of observations across CRSP size quintiles.  
For the full sample, over 73% of the observations reference stocks in the largest size quintile and 
nearly 55% reference stocks in the largest decile.  Only 5% of the SEPs reference stocks from the 
smallest two market capitalization quintiles.  Among the larger SEPs, those with at least $5 
million proceeds, the size concentration is even more dramatic: over 87% (69%) reference stocks 
in the largest quintile (decile).  Only 1% of these SEPs reference stocks in the smallest two 
market capitalization quintiles.  The pattern is similar for SEPs with proceeds of at least $10 
million. 
Panel B of Table 3.5 presents the industry classifications for the reference stocks 
according to both CRSP and COMPUSTAT SIC classification codes.  Nearly half the sample 
SEPs reference manufacturing firms, many of which are technology firms.  Also prominent are 
stocks from the mining, financial, and services sectors. 
3.3 Price Impact of Hedging Trades for Two Brands of SEPs 
The analysis begins by considering the price impact of the SPARQS and STRIDES, two of the 
most popular brands of SEPs.  By focusing on these two very similar brands, we are able to 
construct model-based estimates of the hedge trade required to establish a delta-neutral position.  
Additionally, we are able to connect the magnitudes of the predicted trade size with the estimated 
intra-day order imbalances. 
Table 3.6 shows the abnormal performance of the  SPARQS’ and STRIDES’ underlying 
stocks during eleven-day windows covering the period from five trading days before to five 
trading days after the pricing dates.  The dates shown are in “event time” relative to the pricing 
dates, i.e. date 0 is the pricing date and date 𝑡 is the date 𝑡 days after (or before, if 𝑡 < 0) the 
pricing date. The first row of results in Panel A shows the average returns of the underlying 
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stocks for the full sample of both SPARQS and STRIDES.  The 𝑡-statistics for tests of the 
hypotheses that the average returns are equal to zero are in parentheses below the average 
returns.  The next two rows present the average market-adjusted returns on the underlying stocks 
and the associated 𝑡-statistics for tests of the hypotheses that the average market-adjusted returns 
are equal to zero.  The market-adjusted returns are relative to the returns on the CRSP value-
weighted index, that is the market-adjusted return for underlying stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀,𝑡, 
where 𝑟𝑀,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day 𝑡. 
For the pricing date the average raw and market-adjusted returns are 103 and 95 basis 
points, respectively, and significantly different from zero, with 𝑡-statistics of 4.94 and 5.16, 
respectively.  The first trading date after the pricing date (event date 1) shows a striking, though 
not complete, reversal: the average raw and market-adjusted returns are -79 and -74 basis points, 
with 𝑡 -statistics of -4.33 and -4.68, respectively.  Returns for none of the other dates are 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels, with the largest 𝑡-statistics for the other 
dates being 1.74. 
The next two rows of Panel A present the numbers of market-adjusted returns that are 
positive and negative on each day in order to confirm that the significant average returns on dates 
0 and 1 are a robust result and not driven by a small number of outliers. On the pricing date the 
ratio of positive to negative market-adjusted returns is 112 to 61, while on the next trade date the 
ratio reverses to become 58 to 115.  The last row of the panel provides the probability that the 
number of positive market-adjusted returns equals or exceeds the number of positive market-
adjusted returns reported in the table under the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive 
return is one half.  Specifically, the probability reported for date 𝑡  is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘 ≥ 𝑥𝑡) =
∑ (𝑛
𝑘
)𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑘𝑛𝑘=𝑥 , where 𝑥𝑡 is the number of positive market-adjusted returns observed on 
day 𝑡, (𝑛
𝑘
)𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑘 is the probability of 𝑘 positive returns out of a total of 𝑛 returns, and 
𝑝 = 0.5 is the probability of a positive return under the null hypothesis. On the pricing date the 
probability under the null of 112 or more positive returns is 0.0001, while on date 1 the 
probability that 58 or more returns are positive is 0.999996.  This latter result implies that the 
probability under the null that 115 or more of the market-adjusted returns are negative is 4 ×
10−6. 
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Panels B and C present the corresponding results for subsamples consisting of the 
SPARQS and the STRIDES, respectively. The results for both subsamples are similar to those 
for the full sample in that they show significantly positive average raw and market-adjusted 
returns on the underlying stocks on the pricing date, and significant, though not complete, 
reversals on the next trade date.  As with the full sample, these results for the average returns are 
confirmed by the non-parametric tests based on counts of positive and negative returns shown in 
the last rows of Panels B and C.  A difference between the two subsamples is that on the pricing 
date the average raw and market-adjusted returns of the SPARQS’ underlying stocks are only 
about one-half as large as those of the STRIDES’ underlying stocks: 79 versus 161 basis points 
for the raw returns of the SPARQS versus those of STRIDES, and 76 versus and 143 basis points 
for the market-adjusted returns.  A second difference is that Panel B provides some evidence that 
the SPARQS have a positive average return on day -1.  For this day the SPARQS’ average 
market-adjusted return is 43 basis points, with a 𝑡-statistic of 2.16.  While the average day -1 raw 
return of 36 basis points has a 𝑡-statistic of only 1.54 and the non-parametric test statistic based 
on the numbers of positive and negative returns has a 𝑝-value of 11.11%, it should be recognized 
that these are less powerful tests. 
Some context for these results is provided by the ratios of the principal amounts of the 
SEP issues to the market capitalizations of the underlying stocks on the pricing date.  The third 
column from the right of Table 3.2 reports that the mean ratios of the SEP proceeds (total 
principal amounts) to the market capitalizations of the underlying stocks as of the close of 
trading on the day before the pricing date are 0.188% and 0.216% for the SPARQS and 
STRIDES, respectively, and the median ratios are 0.096% and 0.085%.  The results thus indicate 
that a SEP’s issue with a total principal amount equal to about 0.1% or 0.2% of the market 
capitalization of the underlying stock causes the underlying stock temporarily to increase in 
value by about one percent. 
There is no immediately obvious explanation for the differences in the pricing date 
average returns of the two varieties of SEP. Table 3.2 reveals that the STRIDES issues tend to be 
larger, with mean and median proceeds of $50.4 and $37.5 million, respectively, in contrast to 
$25.5 and $20.2 million for the SPARQS.  However, the STRIDES’ underlying stocks have 
correspondingly larger market capitalizations, so that the ratios of the proceeds to the market 
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capitalizations of the underlying stocks as of event date -1 are similar.  As indicated above, the 
mean ratios are 0.188% and 0.216% for the SPARQS and STRIDES, respectively, and the 
median ratios are 0.096% and 0.085%.     
The return reversals observed on the day after the pricing date indicate the pricing date 
returns are not due to any information conveyed by the issuances, and strongly suggest that the 
price movement on the pricing date is due to the price impact of the issuers’ hedging trades in the 
underlying stocks. The reversals also indicate that the positive pricing date returns are not due to 
any selection bias in which issues are more likely to be completed on days in which the 
underlying stock price performs well.   Figures 3.1 and 3.2 further explore the price impact of the 
issuers’ hedging trades in the underlying stocks by examining intraday returns and net buying 
volume.  For the SPARQS and STRIDES, respectively, the two figures show the average 
intraday cumulative market-adjusted returns (left scale) and intraday cumulative net buying 
volume (right scale) for the underlying stocks during 5-minute intervals throughout the pricing 
date. We normalize the intra-day order imbalance by shares outstanding.  The market-adjusted 
returns are computed relative to the return on the S&P Depositary Receipts (SPDRs, ticker 
symbol SPY).  For each 5-minute interval, the return on the underlying stock is computed from 
(i) the price of a transaction that has a time stamp that falls within the interval and is at or closest 
to the end of the interval, and (ii) the closing price from the previous day.60  The SPDRs’ returns 
are computed similarly.  Net buying volume is estimated by classifying each trade as either a 
“buy” or “sell”.  First, trades that occur at or above (below) the prevailing ask (bid) price are 
classified as “buy” (“sell”) trades.61  Following the methodology of Lee and Ready (1991), trades 
inside the quotes are classified according to the tick test where trades are classified “buys” if they 
occur on an uptick or zero uptick and “sells” if they occur on a downtick or zero downtick.62  
The net buying volume for each 5-minute interval is the sum of the buy and sell orders that have 
time stamps that fall within the interval, treating a sell as a negative buy, and the cumulative net 
                                                 
60 When the pricing date corresponds to an ex-dividend date, the CRSP distribution amount is added to the intraday 
price when computing intraday returns.  Across the full sample of 173 SEPS, only one SPARQS pricing date 
coincided with an ex-dividend date, but several SEPs pricing dates correspond to ex-dividend dates for the SPDRs. 
61 Following the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, we exclude all trades with special settlement conditions, and the 
prevailing quotes are computed from the most recent eligible quotes five seconds prior to the trade price. 
62 We eliminate all quotes meeting any of the following criteria: negative bid; negative ask; negative depth; negative 
spread; spreads greater than $5; quote modes that are not NBBO eligible. 
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buying volume is the sum of the net buying volume for the current interval and all previous 
intervals, normalized by shares outstanding. 
Figure 3.1 for the SPARQS shows a significant order imbalance during the 5-minute 
interval that includes the open, with average net buy volume of about 100,750 shares (0.45% of 
shares outstanding), along with a large average initial excess return of 30.2 basis points.  
Following the open, average cumulative net buy volume increases at an approximately constant 
rate to a level of about 358,250 shares (0.52% of shares outstanding) at 3:30 p.m., followed by 
average net buying volume of more than 211,800 additional shares (0.40% of shares outstanding) 
from 3:30 to the close of trading. After the initial return of 30.2 basis points the cumulative 
market-adjusted return increases only slightly through most of the day, to 38.3 b.p. at 3:30 p.m., 
and then increases very rapidly to the close of trading.  Thus, average cumulative net buying and 
market-adjusted returns display similar patterns, with the main difference being that larger 
proportions of the cumulative return are realized in the 5-minute interval that included the open 
and after 3:30 p.m.63 
Figure 3.2 for the STRIDES differs from Figure 3.1 in that it does not show a significant 
imbalance of net buys during the 5-minute interval that includes the open; instead, both average 
net buys and the average market-adjusted return are slightly negative during the first 5-minute 
interval.  After the first 5 minutes, both climb steadily throughout the day, and then very rapidly 
toward the end of the day.  The two lines display strikingly similar patterns; in fact, the lines 
showing the cumulative net buys and market-adjusted return are so similar that they actually 
cross each other many times during the day. 
We verify that these order imbalances reflect the issuers’ hedging trades by examining 
the relation between the magnitudes of the hedging trades predicted by valuation models and the 
estimated order imbalances.  To do this, we first compute the deltas of the SPARQS and 
                                                 
63 The average intraday returns as of 4:05 p.m. in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 do not exactly match the average market-
adjusted pricing date returns in Panels B and C of Table 3.6 because the market adjustment in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is 
done using the return on the S&P Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) while the market adjustment in Table 3.6 is done 
using the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. The return on the SPDRs differs from the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index both because the SPDRs do not exactly track the reported S&P, and because the S&P differs 
from the CRSP value-weighted index. In addition, the last exchange trade used to compute the CRSP daily return 
often has a time stamp after 4:05 p.m., and thus differs from the trade used to compute the return in the last time 
interval shown in the figures. This latter fact applies to both the underlying stocks and the SPDRs. 
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STRIDES.  To compute the deltas, we employ the pricing model in Henderson and Pearson 
(2011).  The pricing model assumes that under the risk-neutral probability the stock price follows 
a geometric Brownian motion process with constant drift and volatility.  The value of the SEPs at 
time 𝑡, denoted 𝑉(𝑆, 𝑡) where 𝑆 is the underlying stock price, satisfies the Black-Scholes-Merton 
partial differential equation.  The terminal boundary condition is given by the SEPs value at 
maturity, 𝑉(𝑆, 𝑡) = 𝑅𝑆𝑇 + 𝐶𝑇, and equals the product of the number of shares 𝑅 to which the 
SEP is entitled and 𝑆𝑇, the stock price at maturity, plus the final coupon amount 𝐶𝑇.  The call 
price, which varies of time and is based on a stated internal rate of return, provide the upper 
spatial boundary condition while “clean-up” provisions which result in early redemption at low 
stock prices provide the lower spatial boundary condition.  Volatility estimates are taken from 
the implied volatilities of exchange-traded options with time-to-expiration most closely matching 
the maturity of the SEPs and strike prices most closely matching the stock price at which the 
issuer rationally calls the SEPs.  We compute the delta from the pricing model, and the predicted 
hedge trade size for the 𝑖th SEP is omputed as the product of ∆𝑖 and the number of units of the 
SEP issued. 
The average estimated order imbalances across the full sample of 173 SEPs is 0.092% of 
shares outstanding, which is of similar magnitude, although slightly larger than, the average 
model-predicted hedge trade size of 0.082% of shares outstanding.  Table 3.7 presents the results 
of the regressions of order imbalance on predicted trade size.  The results for the SPARQS are in 
the first two columns, those for the STRIDES are in the middle columns, and those for the 
combined sample of SPARQS and STRIDES are in the last two columns.  For each set of 
products the regress is estimated both with and without a constant.  If the daily order imbalance 
exactly equals the model-predicted hedge trade for every SEP, the estimated coefficient on 
predicted trade size will equal one and the regression will explain all of the variation in order 
imbalance (i.e., 𝑅2 = 1).  We do not expect this exact relationship to hold in the data for several 
reasons.  First, the order imbalances are measured with error because the procedure for signing 
trades using trade and quote data results is imperfect.  Additionally, the hedge trades are only one 
component of order flow and the daily order imbalance will reflect volume from other many 
sources. 
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Referring to the first two columns in Table 3.7, in the SPARQS sample the estimated 
coefficients for model-predicted trade size are 0.6604 and 0.8435 when the regression is 
estimated with and without an intercept, respectively, with highly significant 𝑡-statistics of 5.10 
and 8.05.  The coefficient estimate 0.8435 indicates that for the SPARQS an increase in the 
model-predicted hedging trade size of 0.01% of the shares outstanding results in an increase in 
the estimated daily order imbalance of 0.0084%.  The STRIDES results are similar with 
estimated coefficients of 0.9018 and 0.9579 and 𝑡-statistic of 4.181 and 5.450.  The regressions 
using the full sample are reported in the last columns and have coefficients of 0.7467 and 0.8829 
with 𝑡-statistics of 6.728 and 9.798.  The regression 𝑅2𝑠 range from 0.14 for the SPARQS to 
0.27 for the STRIDES and 0.19 for the combined sample, indicating that variation in the model-
predicted trade size explains a large portion of the variation in the estimated daily order 
imbalance.  In summary, the results reported in Table 3.7 have coefficient estimates reasonably 
close to one, the coefficient estimates are highly significant, and the regression 𝑅2𝑠  are 
reasonably high.  Thus, the results confirm that the estimated order imbalances from the 
transactions-level data on the pricing dates reflect SEPs issuers’ hedging activities. 
3.4 Results for the Full Sample 
We next extend the analysis to investigate the price impact of issuer hedge trades in the full 
sample of all U.S. publicly issued SEPs.  Modeling all of the issues is not realistically feasible 
due to the range of product designs, so in the full sample we use the issue proceeds as a proxy for 
the hedge trade size.  The analysis of the broader sample of literally thousands of issues 
demonstrates that the price impacts are not an isolated phenomenon found only in a limited 
number of issues, but rather that the hedge trades frequently affect the prices of large 
capitalization U.S. common stocks. 
Because the full sample consists of over 10 thousand issues, it includes many instances in 
which there were multiple SEP issues based on the same underlying stock priced on the same 
date.  In these cases, we aggregate the proceeds, i.e. for issues sharing the same underlying stock 
and pricing date we create a single “aggregated” observation with proceeds equal to the sum of 
the issues’ proceeds.  The sample also contains 12 “bearish” SEPs that benefit from decreases in 
the underlying stock price.  In the cases in which “bearish” and “bullish” SEPs based on the 
same underlying stock had the same pricing date, we treat the proceeds of the bearish product as 
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negative when aggregating the proceeds.  In the cases when a “bearish” product was issued 
without a matching “bullish” product, we multiply the underlying stock returns by negative one 
before we include them in the average returns, because the initial hedge trades for the bearish 
products require short-selling the underlying stocks.64 
Panel A of Table 3.8 presents three different measures of the underlying stock average 
returns on and around the pricing dates for the aggregated observations with aggregate proceeds 
of at least $5 million.  The first set of results consists of the average raw returns, and shows a 
price impact of +34 basis points and an associated 𝑡-statistic of 4.31.  Panel A next presents the 
underlying stock returns in excess of the CRSP value-weighted index and the S&P 500 index 
returns.  On the pricing date, the average returns in excess of the CRSP value-weighted and S&P 
500 indexes are +18 and +19 basis points, respectively, and are statistically significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels.  This finding of positive average returns on the pricing 
date is consistent with the earlier findings for the SPARQS and STRIDES. 
The average raw return to the underlying stocks on the next trading date is -16 basis 
points with a 𝑡 -statistic of -2.52.  The average excess returns relative to the CRSP value-
weighted and S&P 500 indexes are -14 and -11 basis points, respectively, with both being 
statistically significant. Thus, the positive returns on the pricing date are mostly reversed on the 
next trading date, also consistent with the findings for the SPARQS and STRIDES.   
Interestingly, the reversals appear to continue on event date +2 on which the average raw and 
excess returns are -13, -13, and -11 basis points, all statistically significant.  For all three 
measures of returns, the sum of the event dates +1 and +2 returns almost exactly offsets or close 
to offsets the positive average returns on the pricing date. 
Panel B of Table 3.8 presents the average returns for the subset of 1,024 aggregated 
issues having proceeds of at least $10 million.  The average proceeds for the observations in 
Panel B is $38.6 million, compared to average proceeds of $24.6 million in the subsample with 
proceeds of at least $5 million for which results were presented in Panel A.  Consistent with the 
larger proceeds and thus larger hedge trades, the price impacts in Panel B are larger in magnitude 
                                                 
64 Due to the aggregation, the number of observations that satisfy the size cutoffs of $5 million and $10 million 
increases.  Thus, the numbers of observations in the subsamples with proceeds greater than or equal to $5 million 
and $10 million reported in Table 3.8 exceed the numbers of issues with proceeds greater than or equal to $5 million 
and $10 million reported in Table 3.3. 
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than those in Panel A.  Specifically, the average raw return on the pricing date is +45 basis points 
with a 𝑡-statistic of 5.05.  The returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted and S&P 500 index 
are +36 and +38 basis points, respectively, and are statistically significant.  The pattern of 
reversals is also present, as the raw returns on event dates 1 and 2 are -24 and -21 basis points, 
respectively, with both being significantly different from zero.  The return reversals are also 
evident in the market-adjusted returns. 
These average returns, while highly significant, are not as large as the corresponding 
average returns for the SPARQS and STRIDES  reported in Table 3.6. There are two possible 
reasons for this.  First, at least some of the differences in the magnitudes of the average returns 
are almost certainly due to differences in the sizes of the required hedge trades.  The average 
proceeds of the observations with proceeds of at least $5 million used in Panel A is about $24.6 
million, which is similar to the average SPARQS proceeds of about $25 million (and smaller 
than the average STRIDES proceeds of about $50 million).  The sample used in this section, 
however, consists predominantly of products that have smaller option elasticities than the 
SPARQS and STRIDES. For example, the most common products in the full sample are barrier 
reverse convertibles, which have exposure to the underlying stock price only if the barrier is 
touched. Thus, the typical issue in the full sample require a smaller hedging trade than an issue 
of SPARQS or STRIDES with the same proceeds. 
Second, the pattern of reversals spread over two days is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the hedging trades for some issues are executed on event date +1 rather than the pricing 
date.65  Issues hedged on date +1 would tend to show a zero return on the pricing date, a positive 
return on event date +1, and a reversal on date +2.  So long as the fraction of issues hedged on 
date +1 is not too large, the overall averages would show negative average returns on both dates 
+1 and +2.  The possibility that not all hedge trades are executed on the pricing date would also 
tend to reduce the pricing date average return, and thus help to explain why the pricing date 
average returns for the full sample are smaller than those for the SPARQS and STRIDES.  
                                                 
65 Examination of the point estimates of the average returns for the SEPs issued by each of the different issuers 
suggests that three issuers (Eksportfinans, JP Morgan, and RBC) may have executed their hedge trades on date +1 
rather than on the pricing date. However, the sample sizes of the individual issuers are not large enough for one to be 
confident in this conclusion. 
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Alternatively, it might simply be the case that it takes the market two days to incorporate the 
information that the purchases on the pricing date were not based on information. 
Regardless, this evidence that the price impacts are found in the sample of all SEP issues 
with proceeds greater than $5 million documents that economically significant price impacts due 
to derivatives hedging trades are a widespread phenomenon. 
3.5 Why are the estimates of price impact so large? 
Obizhaeva (2009) presents estimates of the price impact of set of trades referred to as “portfolio 
transition orders” or “portfolio transitions”.66 She argues that such trades allow for bias-free 
estimation of liquidity and price impact because the quantities to be traded are fixed before trade 
execution.  Thus, there is no feedback effect of prices on trades, i.e. no endogeneity.  In this 
sense the portfolio transitions studied by Obizhaeva (2009) and Obizhaeva (2011) are similar to 
the SEP hedge trades we use, and her estimates of price impact are the estimates in the literature 
that are most comparable to ours. 
Using the parameter estimates in Obizhaeva (2009) and the characteristics of a typical 
SPARQS or STRIDES issue and its underlying stock, the appendix calculates that Obizhaeva’s 
estimates imply that the price impact of the hedge trades for a typical SPARQS or STRIDES 
issue should be about 30 basis points.  In contrast, Table 3.8 shows an average pricing date return 
for the combined sample of SPARQS and STRIDES of about 100 basis points.  The reversal on 
event date +1, which is a conservative measure of the price impact, is about 80 basis points.  
Thus, our estimates of the price impact are between two and three times greater than what one 
might have expected given Obizhaeva’s estimates based on her portfolio transition data. Why are 
our estimates of price impact so much larger? 
                                                 
66 Obizhaeva (2009) describes the portfolio transitions as follows:  
Portfolio transitions are economically significant transactions that involve transfers of funds 
from legacy portfolios to target portfolios. They are initiated by institutional sponsors wishing 
to replace their fund managers, rebalance their asset classes, or accommodate large cash 
inflows and outflows. Institutional sponsors usually delegate portfolio transitions to transition 
managers who become responsible for selling securities from legacy portfolios and buying 
securities from target portfolios. The list of orders to be executed is provided to transition 
managers the night before portfolio transitions begin. 
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The calculations in the appendix are based on Obizhaeva’s estimate that the value of a 
price impact parameter 𝜆 is 3.47 for the group of stocks most comparable to those underlying the 
SPARQS and STRIDES. An initial observation is that the point estimate of 𝜆 = 3.47 is not 
particularly precise, as the upper limit of the 95% confidence band is close to 7.  Similarly, the 
standard errors of our estimates of either about 100 or about 80 basis points are about 21 or 18 
basis points, respectively. Thus, the evidence that our estimates of the price impact differ from 
Obizhaeva’s is not overwhelming.  Also, the 2001--2005 sample period in Obizhaeva (2009) 
includes only 5 of the 9 years in the SEPs sample period, and it is possible that this plays a role 
in the difference in the estimates of the price impact. 
The difference also may be partly due to the fact that Obizhaeva (2009) finds that the 
price impact parameter is increasing in average daily volume, and the average daily volume of 
the SPARQS’ and STRIDES’ underlying stocks is actually greater than the average daily volume 
in Obizhaeva (2009)’s highest volume group “𝑎𝑑𝑣10”. Specifically, the rightmost column in 
Table 1, Panel B of Obizhaeva (2009) shows that the average daily volume for her high-volume 
group “𝑎𝑑𝑣10” is about $200 million.  For the SPARQS’ and STRIDES’ underlying stocks, 
average daily volume computed as the product of the median daily turnover and median market 
capitalization from Table 2 are about $272 and $486 million, respectively. Also, the portfolio 
transitions studied in Obizhaeva (2009) are typically executed over multiple days, in contrast to 
the SEPs’ hedging trades that appear to be executed over only one day, with a large fraction of 
the trading occurring in the 30 minutes prior to the close of trading.  To the extent that high-
volume stocks display resilience one would expect the price impact of the portfolio transitions 
executed over multiple days to be smaller. 
Our finding of price impacts larger than Obizhaeva’s estimates suggest might also be due 
to the fact that the SPARQS and STRIDES issuers do not have incentives to minimize the price 
impacts of the hedging trades. To understand why the issuers do not have such incentives, 
consider the standard interpretation of an equity derivative as equivalent to Δ = 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑆⁄  shares of 
the underlying stock and a position in a money-market account. Suppose that a SEP is priced at 
the close of trading, and, as the results above indicate, the issuer buys shares of the underlying 
stock prior to the close of trading and these hedge trades cause the stock to close at a price of 𝑝∗ 
greater than its fair market value 𝑝.  Given this, an issuer’s sale of a structured equity product is 
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equivalent to selling ∆ shares at the price 𝑝∗ > 𝑝.  If the stock was trading at its fair market value 
of 𝑝 prior to the time when the issuer began putting on the hedge, the average price ?̅? at which 
the issuer acquires the shares is likely to be between 𝑝 and 𝑝∗, and thus less than 𝑝∗.  In fact, the 
price impact of the hedge trades will benefit the issuer to the extent that it causes 𝑝∗ to exceed ?̅?, 
and the issuer has an incentive to trade in a way that will maximize the difference 𝑝∗ − ?̅?.  This 
suggests that the issuer might have an incentive to trade aggressively as the close of trading 
approaches.  While they do not provide conclusive evidence that the issuers do not try to 
minimize the price impact of the hedge trades, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that the SPARQS and 
STRIDES issuers do trade more aggressively as the close approaches. 
However, it is possible that the time pattern on trading in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 can be 
explained by the issuers’ desire to trade off price impact and price risk.  To the extent that an 
issuer executes buys stock early on the pricing date, it is exposed to the risk of changes in the 
underlying stock price because it has part of the hedge in place but has not yet priced and sold 
the SEP.  A desire to limit this risk can possibly explain why issuer’s execute a large fraction of 
the hedge trade close to the end of the pricing date.  Given the data we have, we do not see any 
way to distinguish between the hypotheses that the issuers are or are not executing the hedge 
trades in order to minimize their price impact.  But our evidence either implies that the price 
impact of hedging trades is very large, or else suggests that issuers are successfully impacting the 
prices of large, actively traded common stocks in order to affect the prices at which derivatives 
based on the common stocks are sold. 
In light of these factors, our finding that the hedge trades have much greater price impact 
than Obizhaeva’s estimates would suggest seems reasonable. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper documents that the underlying stocks of a sample of SEP issues experience 
surprisingly large market-adjusted returns on the SEP’s pricing dates.  For the SPARQS’ 
underlying stocks the average pricing date market-adjusted return is 93 basis points, while for the 
STRIDES’ underlying stocks the average market-adjusted return is 143 basis points. There is 
convincing evidence that these returns are due to the price impact of the trades in the underlying 
stocks that the issuers execute in order to hedge their liabilities on the SEPs.  These results 
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demonstrate the existence of an important interaction between the markets for equity derivatives 
and their underlying stocks, in which stock trades placed in order to hedge derivatives positions 
have important impacts on the prices of the underlying stocks.  The existence and importance of 
such interactions is a question that has been of long-standing regulatory and policy interest. 
 These results also have immediate implications for the pricing and valuation of 
derivatives positions based on individual equity prices, e.g. for the bid-offer spread on an equity 
swap or other equity derivative.  The bid-ask spread must be large enough to compensate the 
derivatives market maker for the price impact of the trades in the underlying stock necessary to 
hedge the derivative. The results in this paper provide estimates of the price impact for a sample 
of large-capitalization underlying stocks. 
 Related to this, an issue that arises in the specialist risk management function of large 
financial institutions is how to estimate liquidation values of positions in financial instruments, 
e.g. what is the relation between the quoted market price and the value that can be realized from 
the (perhaps forced) liquidation of a large position (See, e.g. Allen (2003)).  The discount of the 
liquidation value to the quoted price is determined by the price impact of the trades needed to 
liquidate the position, and the results in this paper provide relevant evidence about the magnitude 
of the price impact for common stock positions. 
 An important advantage of the results in the current paper relative to some alternative 
estimates of the price impact of trading volume is that the total number of shares needed to hedge 
a SEP issue is exogenous to the price impact of those trades, i.e. the return on the pricing date 
does not affect the number of shares needed to hedge the SEP issue.67  This is not the case with 
most alternative approaches that involve aggregating signed order flow during say 5 or 30-
minute time intervals and regressing returns over the same intervals on the estimates of signed 
order flow.  To the extent that either market makers set quotes to manage their inventories, 
derivatives traders whose positions have non-zero gammas rebalance their hedges, or the market 
includes some short-term feedback traders, the return over a say 30-minute interval will affect 
                                                 
67 The SEPs in our sample are priced at the close of trading. One result of this is that the SEPs’ deltas are not 
functions of the pricing date returns. It appears that the bulk of the hedging trades are executed prior to the close of 
trading on the pricing date.  To the extent that all are, the number of shares traded is not affected by the pricing date 
returns.  Even if some hedging trades are executed on the next trading day, the total number of shares required to 
hedge will not be importantly affected by the intra-day returns on the next day because the embedded options in the 
SEPs are well out-of-the-money on the pricing dates and their gammas are not large. 
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the signed order flow during the interval. Thus, such alternative approaches are potentially 
affected by an endogeneity bias. 
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3.7 Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1: SPARQS’ Cumulative Intraday Returns and Net Buying Volume 
Average intraday cumulative market-adjusted returns (left scale) and net buying volume (right scale) for 
the SPARQS’ underlying stocks during 5-minute intervals on the pricing date.  The market-adjusted 
returns are computed relative to the return on the S&P Depositary Receipts (SPDRs, ticker symbol SPY).  
For each 5-minute interval, the return on the underlying stock is computed from (i) the price of a 
transaction that has a time stamp that falls within the interval and is at or closest to the end of the interval, 
and (ii) the closing price from the previous day. The SPDRs’ returns are computed similarly. Net buying 
volume is estimated by classifying each trade as either a “buy” or “sell”.  Trades that occur at or above 
(below) the prevailing ask (bid) price are classified as “buy” (“sell”) trades.   Trades inside the quotes are 
classified according to the tick test, in which trades are classified “buys” if they occur on an uptick or zero 
uptick and “sells” if they occur on downticks or zero downticks.  Following the Lee and Ready (1991) 
algorithm, we exclude all trades with special settlement conditions, and the prevailing quotes are 
computed from the most recent eligible quotes five seconds prior to the trade price. The net buying 
volume for each 5-minute interval is the sum of the buy and sell orders that have time stamps that fall 
within the interval, treating a sell as a negative buy, and the cumulative net buying volume is the sum of 
the net buying volume for the current interval and all previous intervals.  Net buying volume is 
normalized by shares outstanding. 
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Figure 3.2: STRIDES’ Cumulative Intraday Returns and Net Buying Volume 
Average intraday cumulative market-adjusted returns (left scale) and intraday cumulative net buying 
volume (right scale) for the STRIDES’ underlying stocks during 5-minute intervals on the pricing date.  
The market-adjusted returns are computed relative to the return on the S&P Depositary Receipts (SPDRs, 
ticker symbol SPY).  For each 5-minute interval, the return on the underlying stock is computed from (i) 
the price of a transaction that has a time stamp that falls within the interval and is at or closest to the end 
of the interval, and (ii) the closing price from the previous day.  Net buying volume is estimated by 
classifying each trade as either a “buy” or “sell”.  The SPDRs’ returns are computed similarly. Net buying 
volume is estimated by classifying each trade as either a “buy” or “sell”.  Trades that occur at or above 
(below) the prevailing ask (bid) price are classified as “buy” (“sell”) trades.   Trades inside the quotes are 
classified according to the tick test, in which trades are classified “buys” if they occur on an uptick or zero 
uptick and “sells” if they occur on downticks or zero downticks.  Following the Lee and Ready (1991) 
algorithm, we exclude all trades with special settlement conditions, and the prevailing quotes are 
computed from the most recent eligible quotes five seconds prior to the trade price. The net buying 
volume for each 5-minute interval is the sum of the buy and sell orders that have time stamps that fall 
within the interval, treating a sell as a negative buy, and the cumulative net buying volume is the sum of 
the net buying volume for the current interval and all previous intervals.  Net buying volume is 
normalized by shares outstanding. 
 
 
  
108 
 
Table 3.1: Underlying Stocks of the SPARQS and STRIDES 
Descriptive statistics for the underlying stocks of the SPARQS and STRIDES.  Panel A lists the 
stocks referenced by at least three SPARQS or STRIDES.  Panel B provides the proportions of 
the underlying stocks that fall into each market-capitalization quintile, and also the largest decile.  
In Panel B, each underlying stock is assigned to a NYSE market capitalization quintile or decile 
based on its market capitalization on the last day of the month immediately preceding the 
structured product pricing date.  Market capitalization is defined as the product of shares 
outstanding and the last price, with both of these taken from the CRSP daily file. 
 
Panel A: Most Frequent Underlying Stocks 
Sample Observations Company Name  
Number 
SPARQS  Number STRIDES 
11  APPLE  9 2 
6  INTEL  4 2 
5  CISCO SYSTEMS  1 4 
4  EMC   2 2 
4  TEXAS INSTRUMENTS  3 1 
4  BEST BUY  2 2 
4  VALERO ENERGY   4 0 
4  YAHOO  3 1 
4  NVIDIA  4 0 
3  CORNING  2 1 
3  QUALCOMM   2 1 
3  DELL COMPUTER  2 1 
3  JUNIPER NETWORKS  3 0 
3  BOEING  1 2 
3  AT&T 3 0 
3  XILINX  2 1 
3  WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL   3 0 
3  MONSANTO  2 1 
3  NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR  3 0 
3  EXXON MOBIL   2 1 
 
Panel B: Size Quintile Distribution of Underlying Stocks 
Structured Product 
Smallest 
Quintile 2 3 4 
Largest 
Quintile 
Largest 
Decile 
SPARQS and STRIDES   0.00% 0.00% 1.16% 12.72% 86.13% 64.74% 
SPARQS               0.00% 0.00% 0.81% 16.13% 82.06% 60.48% 
STRIDES              0.00% 0.00% 2.04% 4.08% 93.88% 75.51% 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of the SPARQS and STRIDES 
Descriptive statistics of the SPARQS and STRIDES.  The sample consists of all SPARQS and STRIDES issues through 2009, with 
the except of one STRIDES based on an index. (The last STRIDES was priced in August 2008 and issued in September 2008, prior to 
Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch.) Issue-level details come from the pricing supplements available from the SEC’s 
EDGAR database.  The table presents the mean, median, maximum, and minimum coupon rates, days to first call, yield-to-call, 
original days to final maturity, and proceeds of the SEPs.  The table also reports the statistics for the ratio of the issue proceeds to the 
market capitalization of the underlying stock, and the market capitalization and turnover of the underlying stock.  Market 
capitalization is defined as the product of the closing stock price and the number of shares outstanding on the date immediately 
preceding the SEP’s pricing date.  The daily turnover is measured as the ratio of the average daily trading volume over the 21 trade 
days immediately preceding the pricing date divided by the shares outstanding as of the day before the pricing date.  The shares 
outstanding, price, and trading volume data come from the CRSP daily file. 
 
Issue Characteristics of the SPARQS and STRIDES 
    
Coupon 
Rate 
Days to 
First Call 
Yield-
to-Call 
Day to 
Maturity 
Proceeds 
($) 
Ratio of Proceeds 
to Market Cap 
Market 
Capitalization 
Daily 
Turnover 
SPARQS: Sample Size = 124                 
Mean    8.88% 211.52 22.48% 402.89 25,506,616 0.19% 45,971,038,200 1.73% 
Median     8.00% 201 20.00% 385 20,227,964 0.10% 23,323,071,490 1.17% 
Maximum    16.00% 368 53.00% 719 136,500,000 1.42% 503,363,863,380 6.38% 
Minimum    6.00% 180 15.00% 364 861,551 0.00% 1,632,424,710 0.38% 
STRIDES: Sample Size = 49 
        Mean    8.13% 318.63 19.31% 638.16 50,402,122 0.22% 68,047,941,066 1.44% 
Median     8.00% 366.5 17.00% 731 37,500,000 0.09% 39,322,451,960 1.19% 
Maximum    12.00% 369 42.00% 1,096.00 163,020,000 1.74% 475,203,728,160 5.68% 
Minimum    5.75% 182 11.00% 365 14,124,000 0.02% 1,440,095,800 0.24% 
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Table 3.3: Annual Issues and Proceeds for Full Sample 
Annual issues and proceeds for the sample of structured equity products (SEPs) based on individual equities.  Sample observations 
come from data extracted from pricing supplements downloaded from the SEC’s EDGAR database.  The sample period covers the 
years 1994 through 2009. 
 
Annual Issues and Proceeds of Publicly Registered SEPs 
 
All Issues Proceeds ≥ $5 million Proceeds ≥ $10 million 
Sample 
Year Number Issues Total Proceeds Number Issues Total Proceeds 
Number 
Issues Total Proceeds 
1994 5 246,862,500.00 5 246,862,500.00 5 246,862,500.00 
1995 1 240,000,000.00 1 240,000,000.00 1 240,000,000.00 
1996 9 1,063,431,536.08 8 1,058,431,552.00 8 1,058,431,552.00 
1997 5 320,732,951.50 4 315,907,951.50 4 315,907,951.50 
1998 21 855,849,206.35 21 855,849,206.35 18 834,497,136.35 
1999 28 1,341,282,106.75 25 1,327,398,848.89 23 1,314,395,440.89 
2000 27 1,163,948,309.92 26 1,160,561,651.92 26 1,160,561,651.92 
2001 78 2,976,960,086.36 76 2,970,426,286.36 73 2,947,426,279.56 
2002 85 2,238,025,325.66 84 2,233,525,325.66 71 2,134,770,203.48 
2003 134 2,876,451,328.72 106 2,805,295,365.88 89 2,685,360,043.40 
2004 262 4,986,846,245.85 160 4,781,587,411.44 107 4,401,970,049.53 
2005 356 5,541,641,152.61 157 5,173,102,774.24 111 4,861,246,293.18 
2006 797 6,320,047,855.72 177 5,297,965,097.50 119 4,909,851,180.69 
2007 3,329 11,412,473,380.82 325 7,194,360,950.83 158 6,119,927,106.80 
2008 3,307 9,252,315,545.48 303 5,185,963,651.86 109 4,011,893,184.35 
2009 2,044 4,540,219,570.67 197 2,289,162,882.89 57 1,469,716,724.11 
TOTAL 10,488 55,377,087,102.49 1,675 43,136,401,457.32 979 38,712,817,297.76 
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Table 3.4: Most Frequent Underlying Stocks, Full Sample 
Descriptive statistics for the stocks referenced by the sample SEPs.  The table provides 
information about the twenty most frequently referenced underlying stocks.  The table includes 
the ticker symbol, company name, number of SEPs issues based on the company's stock, and the 
total SEPs proceeds for all issues based on the reference stock. 
 
Panel A: Most Frequent Underlying Stocks 
Symbol 
Ticker Company Name 
Number 
Observations Total Proceeds 
AAPL APPLE COMPUTER INC.             337 1,912,827,679.56 
GE   GENERAL EECTRIC CO              220 1,876,406,333.67 
GM   GENERAL MOTORS CORP             198 793,236,000.00  
FCX  
FREEPORT MCMORAN COPPER & 
GOLD  186 459,787,127.08  
BTU  PEABODY ENERGY CORP             146 323,680,000.00  
BAC  BANKAMERICA CORP                136 443,204,284.39  
JPM  JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 134 622,133,373.56  
DE   DEERE & CO 131 361,149,290.45  
INTC INTEL CORP                      127 1,393,216,569.75 
VLO  VALERO ENERGY CORP              126 545,427,734.98  
CAT  CATERPILLAR INC                 124 383,199,362.94  
AA   ALCOA INC                       123 729,479,638.08  
WFC  WELLS FARGO & CO 123 404,026,593.06  
RIMM RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD          121 248,966,241.62  
X    US X US STEEL GROUP INC         116 204,325,085.34  
XOM  EXXON MOBIL CORP                109 662,862,584.34  
ACI  ARCH COAL INC                   109 219,154,799.46  
SLB  SCHLUMBERGER LTD                104 353,179,278.59  
COP  CONOCOPHILLIPS                  99 291,320,843.06  
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP                  98 530,536,716.48  
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Table 3.5: Size and Industry Classification for Underlying Stocks 
Descriptive statistics for the underlying stocks of the full sample of SEPs.  Panel A provides the 
percentages of the underlying stocks that fall into each market-capitalization quintile, and also 
the largest decile.  In Panel A, each underlying stock is assigned to a NYSE market capitalization 
quintile or decile based on its market capitalization on the last day of the month immediately 
preceding the SEP pricing date.  Market capitalization is defined as the product of shares 
outstanding and the last price, with both of these taken from the CRSP daily file.  Panel B 
presents the industry classification for each of the underlying stocks based on both the CRSP and 
the COMPUSTAT 2-digit SIC codes.  We map the SIC codes to ten industry portfolios based on 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics classification scheme which is available at 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html.  
 
Panel A: Size quintile distribution of underlying stocks 
Structured Product 
Smallest 
Quintile 2 3 4 
Largest 
Quintile 
Largest 
Decile 
Full Sample                            1.27% 3.51% 6.93% 15.03% 73.26% 54.29% 
All Issues, Proceeds >= $5 
million   0.15% 0.84% 2.95% 8.68% 87.38% 69.59% 
All Issues, Proceeds >= $10 
million  0.16% 0.55% 1.64% 8.72% 88.94% 71.42% 
 
Panel B: Industry classification for underlying stock 
SIC Division Total Proceeds Total Issues 
Classificaiton according to CRSP SIC 
  Agriculture                        1,130,000.00 3 
Mining                             5,148,118,577.56 1560 
Construction                       510,305,302.66 133 
Manufacturing                      29,671,104,575.55 4853 
Utility                            3,869,006,364.47 663 
Wholesale trade                    178,364,435.77 38 
Retail trade                       3,444,707,855.84 725 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 7,524,445,370.00 1615 
Services                           5,024,439,620.64 890 
Nonclassifiable                    5,465,000.00 8 
   Classificaiton according to COMPUSTAT SIC 
  Agriculture                        373,970,337.35 95 
Mining                             4,828,400,575.32 1427 
Construction                       510,184,217.21 141 
Manufacturing                      26,513,946,181.78 4673 
Utility                            5,426,553,086.77 737 
Wholesale trade                    139,059,432.00 24 
Retail trade                       3,606,021,582.85 810 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 7,439,609,933.01 1642 
Services                           4,255,062,293.79 701 
Nonclassifiable                    2,284,279,462.41 238 
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Table 3.6: Average Returns of Underlying Stocks of the SPARQS and STRIDES Around the Pricing Dates 
Average raw and market-adjusted returns of the underlying common stocks on and around the pricing dates of the SPARQS and 
STRIDES. Dates are relative to the pricing dates, e.g. date 0 is the pricing date and date 𝑡 is the date 𝑡 days after (or before, if 𝑡 < 0) 
the pricing date.  Market-adjusted return are computed using the return on the CRSP value-weighted index, that is the market-adjusted 
return for underlying stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀,𝑡, where 𝑟𝑀,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day 𝑡. 
The first row of results in Panel A shows the average returns on the underlying stocks of the full sample of both SPARQS and 
STRIDES from 5 days before to 5 days after the pricing date.  The 𝑡 -statistics for the tests of the hypothesis that the average returns 
are equal to zero are in parentheses below the average returns.  The next two rows present the average market-adjusted returns on the 
underlying stocks and the associated 𝑡 -statistics.  After these the table presents the number of market-adjusted returns that are positive 
and negative on each day.  The last row provides the probability that the number of positive market-adjusted returns equals or exceeds 
the number of positive market-adjusted returns reported in the table under the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive return is 
0.5.  Specifically, the probability reported for day 𝑡 is, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘 ≥ 𝑥𝑡) = ∑ (
𝑛
𝑘
) 𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑘𝑛𝑘=𝑥 , where 𝑥𝑡 is the number of positive 
market-adjusted returns observed on day 𝑡, (
𝑛
𝑘
) 𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑘 is the probability of 𝑘 positive returns out of a total of 𝑛 returns, and  
𝑝 = 0.5 is the probability of a positive return under the null hypothesis. In Panel A the sample size is 𝑛 = 173.  Panels B and C 
present the corresponding results for the subsamples of SPARQS (𝑛𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑄𝑆 = 124$) and STRIDES (𝑛𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑆 = 49), respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Day relative to pricing 
date  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Average return   0.0016  0.0024 0.0034 0.0008  0.0004 0.0103 -0.0079 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0008 0.002 
t-statistic  (0.70)   (1.15)  (-1.66) (-0.37) (0.20)  (-4.94) (-4.33)  (0.15)  (-0.45)  (0.37)   (1.21)  
Average mkt.-adj. return   0.0001  0.0025  0.0029   0.0006  0.0015   0.0095  -0.0074 -0.0012 -0.0021  0.0007  0.0019 
t-statistic   (-0.06)  (-1.38)  (1.74)   (0.32)   (0.86)   (5.16)   (-4.68)   (-0.78)   (-1.23)   (0.37)   (1.47) 
Number mkt.-adj. ret. >0  87  93  88  84  94   112  58   84  81  90  90  
Number mkt.-adj. ret. <0  86  80  85  89  79   61  115  89  92  83  83  
Probability under 𝐻0  0.5000  0.1808  0.4396  0.6758  0.1436  0.0001 1.0000  0.6758  0.8192  0.3242  0.3242 
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Table 3.6 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: SPARQS 
Day relative to pricing 
date  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Average return  0.0018 0.0018 0.0012    0.0004  0.0036  0.0079 -0.0058 0.0009  -0.0016 0.0017  0.0031  
t-statistic  (0.71)   (0.76)  (-0.53) (-0.14) (1.54)  (-3.7)  (-3.01) (0.40)   (-0.71)  (-0.75) (-1.63) 
Average mkt.-adj. return  -0.0002 0.0025  0.0017 0.0003 0.0043 0.0076 -0.0055 -0.0009 -0.0031  0.0014  0.0030  
t-statistic  (-0.09) (-1.24) (-0.87) (-0.13) (-2.16) (-3.9)  (-3.22)  (-0.51)   (-1.45)  (-0.71) (-2.02) 
Number mkt.-adj. rets. >0  63  67  59  63  70  78 44 60  57  64  71  
Number mkt.-adj. rets. <0  61  57  65  61  54  46 80 64  67  60  53  
Probability under 𝐻0  0.4642  0.2095  0.7351  0.4642  0.0889  0.0026 0.9996 0.6732  0.8384   0.3939   0.0633  
 
Panel C: STRIDES 
Day relative to pricing 
date  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Average return  0.0009  0.0039  0.0088  0.0019  -0.0075 0.0161   -0.0131 -0.0014  0.0010  -0.0015 -0.0008 
t-statistic  (0.20)  (-0.9) (2.11)  (-0.55)  (-1.76)  (-3.28)  (-3.17)   (-0.38)  (0.28)   (-0.29)   (-0.26) 
Average market-adjusted 
return   0.0001  0.0023 0.0060  0.0013  -0.0054 0.0143  -0.0119   -0.0018  0.0001   -0.0011 -0.0011 
t-statistic  (-0.02) (-0.62) (-1.86) (0.47)   (-1.49)   (3.41)   (-3.53)  (-0.67)  (0.05)   (-0.26) (-0.45) 
Number mkt.-adj. ret. >0  24  26  29  21  24   34  14   24  24  26  19  
Number mkt.-adj. ret. <0  25  23  20  28  25   15  35   25  25  23  30  
Probability under 𝐻0  0.6123  0.3877  0.1264  0.8736  0.6123   0.0047  0.9993  0.6123  0.6123  0.3877   0.9573  
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Table 3.7: Regressions of Order Imbalance on Predicted Trade Size 
Coefficient estimates and 𝑡-statistics from regressions of the pricing date order imbalances on the 
predicted hedging trade size for the SPARQS and STRIDES.  The dependent variable is the daily 
order imbalance for the underlying stock on the pricing date of each SEP.  For each SEP in the 
sample, on the pricing date all trades are classified as “buys” or “sells” in accord with the method 
of Lee and Ready (1991).  Daily order imbalance is the total daily trading volume of buy orders 
minus sell orders, and that difference is divided by CRSP shares outstanding.  The independent 
variable is the estimated trade size required to fully delta-hedge the SEPs issue computed as the 
valuation model estimate of delta times the number of shares issued, normalized by CRSP shares 
outstanding.  The sample consists of 124 SPARQS and 49 STRIDES, or a total of 173 SEPs. 
 
Coefficient Estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) 
  SPARQS   STRIDES   Full Sample 
Intercept               0.3941           0.1499           0.3141   
                        (-2.325)           (-0.456)           (-2.064) 
 Predicted Trade Size    0.6604 0.8435   0.9018 0.9579   0.7467 0.8829 
                        (-5.096) (-8.05)   (-4.181) (-5.45)   (-6.728) (-9.798) 
𝑅2               0.175 0.139   0.275 0.272   0.21 0.19 
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Table 3.8: Average Returns of Underlying Stocks Around the Pricing Dates (Full Sample) 
Average raw and market-adjusted returns of the underlying common stocks on and around the pricing dates of the SEPs. Dates are 
relative to the pricing dates, e.g. date 0 is the pricing date and date 𝑡 is the date 𝑡 days after (or before, if 𝑡 < 0) the pricing date.  
Excess returns are computed using the return on the CRSP value-weighted index and the S\&P 500 index, that is the excess return for 
underlying stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀,𝑡, where 𝑟𝑀,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index or the S&P 500 index on day 𝑡. 
 
Panel A: Extended Sample, Proceeds ≥ $5 million (1,816 observations) 
Day relative to pricing date  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Raw return  0.0006 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0012 0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0007 
t-statistic  (0.77)  (-1.75) (-0.49)  (-0.40)  (-1.68)  (-4.31)  (-2.52)    (-2.11)   (-0.83)   (-0.10)     (-1.03)   
Excess return (CRSP Value 
Weighted)  0.0003 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0002 
t-statistic  (-0.49) (-1.22) (-0.2)  (-1.24)   (-1.23)  (-2.92)  (-2.69)    (-2.40)   (-1.60)   (-0.91)     (-0.44)   
Excess return (S&P 500) 0.0005 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0001 
t-statistic  (-0.8) (-1.53) (-0.56)  (-1.05)   (-1.12)  (-3.11)  (-2.13)    (-2.04)   (-1.20)   (-0.73)     (-0.13)   
 
Panel B: Extended Sample, Proceeds ≥ $10 million (1,024 observations) 
Day relative to pricing date  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Raw return  0.0004 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0045 -0.0024 -0.0021 0.001 0.0008 0.0011 
t-statistic  (-0.46) (-1.42) (-1.61)  (-0.90)  (-0.13) (-5.05)  (-2.97)   (-2.80)  (-1.3) (-0.89) (-1.45) 
Excess return (CRSP Value 
Weighted)  0.0003 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0036 -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 
t-statistic  (-0.37) (-0.83) (-0.92)  (-1.30)   (-0.08)  (-4.67)  (-3.15)   (-3.17)  (-0.63) (-0.88) (-0.9) 
Excess return (S&P 500) 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0009 0 0.0038 -0.002 -0.0019 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 
t-statistic  (-0.58) (-0.98) (-1.21)  (-1.10)   (-0.02)  (-4.86)  (-2.84)   (-2.92)  (-0.87) (-1.11) (-1.1) 
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Appendix A: Comparison to Obizhaeva’s Price Impact Estimates 
Section 3.5 discusses the difference between our estimates of price impact for the SPARQS and 
STRIDES and what one would expect given the estimates in Obizhaeva (2009).  This appendix 
explains how we computed the SPARQS and STRIDES price impact that one would expect 
based on Obizhaeva (2009). 
In Obizhaeva (2009) the proportional price impact per unit of standard deviation for the 
𝑖th stock is given by (see Obizhaeva (2009) Equation (1)) 
𝑑𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑡,𝑖×𝜎𝑟,𝑖
= ?̃? × (𝐼𝐵𝑆,𝑖 ×
𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖
) + 𝑑?̃?𝑡,𝑖,       (1) 
where 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 is the standard deviation of daily returns of the 𝑖th stock, ?̃? is the price impact 
parameter, 𝐼𝐵𝑆,𝑖 is the trade direction indicator taking the value 1 for buy orders and -1 for sell 
orders, 𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖 is the size of the trade in the 𝑖th stock, measured as the number of shares, 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖 is 
the average daily volume in the 𝑖th stock, also measured in shares, and 𝑑?̃?𝑡,𝑖 models the random 
arrival of new public information.  Note that in equation (1) the trade 𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖 is scaled by average 
daily volume, so that the right-hand side variable 𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖⁄  is the trade measured as the 
fraction of shares outstanding.  For her overall sample combining buy and sell orders in both 
NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ-listed stocks Obizhaeva (2009) estimates ?̃? to be 0.30.  For the 
subsamples of buy (sell) orders in the NYSE/AMEX-listed stocks she estimates ?̃? to be 0.85 
(0.32), while for buy (sell) orders in NASDAQ-listed stocks she estimates the parameter to be 
0.85 (0.23). 
Perhaps surprisingly, Obizhaeva (2009) finds that the price impact is generally larger for 
stocks with higher trading volume.68  She also finds that for the overall sample the price impact 
of buys is greater than that of sells.  Specifically, she estimates the parameter ?̃? from both buys 
and sells for 10 different groups of stocks, determined by thresholds equal to the 30th, 50th, 60th, 
70th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of average daily volume for NYSE-listed 
common stocks. Her largest group (volume above the 95th percentile) seems to be the one that 
                                                 
68 She offers the plausible explanation that buy orders amounting to say 1% of volume are not unusual for a lower-
volume stock, but are unusual for a high-volume stock in which there is ordinarily a large flow of both buy and sell 
orders. Thus, a buy order of 1% of daily volume in a high-volume stock carries more information. 
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best matches the underlying stocks of the SPARQS and STRIDES.  For this group, the estimates 
of ?̃?  obtained from buy orders in NYSE/AMEX-listed stocks is 3.47. 69  We compare the 
estimated price impact using Obizhaeva’s estimate of ?̃? = 3.47  based on buy orders to our 
estimates because the issuers must buy the underlying stocks to hedge the SPARQS and 
STRIDES. 
To do this, we combine Obizhaeva’s estimate of ?̃? = 3.47 with the characteristics of the 
underlying stocks of the SPARQS and STRIDES in order to see what price impact is implied by 
her estimate of ?̃? = 3.47. Disregarding the random component 𝑑?̃?𝑡,𝑖, for buy orders 𝐼𝐵𝑆,𝑖 = 1 and 
equation (1) can be rewritten as 
𝑑𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑡,𝑖
= ?̃? × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 ×
𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖
.         (2) 
Our summary statistics for the SPARQS and STRIDES in Table 3.2 indicate that the 
median ratios of the proceeds to the market capitalizations of the underlying stocks are 0.096% 
and 0.085% for the SPARQS and STRIDES, respectively.  Multiplying by the typical elasticity 
of 0.4, the ratios of the dollar amount of required hedging trade to market capitalization are 0.4 ×
0.096% = 0.0384%  and 0.4 × 0.085% = 0.0340% , respectively.  Letting 𝑀𝑖  denote the 
number of outstanding shares for the 𝑖 th underlying stock, in our sample the ratio 
(𝑃𝑖 × 𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖) (𝑃𝑖 × 𝑀𝑖)⁄ = 𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖 𝑀𝑖⁄  is typically roughly 0.0384% or 0.0340% for the SPARQS 
and STRIDES, respectively.  Table 3.2 also reveals that the median values of daily turnover, 
defined as 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖 𝑀𝑖⁄ , are 1.17% and 1.19% for the SPARQS and STRIDES, respectively.  The 
price impact is then estimated as 
𝑑𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑡,𝑖
= ?̃? × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 ×
𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖
          (3) 
= ?̃? × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 ×
𝑑𝑋𝑡,𝑖
𝑀𝑖
×
𝑀𝑖
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖
         (4) 
                                                 
69 See the estimates of ?̃? for various sets of orders for the group “𝑎𝑑𝑣10” toward the top of Table 3 on p. 34 of the 
March 22, 2009 version of Obizhaeva (2009).  The estimate based on buy orders in NASDAQ-listed stocks is 0.98, 
and is an exception to the general pattern that the estimated price impact is larger for stocks with higher trading 
volume.  However, the price impact parameter for high-volume NASDAQ-listed stocks is estimated imprecisely, 
with a 95% confidence interval that appears to extend out to about 6 (see Figure 3, Panel A, the third graph in the 
row). 
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= 3.47 × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 × 0.0384% ×
1
1.17%
       (5) 
= 0.114 × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖         (6) 
For the SPARQS and 
𝑑𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝑃𝑡,𝑖
= 3.47 × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 × 0.0340% ×
1
1.17%
        (7) 
= 0.101 × 𝜎𝑟,𝑖         (8) 
for the STRIDES, respectively. If 𝜎𝑟,𝑖 ≈ 0.03  then these imply price impacts of 
somewhat above 30 basis points. A slightly lower value of 𝜎𝑟,𝑖, which seems more reasonable, 
would imply a price impact of about 30 basis points.  In contrast, Table 3.8 shows an average 
pricing date return for the combined sample of SPARQS and STRIDES of about 100 basis 
points.  The reversal on event date +1, which is a conservative measure of the price impact, is 
about 80 basis points. 
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